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1 Abstract 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) vision proposes many revolutionary 
operational concepts, such as surface trajectory-based operations (STBO) and technologies, including 
display of traffic information and movements, airport moving maps (AMM), and proactive alerts of 
runway incursions and surface traffic conflicts, to deliver an overall increase in system capacity and 
safety.  A piloted simulation study was conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Langley Research Center to evaluate the ability of a flight crew to conduct safe and efficient 
airport surface operations while utilizing an AMM.  Position accuracy of traffic was varied, and the effect 
of traffic position accuracy on airport conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) capability was measured.  
Another goal was to evaluate the crew’s ability to safely conduct STBO by assessing the impact of 
providing traffic intent information, CD&R system capability, and the display of STBO guidance to the 
flight crew on both head-down and head-up displays (HUD).  Nominal scenarios and off-nominal conflict 
scenarios were conducted using 12 airline crews operating in a simulated Memphis International Airport 
terminal environment.  The data suggest that all traffic should be shown on the airport moving map, 
whether qualified or unqualified, and conflict detection and resolution technologies provide significant 
safety benefits.  Despite the presence of traffic information on the map, collisions or near-collisions still 
occurred; when indications or alerts were generated in these same scenarios, the incidents were averted.  
During the STBO testing, the flight crews met their required time-of-arrival at route end within 10 
seconds on 98 percent of the trials, well within the acceptable performance bounds of 15 seconds.  Traffic 
intent information was found to be useful in determining the intent of conflicting traffic, with graphical 
presentation preferred.  The CD&R system was only minimally effective during STBO because the 
prevailing visibility was sufficient for visual detection of conflicting traffic.  Overall, the pilots indicated 
STBO increased general situation awareness but also negatively impacted workload, reduced the ability to 
watch for other traffic, and increased head-down time. 
2 Introduction 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) vision transforms the air transportation 
system to meet the projected growth in aircraft operations expected in the 2025 time-frame (1.4 to 3 times 
current levels [JPDO, 2010]) in a safe, efficient, and reliable manner.  NextGen is envisioned to remove 
many constraints of the current air transportation system, support a wider range of operations, and deliver 
an overall increase in system capacity and safety.  Emerging NextGen operational concepts [JPDO, 
2010], such as trajectory-based airborne and surface operations, equivalent visual operations, and high-
density arrival and departure operations, represent a revolutionary approach to air traffic management; as 
a result, a dramatic shift in the tasks, roles, and responsibilities for the flight deck are required to ensure a 
safe, sustainable air transportation system.  A net-centric infrastructure is envisioned, enabling a safe and 
efficient airport surface environment by providing the information necessary to improve flight deck and 
ground vehicle situation awareness through display of ground traffic, airport moving maps (AMM), and 
proactive alerts of runway incursions and surface traffic conflicts. 
Surface Trajectory-Based Operations (STBO) is a NextGen operational concept aimed at improving 
the efficiency and safety of surface operations at high-density airports.  Surface movement management 
tools will utilize improved surveillance, environmental and operational conditions, and other information 
to sequence aircraft for departure, issue conflict-free time-based taxi routes, monitor taxi conformance, 
and revise taxi plans as necessary.  The optimized three-dimensional (lateral, longitudinal, and time) taxi 
routes are intended to be transmitted through data communication protocols and displayed to the flight 
crew on a flight deck surface movement display.  Although STBO is intended to eliminate surface traffic 
conflicts, on-board conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) systems will provide an additional 
protective safety layer for NextGen operations in the event that tactical or strategic situation awareness is 
not sufficient or when human errors or blunders occur. 
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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has developed a CD&R concept that 
leverages advances in flight deck displays and technologies to promote enhanced surface and airborne 
traffic awareness with associated flight deck alerting concepts for safety assurance. These concepts 
employ continual ownship and traffic data monitoring and algorithms to detect potential conflicts on the 
runway and during taxi operations for aircraft and surface vehicles. NASA has also conducted initial 
research on ground-based CD&R for air traffic control (ATC) STBO decision support tools [Cheng et al., 
2011a; Cheng et al., 2011b; and Montoya et al, 2013] and the integration of ground- and flight deck-based 
CD&R for STBO [Cheng et al., 2012]. 
A high-fidelity full-motion piloted simulation experiment was conducted as a two part study to 
evaluate flight deck concepts.  The objectives of Part 1 were to evaluate the ability of a flight crew to 
conduct safe and efficient airport surface operations while utilizing an AMM.  Horizontal position 
accuracy of the traffic was varied, and the effect of traffic position accuracy on CD&R capability was 
measured.  The evaluation included approach, departure, and runway incursion scenarios and two AMM 
conditions.  The objectives of Part 2 were to evaluate the crew’s ability to safely conduct STBO by 
assessing the impact of providing traffic intent information, flight deck-based CD&R system capability, 
and the display of STBO guidance to the flight crew on both head-down and head-up displays (HUD).  
Evaluations were conducted during STBO taxi operations from the ramp to the departure runway utilizing 
two AMM conditions, a HUD or no HUD, and airport traffic with various levels of horizontal position 
accuracy.  This paper describes the experimental systems, method, and quantitative and qualitative 
results. 
3 Background 
Research and technologies relevant to the current simulation study are discussed below.  These 
relevant technologies are airport moving maps, STBO, and surface CD&R. 
3.1 Airport Moving Maps 
The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (cooperative government-industry initiative) recommended 
the use of AMMs as a highly effective safety enhancement to reduce the risk of runway incursions.  A 
detailed analysis of surface accident and mitigation strategies concluded that flight deck AMMs are 
essential to the prevention of surface accidents and incidents [Boucek, 2002].  Research has supported the 
conclusion that situation awareness is substantially enhanced by the presence of an electronic display that, 
as a minimum, depicts ownship position.  For example, research found that 17% of low-visibility and 
night taxi trials resulted in navigation errors that were mitigated by the use of AMMs [Hooey and Foyle, 
2006].  The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended the adoption of AMM 
displays [NTSB, 2007] and they are standard equipage on most new commercial transport aircraft.  
Although AMMs may be displayed on forward flight deck displays, the most common location is on 
EFBs. 
According to the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA's) Advisory Circular (AC) 120-76A [FAA, 
2014a], an EFB is an electronic display system intended primarily for cockpit/flight deck or cabin use.  
EFB devices can be subdivided into three different classes [FAA, 2014a]: 
•  Class 1 EFB:  Portable commercial-off-the-shelf computer system used for aircraft operations, 
such as flight crew laptops, which are not inter-connected with ship systems and do not require 
certification; 
•  Class 2 EFB:  Portable and typically commercial-off-the-shelf-based systems connected to the 
aircraft during normal operations which do require minimal certification (e.g., power supply); 
and 
•  Class 3 EFB:  Fully installed equipment that requires formal certification. 
The FAA specifies requirements for the approval of the AMM function [FAA, 2003 and RTCA, 
2003a].  Originally, AMM applications showing ownship position were limited to Class 3 EFB devices 
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but, in 2007, the FAA reversed course and certified Class 2 EFBs to depict ownship location on the 
airport surface [FAA, 2007a].  As a consequence, electronic AMMs for surface operations can vary 
significantly in the level of detail (e.g., airport surface information elements depicted) and functionality 
available. 
The simplest AMM may consist of ownship position superimposed on a geo-referenced electronic 
airport diagram.  The airport attributes depicted will be identical to what is presented on a paper chart.  
This map may be non-interactive; functionality, if any, will be limited, e.g., zooming may be available, 
but more complicated features such as de-cluttering may not be available. 
More complex AMM displays are constructed from a database that contains positional data describing 
the location of airport attributes.  The database information is collected through a detailed survey that 
maps the location of these attributes.  AMMs constructed from a database vary in the detail with which 
the airport is depicted and in the functionality available.  Common display elements depicted include 
ownship position, runways, runway labels, taxiways, taxiway labels, non-movement areas, and buildings.  
Common functions include zooming, displaying traffic, and de-cluttering.  Features such as surface 
navigation guidance with the display of a taxi route and auto-zoom are currently not certifiable [FAA, 
2007a] and AMMs are limited to display of ownship position. 
Although the FAA has included the use of traffic displays for surface operations in the mid-term 
NextGen vision, the depiction of surface traffic on the AMM is not currently allowed.  However, RTCA 
DO-289 [RTCA, 2003b] specifies the requirements for positional accuracies (described below) required 
for depiction of ownship and traffic position for Aircraft Surveillance Applications.  The document 
specifies the requirements for traffic display elements that include, at a minimum: AMM database, 
ownship and traffic symbols, positioning information, heading, and traffic status (e.g., airborne).  Also, 
RTCA DO-322 [RTCA, 2010a] provides the minimum operational, safety, and performance requirements 
(SPR) for the implementation of enhanced Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness for Surface Operations 
(ATSA-SURF). 
The Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp) describes the accuracy of positional 
information.  NACp values range from 0 to 11 [RTCA, 2002].  The NACp categories of 8 and higher are 
listed in Table 1 with their associated horizontal Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU) values, since only 
NACp values of 8 and higher were used for this study.  Both DO-289 and DO-322 define the minimum 
requirement for horizontal position accuracy for depiction of ground traffic on an AMM to be at least 30 
m within 95% containment bounds, equivalent to NACp 9.   
Table 1.  NACp Horizontal Accuracy Bound. 
NACp 95% Horizontal Accuracy – Estimated 
Position Uncertainty (EPU) 
8 EPU < 92.6 m (0.05 nm, 305.6 ft) 
9 EPU < 30 m (99 ft) 
10 EPU < 10 m (33 ft) 
11 EPU < 3 m (9.9 ft) 
 
The FAA has issued an Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Final Rule to 
support ATC service [FAA, 2010] which includes performance standards.  The rule states that EPU of the 
reported position must be less than 0.05 nm, which is equivalent to NACp 8.  This positional surveillance 
accuracy is not sufficient to support the depiction of traffic information on an AMM display, per DO-322, 
although possible risk mitigation strategies have been proposed (e.g., RTCA DO-322, Appendix D) 
[RTCA, 2010a] that may increase the traffic position reporting for otherwise unqualified traffic (e.g., 
NACp < 9) through, for example, the comparison of traffic position with runway and taxiway location; 
ground sensor positional data; known ionospheric status; use of multilateration, Traffic Information 
Service – Broadcast (TIS-B), Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)/Satellite-based Augmentation 
System (SBAS), and Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)/Ground Based Augmentation System 
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(GBAS); and dual-frequency Global Positioning System (GPS).  RTCA DO-338 [RTCA, 2012] provides 
an excellent overview of these mitigations for qualification of ADS-B Out rule compliance (NACp = 8) 
targets for surface surveillance.  Ownship horizontal dilution of precision, requalification of surface 
features, and multilateration were identified as the best candidates based on cost and implementation 
timeframe and since LAAS and dual-frequency GPS are considered unlikely to be fielded. 
Despite concerns regarding the use of the ADS-B Out with NACp 8 accuracy to enable successful 
and safe surface surveillance, major aircraft manufacturers (i.e., Boeing and Airbus) have announced 
intentions to use traffic displays beyond the presentation of ownship only information to yield the 
theorized benefits that should accrue with greater situation awareness of low altitude (i.e., below 1000 
feet (ft) above ground level) and surface traffic.  Boeing’s approach includes added features on “crew 
awareness of taxi route, airport traffic, runway status, and runway traffic conflicts” in the 2011 – 2018+ 
timeframe [Clark and Trampus, 2011].  Airbus Onboard Airport Navigation System (OANS) technology 
brochure describes functions including, “moving map capability with A/C position overlay”, significant 
“interactivity” features (e.g., search functions), and integration with other Airbus surface safety 
technologies including, “Brake to Vacate”, “Runway Proximity Advisory”, datalink loading of ATC 
path/clearances, ADS-B traffic display, and “threat detection information” [Airbus, 2015]. 
3.2 Surface Trajectory-Based Operations 
Delays due to surface congestion, such as aircraft waiting to cross active runways, are often cited as 
being responsible for the largest delay costs in the U.S. airspace system [Glass and Gawdiak, 1997; 
Williams et al., 2006].  Surface congestion delays may result from various causes but often are due to 
limited resources, such as available runways and taxiways.  Airport capacity is typically measured in 
terms of runway throughput for arrival and departure operations.  Often, controllers attempt to maximize 
runway capacity through queuing strategies that line up multiple aircraft at a departure runway end to 
minimize departure slot losses.  Similarly, controllers apply arrival strategies that minimize runway 
occupancy and runway crossing times.  The FAA Airport Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance [FAA, 1999] 
captured the delay costs associated with inefficient surface operations and identified that movement area 
delays are due predominately to departure and runway crossing queuing.  Movement area delays can be 
increased due to lack of push-back time prediction and timing uncertainties for taxi operations, such as 
speed control, clearance and hand-off, and hazard avoidance (e.g., stop-and-go for avoidance of ground 
vehicles).  Weather and airport expansion have exacerbated the issue because of delays caused by gate 
access, de-icing operations, and longer taxi times from new runways.  Predictions of decreased intervals 
between arriving and departing traffic because of proposed technologies in the NextGen system will allow 
more aircraft per unit time in the terminal maneuvering area (e.g., Prevot et al., 2012).  A logical 
prescription to the issues identified above would be to better effectively control surface operations to 
emulate the timing precision witnessed in airborne operations (i.e., required/controlled time-of-arrival).  
The STBO concept has been proposed to effectively achieve time-based precision surface movements to 
optimize the available airport surface and maximize the number of aircraft that could safely conduct gate-
to-departure and arrival-to-gate operations [JPDO, 2011].  Mid-term [FAA, 2009a and RTCA, 2011] and 
far-term [Hooey et al., 2014] STBO concepts have been proposed. 
The FAA established the STBO to conduct research on airport time-based surface operations.  To 
achieve the goals of the project, it was observed that changes in procedures would be required, as well as 
advances in automation aids and collaboration between the flight deck and controllers.  For example, 
local data exchange [Brinton and Atkins, 2008] may be required to share flight readiness information and 
collaborative decision-making between airline coordinators (Airline Operation Centers); flight dispatch; 
tower controllers; and flight crews (including between aircraft) that would enable the precise pre-planned 
runway schedules and coordination necessary to ensure safe and efficient movements.  Advantages 
include reduced engine operation and environmental impacts, less surface taxi time, more efficient 
routings, and avoidance of surface congestion, particularly during peak times. Through ground-based 
communication, navigation and surveillance, and STBO automation aids, the sequence of aircraft 
  
5 
movements can be more tightly controlled.  However, to fully realize the benefits, flight deck 
technological aids are also expected to be needed.  An example is the use of digital taxi clearances 
[Baxley et al., 2010] that may facilitate needed taxi conformance monitoring [Diffenderfer and Morgan, 
2011] and mitigation of potential runway/taxiway incursions and other hazards (e.g., taxi to wrong 
runway) that have been predicted with the potential future increase in number of movements on limited 
available concrete [Funk et al., 2008].  The use of STBO is likely to fundamentally change the roles and 
responsibilities of controllers and flight crews [Verma et al., 2007] and how aircraft taxi compared to 
current surface operations.   
Surface traffic management systems for Air Traffic Control (ATC) are an enabling technology for 
STBO.  These systems are primarily designed to support airport configuration management, runway 
assignment, scheduling and sequencing, taxi routing, and conformance monitoring.  Extensive work has 
been conducted to define the concept of use for these technologies [Ashley et al., 2011; Diffenderfer and 
Morgan, 2010; and Morgan, 2010] and human-in-the-loop testing has been reported [McGarry and Kerns, 
2010; Stelzer, 2010; Stelzer and Stanley, 2011; and Stelzer et al, 2011].  The Spot and Runway Departure 
Advisor is a surface management system developed by NASA that aids tower controllers in maintaining 
efficient airport surface operations by providing specific optimized timing and sequencing information for 
each departing aircraft (metering at spots, runway departure point, and active runway crossing 
intersections).  Use of this advisor will result in reduced taxi times, departure queues, runway crossing 
wait times, fuel burn, and environmental emissions [Hoang et al., 2014; Hoang et al., 2011; Jung et al., 
2011; and Jung et al., 2010]. 
A key component of the NextGen STBO vision is the generation of conflict-free time-based taxi 
clearances to enable precise departure times and limited simultaneous runway occupancy [JPDO, 2010b].  
These taxi route clearances will likely be sent directly to the flight deck [Diffenderfer and Morgan, 2010].  
STBO flight deck research has focused primarily on information display requirements for presentation of 
automated STBO taxi clearances to the crew and the ability of the crew to comply with the STBO 
clearances [Williams et al., 2006; Foyle et al., 2009; Prinzel et al., 2009; Shelton et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 
2009; and Foyle et al., 2011].  For STBO to be successful, it was concluded that an advanced flight deck 
display would be needed [Foyle et al., 2009; Bakowski et al., 2011; and Foyle et al., 2011].  Advances in 
flight deck avionics and displays have great potential to provide graphical depiction of the taxi route, 
including waypoints, hold-short points, and target time and speed indicators [Cheng et al., 2008; Shelton 
et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2006].  To prevent excessive head-down time, STBO guidance may need to 
be shown on a HUD or head-worn display [Bakowski et al., 2011; Shelton et al., 2009; and Foyle et al., 
2011]. 
The move toward STBO surface operations has significant implications for surface safety and pushes 
the need for CD&R capability beyond the current runway incursion focus to include all surface 
operations.  Although the safety impact of following STBO taxi clearances has not been determined, non-
conformance to these clearances could result in unintentional taxi conflicts.  In these instances, taxi 
CD&R capability becomes critical.  Initial research has been conducted on ground-based CD&R for ATC 
STBO decision support [Cheng et al., 2011a; Cheng et al., 2011b; and Montoya et al, 2013] and on the 
integration of ground-based and flight deck-based CD&R for STBO [Cheng et al., 2012]. 
3.3 Surface CD&R 
The worst aviation accident on record resulted in 583 fatalities and was caused by a runway incursion 
when two fully loaded 747 airplanes operating in low visibility collided on a runway at Tenerife airport in 
1977.  Airport surface safety, including runway incursion prevention, is a serious concern of the NTSB 
[NTSB, 2012], FAA, and NASA.  The FAA is committed to reducing the severity, number, and rate of 
runway incursions by implementing a combination of guidance, education, outreach, training, technology, 
infrastructure, and risk identification and mitigation initiatives [FAA, 2011].  Progress has been made in 
reducing the number of serious incursions, from a high of 67 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 to 6 in FY 2010; 
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however, that number is again on the rise with 18 serious incursions in FY 2012.  The rate of all 
incursions has risen steadily over recent years – from a rate of 12.3 incursions per million operations in 
FY 2005 to a rate of 22.7 incursions per million operations in FY 2012 [FAA, 2011; FAA, 2007b; FAA, 
2009b; and FAA 2012].  Without proactive counter-measures, the increase in air traffic forecast under 
NextGen could potentially result in corresponding increases in runway incursion accidents. 
Numerous efforts have been launched by the FAA, industry, and others to reduce the frequency of 
runway incursions and the risk of runway collisions to meet the recommendations put forth by the NTSB 
[NTSB, 2000].  These solutions include EFB with AMM, Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X 
(ASDE-X), Low Cost Ground Surveillance, Airport Movement Area Safety System; Final Approach 
Runway Occupancy Signal; Runway Status Lights; enhanced controller training; airport surface 
operations advisory circulars; improved airport signs, markings, and lighting; improved pilot education, 
training, and awareness; and revised pilot/controller communications phraseology.  These efforts target 
improved awareness and enhanced surveillance. 
Currently, no system is available (either ground or aircraft-based) that directly provides the flight 
deck with alerts of potential runway conflicts with other traffic.  However, some flight deck-based 
situation awareness systems exist, including: 
•   An aircraft-based SmartRunway/Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) was developed 
by Honeywell International Inc. [Honeywell, 2013].  RAAS uses GPS position data and a database 
to provide aural and graphical advisories that supplement flight crew awareness of ownship 
position during ground operations and on approach to landing.  RAAS does not, however, provide 
alerts of runway incursion conflicts with other traffic. 
• SafeRoute™, developed by Aviation Communication & Surveillance Systems, an L3 
Communications and Thales Company, provides the pilot with an electronic map of the airport 
surface on an electronic flight bag, showing ownship and other aircraft positions.  The system will 
also indicate when a runway is occupied by highlighting the runway on the display [ACSS, 2014].  
SafeRoute™ does not, however, detect and alert for conflicts between aircraft and vehicles. 
NASA- and FAA-sponsored research has also been conducted by Honeywell Aerospace and SAAB 
Sensis Corp. to transmit ASDE-X runway incursion alerts (optimized for ATC) to the flight deck 
[Hughes, 2007].  Additional research is needed to determine both the effectiveness of providing the ATC-
optimized ASDE-X alerts to the flight crew and the data link requirements. 
Working cooperatively with NASA, Era Corporation, a SRA International, Inc. subsidiary, developed 
a CD&R system, known as PathProx™, that detects potential runway conflicts and generates alerts for 
display to the flight crew [Cassell et al., 2003].  PathProx™ does not include the cockpit display device 
and is not commercially available at this time. 
A CD&R concept was developed by NASA to address airport surface safety in commercial, business, 
and general aviation sectors [Jones et al., 2001; Jones, 2002; Jones, 2005; Jones and Prinzel, 2006; Jones 
et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2012a, and Jones et al., 2012b].  The concept utilizes flight 
deck displays and technologies for enhanced surface and airborne traffic awareness with flight deck 
alerting concepts for safety assurance during approach, landing, and surface (runway and taxiway) 
operations. 
The Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts 
(SURF IA) application has been established by RTCA to reduce the likelihood and severity of runway 
incursions and collisions.  A SURF IA SPR [RTCA, 2010b] has been developed to increase flight crew 
situation awareness of the runway environment and facilitate an appropriate and timely response to 
potential conflict situations.  As part of this effort, the FAA sponsored flight demonstrations, conducted 
by Aviation Communication and Surveillance Systems [ACSS, 2010] and Honeywell [Honeywell, 2010], 
to show the feasibility of implementing this technology.  NASA research was integrated into this effort. 
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4 System Description 
This section describes the experimental hardware and simulation elements used for this study, 
including the simulation facility, flight deck displays, air traffic control simulation, CD&R system, and 
surveillance data. 
4.1 Simulation Environment 
This research was conducted in the Research Flight Deck (RFD) simulator at NASA Langley 
Research Center (Figure 1) which is a high-fidelity, six degrees-of-freedom motion-based (Figure 2) large 
commercial aircraft simulator with full-mission capability and advanced glass flight deck displays.  
Operations were conducted at the Memphis International (KMEM) airport.  The out-the-window (OTW) 
scene included realistic taxiways and runways with appropriate markings, airport lighting, and other 
aircraft in simulated visibility conditions and provided approximately 20/40 visual acuity with a 
collimated 200 degree horizontal by 40 degree vertical field of view at 26 pixels per degree resolution.  
All standard audio call-outs were issued. 
The RFD is equipped with dual 46 degree horizontal x 34.5 degree vertical field-of-view commercial 
HUDs with 1400 x 1050 display resolution and greater than 4,000 foot lamberts display brightness; 
however, only the HUD located on the left or captain’s side was utilized. 
As shown in Figure 1, the simulator had four large main instrument panel displays referred to as: (left 
to right) pilot’s Primary Flight Display (PFD), pilot’s Navigation Display (ND), co-pilot’s ND, and co-
pilot’s PFD.  Each display panel had a 13.25 inch x 10.5 inch viewable area at 1280 x 1024 resolution. 
Two EFBs were installed.  Each provided a display resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels over a 10.4 inch 
diagonal area.  The EFBs were mounted outboard of the PFDs and were used as the flight crew’s interface 
for the AMM, charts, checklists, and ATC data-link communications.  The EFBs were located within the 
pilot’s primary field-of-view as per the FAA AC 25-11A [FAA, 2007c]. 
 
 
Figure 1.  RFD Simulator Cockpit Configuration and Displays. 
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Figure 2.  RFD Simulator on Motion Platform. 
4.2 Flight Deck Displays 
The PFD, ND, and HUD formats mimicked current state-of-the-art production aircraft.  Additions 
were made to accommodate study objectives. 
4.2.1 Primary Flight Display 
The PFD included an ATC message area on the outboard portion of the panel showing incoming and 
outgoing ATC data-link communications in textual format, when required by test conditions (Figure 3).  
Incoming messages were color-coded green while outgoing messages were white.  All messages were 
time-stamped. 
 
Figure 3.  Captain’s Primary Flight Display. 
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4.2.2 Navigation Display 
The ND was split, showing a half-screen navigational display and half-screen Engine Indication and 
Caution Alerting System (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Captain’s Navigation Display. 
4.2.3 Head-Up Display 
The HUD was only used during taxi operations when test conditions required.  Standard on-ground 
HUD symbology was used in declutter mode (Figure 5).  Note that ground speed was displayed in the 
lower left. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Head-Up Display Symbology.  
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4.2.4 Electronic Flight Bag Display 
The EFB was used for communications, charts, checklists, and AMM.  Test subjects interacted with 
the EFB through either a bezel button or touch screen interface.  The main menu selections are shown in 
Figure 6. 
The communications function (comm) was used to display and respond to ATC data-link messages 
(Figure 7).  An incoming ATC message was displayed in green on the EFB and also on the PFD.  Once 
the message was acknowledged, the message color changed to white on the EFB and an 
acknowledgement message (e.g., ‘WILCO’) was displayed on the PFD. 
The charts function provided the ability to display arrival, approach, departure, and airport charts 
(Figure 8).  Pan/zoom (full page, half of the diagram, one fourth of the diagram) capability was provided.  
The checklists function provided the capability to display all aircraft checklists.  The checklists 
available were Taxi, Before Takeoff, After Takeoff, Cruise, Descent, Before Landing, After Landing, and 
Parking.  The evaluation pilots were requested to use these checklists during operations. 
The AMM (moving map) was only displayed on the EFB.  Range control for the AMM was 
selectable at 0.4 nautical miles (nm), 0.8 nm, 1.6 nm, or 3.2 nm and was selected through a knob on the 
center isle stand.  The basic AMM display (Figure 9) included an airport layout showing runways, 
taxiways, and buildings.  Surface (tan) and airborne (cyan) traffic icons were shown along with ownship 
position (white chevron).  The AMM used a KMEM airport geographic database developed to RTCA 
standards [RTCA, 2001].  In this document, all figures of the AMM are shown without the surrounding 
EFB bezel button structure.  Specific AMM configurations used for the study are provided in the Test 
Method section below. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Main Menu Page on EFB.  
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   Figure 7.  ATC Communications Page on EFB.          Figure 8.  Airport Diagram Shown on EFB. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Basic Airport Moving Map Display. 
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4.3 Air Traffic Control Simulation 
ATC instructions and other aircraft requests and replies were simulated via a speech generation 
system to increase the fidelity of the simulation and provide normal pilot workload demands.  The 
messages were played through the intercom or through the flight deck speaker system when the ownship 
and simulated traffic reached specified locations or timings to coincide with the scenario task.  The 
subject pilots were asked to provide radio replies as per normal operating procedures.  Human back-up 
was present if additional or unscripted communication or clarification was necessary. 
4.4 Conflict Detection and Resolution 
A CD&R system was active during the testing.  This system was developed based on SURF IA 
specifications [RTCA, 2010b] and NASA CD&R research.  SURF IA specifications were used to develop 
the runway conflict detection portion of the CD&R system used for this testing. 
4.4.1 SURF IA 
SURF IA identifies potential runway conflicts that involve aircraft or vehicles in the airport 
maneuvering area, within 3 nm of the runway threshold and up to 1,000 ft above field elevation (AFE), 
and generates both indications and alerts for display to the flight crew.  SURF IA utilizes traffic 
surveillance information obtained from ADS-B-In and generates indications and alerts based on the 
aircraft/vehicle states during same runway, very closely spaced parallel runway, and intersecting runway 
operating configurations.  Six types of aircraft operational states are defined:  (1) taxiing on a taxiway 
toward a hold line or stopped at a hold line; (2) entering or crossing a runway (not lined up with runway); 
(3) takeoff; (4) approach; (5) after landing roll-out on runway (e.g., less than or equal to 40 knots (kts)); 
and (6) stopped or taxiing along a runway.  To prevent inappropriate crew responses during departure, 
indications and alerts are inhibited above 80 kts ground speed (GS).  The SURF IA application does not 
currently address taxiway or low altitude air-to-air conflicts, directive alerting, and is not intended for use 
on helicopters or vehicles. 
4.4.2 NASA CD&R Research 
NASA CD&R research has included development of algorithms to identify potential traffic conflicts 
at low altitudes near the airport, on the runway, and during taxi operations for multiple classes of aircraft 
and surface vehicles [Otero et al, 2013].  Since SURF IA does not currently include specifications for taxi 
conflicts, NASA research specific to taxi conflict detection was used to develop the taxi conflict detection 
portion of the CD&R system used for this testing. 
The NASA taxi conflict monitor was designed to detect and alert for ground taxi conflicts in the 
airport movement area by computing distances between the ownship and traffic, closing speeds, time to 
closest point of approach and other parameters to determine if criteria and thresholds are met for issuing 
alerts.  Indications are not currently generated for taxi conflict situations. 
4.4.3 Indications and Alerts 
Indications and alerts (IAs) notify the flight crew of potentially hazardous situations.  Criteria for 
issuing IAs are defined in [RTCA, 2010b and Otero et al, 2013]]. 
Indications were intended to generate pilot awareness and situation assessment by highlighting the 
runway and traffic status as relevant to ownship operations.  Indications identified operational conditions 
that were generally normal, yet relevant for runway safety and could be a precursor to a non-normal 
situation.  Only visual annunciations were required and used for indications.  Indications were only issued 
for runway conflict situations.  Two types of indications were utilized. 
A traffic indication (TI) highlighted a potential runway traffic collision/hazard that could emerge in 
the immediate future.  TIs were intended to increase the flight crews’ awareness of the relevant runway 
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traffic.  The flight crew could proceed with the intended operation after a brief assessment of the situation 
and if appropriately cleared.  A TI was displayed on the AMM (Figure 10) as an enlarged traffic symbol 
for the relevant traffic surrounded by a dashed circle in the same color as the traffic symbol and an 
identification tag that showed flight identification and ground speed in knots.  A status message 
(“Traffic”) was displayed at the bottom of the surface map along with the estimated distance to the traffic 
in nautical miles until below 0.1 nm (600 ft), then displayed in feet. 
A runway status indication (RSI) identified whether the runway that the ownship was approaching or 
using was in-use or occupied by other traffic and was not suitable for entering, takeoff, or landing.  
Before proceeding, the crew should ensure they had the appropriate clearance and the indicated traffic 
was not a factor.  An RSI was displayed on the AMM (Figure 11) in the same manner as a TI with the 
addition of a solid blue line outlining the relevant runway. 
 
 
                   Figure 10.  Traffic Indication.                        Figure 11.  Runway Status Indication. 
Alerts identified potential collision hazards which require immediate flight crew awareness and may 
require timely action or response to avoid a collision.  Alerts had priority over indications.  Auditory and 
visual annunciations were required for alerts.  Alerts were issued for both runway and taxi conflict 
situations.  A two-level alerting scheme was utilized. 
Caution alerts were generated for conditions that required immediate flight crew awareness and 
subsequent flight crew response.  A caution alert was displayed on the AMM (Figure 12) as an enlarged 
yellow traffic symbol surrounded by a yellow circle for the relevant traffic, an identification tag that 
showed flight identification and ground speed in knots, and a yellow line around the relevant runway, if 
applicable.  An alert message (“Caution, Traffic”) was displayed at the bottom of the surface map in 
yellow text along with the estimated distance to the traffic.  An audible annunciation was also made 
(“Caution, Traffic, Caution, Traffic”). 
Warning alerts were issued for conditions that required immediate flight crew awareness and 
immediate flight crew response.  Warning alerts could occur without preceding caution alerts.  A warning 
alert was displayed in the same manner on the AMM as a caution alert, except the warning was associated 
with the color red, a square was used to surround the traffic symbol, and the alert message was “Warning, 
Traffic” (Figure 13). 
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An off-scale traffic symbol was pegged on the edge of the display in the direction of traffic if the 
traffic was outside of the AMM viewing area when an IA was generated (Figure 14). 
 
 
                     Figure 12.  Caution Alert.                                         Figure 13.  Warning Alert. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Off-Scale Traffic Symbol Displayed During Runway Status Indication. 
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4.5 Surveillance Data 
The quality and accuracy of reported traffic surveillance data are critical to the integrity of the AMM 
traffic displays and the CD&R capability.  The traffic position accuracy was simulated as dependent upon 
the GPS measurement errors.  A Gauss-Markov process modeled the time correlation between successive 
position measurement errors [Mohleji and Wang, 2010].  It was assumed that ADS-B would be used as 
the means for transmitting (ADS-B Out) and receiving (ADS-B In) these GPS-based aircraft surveillance 
data.  Although ADS-B transmission qualities and effects were not modeled for this study, the traffic 
positional data was updated at one hertz to simulate ADS-B transmission rates.  Latency effects, 
transmission line-of-sight, bandwidth blockage, and vertical position accuracy were not modeled since the 
focus of the study was evaluating the effects of position accuracy (NACp). 
The SURF IA SPR has proposed horizontal position accuracy requirements [RTCA, 2010b] for the 
SURF IA function.  Through analysis, the SPR identified that to meet safety requirements, horizontal 
position accuracy when on the airport surface needs to be at least 10 m within 95% containment bounds 
(NACp 10) to allow indications and alerts to be issued for traffic at virtually all airports in the National 
Airspace System. 
The NACp position accuracy requirements specified in the ADS-B Out Final Rule (see Background 
section), ATSA-SURF requirements for display of traffic on an AMM (see Background section), and 
SURF IA requirements for issuing IAs are shown in Table 2.  To span these accuracy requirements, 
traffic position accuracy equivalent to NACp 8, 9, 10, and 11 levels were used for this study.  Truth data, 
with no accuracy errors, was also recorded.  The accuracy levels (e.g. NACp 8, NACp 9, etc.) were 
controlled for individual traffic.  For each test trial, every aircraft was assigned a position accuracy level.  
This NACp assignment remained consistent for each crew; however, there was some variability in 
position accuracy since the values could fluctuate within the NACp horizontal accuracy bound (Table 1).  
Traffic transmitting horizontal position accuracy equivalent to NACp 8 definitions was considered 
unqualified traffic.  Traffic transmitting position accuracy equivalent to NACp 9 and higher was 
considered qualified traffic (qualified for the ATSA-SURF function). 
Table 2.  NACp Accuracy Requirements. 
NACp ADS-B Out Final Rule Display Per DO-322 
(ATSA-SURF) 
IAs Per DO-323 
(SURF IA) 
8 Yes No No 
9 Yes Yes No 
10 Yes Yes Yes 
11 Yes Yes Yes 
5 Test Method 
The testing was conducted in two phases, Part 1 and Part 2, as described below. 
5.1 Evaluation Pilots 
Twenty-four commercial pilots from four airlines served as participants for the research.  The test 
subjects were paired by airline and role (Captain, First Officer) to ensure crew coordination and cohesion 
with regard to terminal and surface standard operational procedures.  All pilots held an Airline Transport 
Pilot rating.  The Captains had an average of over 17,000 flight hours with 25 years of commercial 
experience.  The First Officers had an average of over 13,000 flight hours with 20 years of commercial 
experience. 
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5.2 Part 1 Testing 
The objectives of the Part 1 testing were to evaluate the ability of a subject crew to conduct safe and 
efficient airport surface operations while utilizing an AMM.  The AMM displayed traffic of various 
position accuracies, which also affected traffic density on the AMM.  The effect of traffic position 
accuracy on CD&R capability was also measured.  The evaluation included approach, departure, and 
runway incursion scenarios and two AMM conditions.  Part 1 testing was conducted prior to Part 2 
testing. 
5.2.1 Part 1 AMM Display Conditions 
Two AMM display conditions were chosen to evaluate the effects of displaying only qualified traffic 
on an AMM (Map A condition) versus displaying all airport traffic on an AMM (Map B condition). 
The Map A condition consisted of the basic AMM format displaying qualified traffic only (traffic 
reporting a horizontal position accuracy of NACp 9 and higher) (Figure 15).  As a result, the locations of 
some of the airport traffic (those reporting horizontal position accuracy of NACp 8) were not displayed.  
The only method of acquiring the NACp 8 reporting traffic was visually, OTW. 
The Map B condition consisted of the basic AMM format displaying both qualified and unqualified 
traffic (traffic reporting a horizontal position accuracy of NACp 8) (Figure 16); therefore, all airport 
traffic was displayed on the AMM.  As position accuracy decreased, the location of traffic symbols could 
vary from the traffic’s actual location.  For example, the traffic symbol for an aircraft transmitting a 
position accuracy of NACp 8 could be displayed 305 ft or more (see Table 1) from the aircraft’s actual 
location, giving a potentially misleading indication of the traffic’s location. 
The traffic position accuracy (NACp level) was not indicated to the crew through methods such as 
different AMM icon shapes or colors to limit the number of evaluation parameters. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Map A Display Condition.                        Figure 16.  Map B Display Condition. 
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5.2.2 Part 1 Test Matrix 
A total of ten trials (eight nominal, two off-nominal) were experienced by each crew.  All trials were 
conducted in daytime 1,800 ft visibility.  ATC clearances were provided verbally via the voice generation 
system; data-link was not used.  The HUD was not utilized.  The full test matrix is shown in Appendix A. 
Nominal trials evaluated the effect of displaying traffic transmitting various position accuracies on 
the AMM during airport surface operations.  Traffic was transmitting position accuracy ranges from 
NACp 8 to NACp 11.  Two AMM conditions (Map A and Map B) were evaluated across subjects during 
two approach and two departure scenarios (Appendix B), for a total of eight nominal trials.  There were 
12 to 14 non-conflicting traffic aircraft per nominal trial, with three to five of those aircraft transmitting 
NACp 8 accuracy (not visible on Map A) 
For the approach scenarios, the ownship was initialized in landing configuration approximately 5 nm 
from the runway threshold (normal position of the final approach fix) for a standard auto-land approach.  
After landing and roll-out, the aircraft was to exit the runway and taxi to the ramp via the designated taxi 
route.  The trial terminated when the aircraft entered the ramp area.  For the departure scenarios, the 
subject crew began taxi from the ramp, taxied to the departure runway via the designated taxi route, and 
executed a takeoff after receiving the appropriate clearance.  The trial terminated once the aircraft reached 
approximately 1,000 ft AFE.  The pilots were requested to maintain a standard taxi speed of 15 kts 
whenever feasible for both the approach and departure scenarios. 
Off-nominal trials were conducted between subjects to evaluate the potential safety implications of 
traffic position accuracy on airport surface CD&R capability.  Each crew completed two off-nominal 
trials as Test Runs 6 and 10 of ten trials.  There were 12 or 13 non-conflicting traffic aircraft per off-
nominal trial, with two of those aircraft transmitting NACp 8 accuracy (not visible on Map A). 
For six of the crews, the objective was to evaluate the impact of displaying qualified versus 
unqualified traffic on the AMM during conflict situations.  These crews were given a taxi crossing and 
departure conflict scenario (see below for description), using either Map A or B display condition (Table 
3).  The conflict traffic was transmitting NACp 8 position accuracy for all these trials; therefore, IAs were 
not issued.  When using Map A, the conflict traffic was not displayed on the AMM and could only be 
seen OTW.  When using Map B, the conflict traffic was displayed on the AMM, albeit with NACp of 8 
accuracy, and could also be seen OTW. 
For the other six crews, the objective of the off-nominal trials was to evaluate the impact of receiving 
versus not receiving IAs for traffic displayed on the AMM during conflict situations.  These crews were 
given a taxi crossing and departure conflict scenario using the Map A display condition.  The conflict 
traffic was transmitting either NACp 9 or NACp 10 position accuracy (Table 4) and, therefore, was 
always displayed on the AMM.  Per SURF-IA specifications, IAs were not issued for traffic transmitting 
NACp 9 position accuracy, but were issued for traffic transmitting NACp 10 position accuracy. 
Table 3.  Part 1 Off-Nominal Group 1 Test Conditions. 
Crew Scenario Map Condition Conflict Traffic Accuracy 
1, 5, 9 Taxi Crossing A 8 
Departure B 8 
3, 7, 11 Taxi Crossing B 8 
Departure A 8 
Table 4.  Part 1 Off-Nominal Group 2 Test Conditions. 
Crew Scenario Map Condition Conflict Traffic Accuracy 
2, 6, 10 Taxi Crossing A 9 
Departure A 10 
4, 8, 12 Taxi Crossing A 10 
Departure A 9 
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5.2.3 Part 1 Conflict Scenarios 
Two conflict scenarios were utilized.  Every effort was made to produce similar timings; however, a 
certain amount of variability was naturally introduced due to the maneuvering conducted by the pilot 
(e.g., taxi speed). 
5.2.3.1 Taxi Crossing Conflict Scenario 
An approach and departure flow was simulated.  Traffic approached Runway 36C (three aircraft) 
(Figure 17, green route) and Runway 36L (three aircraft) (Figure 17, orange route), spaced 5 nm apart and 
staggered between runways.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied to the terminal via the 
routes shown in Figure 17.  There was a departure flow (four aircraft) using Runway 36R via the blue 
colored route shown in Figure 17.  The traffic held at Runway 36C until after an aircraft landed, then 
crossed to Runway 36R for departure approximately every three minutes.  One aircraft would cross 
Runway 36C after every other arrival, for a rate of one departure for every two arrivals.  Three other static 
aircraft were placed in the ramp area to add interest to the scenario. 
At the beginning of this scenario, the ownship was parked on the ramp near Taxiway M6 facing 
Taxiway N.  The flight crew was cleared to taxi to Runway 36C via Taxiways N, P, S, and R (Figure 17, 
magenta route), holding short of Runway 36C.  As the ownship approached the Runway 36C hold line, an 
aircraft was landing on the runway.  The subject crew was cleared to cross Runway 36C when the landing 
traffic was approximately 8,000 ft away. 
This scenario tested the incursion situation where an aircraft taxis across a runway even though 
another aircraft is landing on the same runway.  In this case, the subject crew was given an erroneous 
clearance to cross the runway, resulting in a potential collision unless action was taken. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Part 1 Conflict Scenario,         Figure 18.  Part 1 Conflict Scenario, 
Taxi Crossing.                                              Departure. 
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5.2.3.2 Departure Conflict Scenario 
A southern approach and departure flow was simulated.  Traffic approached Runway 18R (three 
aircraft) (Figure 18, orange route) and Runway 18L (four aircraft) (Figure 18, blue route), spaced 5 nm 
apart and staggered between runways.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied to the terminal 
via the routes shown in Figure 18.  There was a departure flow (three aircraft) using Runway 18C via the 
magenta colored route shown in Figure 18.  The traffic would depart approximately every three minutes, 
for a rate of one departure for every two arrivals. 
One aircraft taxied from the ramp via the green route shown in Figure 18 and held short of Runway 
18C at Taxiway D.  This aircraft was intended to be a distraction for the subject crew.  Two other static 
aircraft were placed in strategic locations (Runway 18C hold lines) to add interest to the scenario. 
At the beginning of this scenario, the ownship was parked on the ramp facing Taxiway J.  The flight 
crew was cleared to taxi to Runway 18C via Taxiways J, K, C, and C8 (Figure 18, magenta route), 
holding short of Runway 18C.  As the ownship was cleared and taxied onto the runway, another aircraft 
taxied from the ramp (Figure 18, yellow route) and held short of Runway 18C at Taxiway L.  As the 
ownship began its departure roll, the aircraft holding on Taxiway L crossed the runway in front of the 
ownship.  Taxiway L is 4,500 ft from the Runway 18C threshold, providing enough time for the departure 
aircraft to stop if necessary. 
This scenario tested the incursion situation where an aircraft taxis across a runway in front of a 
departing aircraft.  The traffic for this scenario, instead of holding short, taxied across Runway 18C 
without clearance as the ownship began its departure. 
5.2.4 Part 1 Procedure 
Prior to the testing phase, each test subject participated in a briefing and simulator training session.  
The training included general simulator characteristics and specific items and procedures related to Part 1 
testing, such as Map Conditions A and B, traffic position accuracy, and CD&R capability. 
During the training for the CD&R capability, the flight crews were trained to abort if a warning alert 
was generated during departure, go-around if a warning alert was generated on approach, and stop if a 
warning alert was generated during taxi.  They were not required to take evasive action when an 
indication or caution alert was issued. 
Before each trial, the flight crew was briefed on the run conditions, e.g., approach or departure, 
visibility, winds, display condition in use, and ATC radio frequencies.  The case order list is shown in 
Appendix C. 
The test runs were documented via audio, video, and digital data recordings, and post-run and post-
test questionnaires (see Appendices G, H, and J). 
5.3 Part 2 Testing 
The objectives of the Part 2 testing were to evaluate the ability to safely conduct STBO by assessing 
the impact of providing traffic intent information, CD&R system capability, and the display of STBO 
guidance to the flight crew on both head-down and head-up displays.  Evaluations were conducted during 
STBO taxi operations from the ramp to the departure runway utilizing two HUD conditions and two 
AMM conditions with airport traffic transmitting various levels of horizontal position accuracy. 
5.3.1 STBO Guidance Algorithm 
For all ownship routes, a nominal taxi trajectory was created and stored in a tabular data file. The 
trajectory was built using ownship’s performance and loading and a nominal acceleration and 
deceleration at the start, end, and around turns to create a planned distance, time, and speed taxi profile. 
Since the operation was conducted in relatively low visibility (1,800 ft), the profile assumed 15 kts in 
straight taxi segments and 5 kts through 90 degree turns.  This speed profile was based upon a general 
consensus of standard operating procedures, including the aircraft flight manual for the Boeing 757 
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aircraft, operating in relatively low visibility conditions.  The designed trajectories were built by a Subject 
Matter Expert (SME).  The trajectories were also checked and adjusted for reasonableness using two other 
check-pilots with Boeing 757 operational air carrier experience.  This becomes relevant in the evaluation 
data described in the results section, which suggest that these nominal trajectory profiles were not 
universally accepted.  The speeds, especially in the turns, were felt to be too slow.  These data highlight 
that there exists extremely significant Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) differences between operators 
and air carriers during surface operations; how these differences can be accommodated in surface STBO 
will be a design and operational challenge. 
The trajectories included ownship position (latitude, longitude, and altitude for the aircraft center-of-
gravity (CG)), ground speed and heading, elapsed time along the route, and required time-of-arrivals 
(RTAs) at the final waypoint and at intermediate waypoints. 
The starting point for the departure routes was an existing Geographical Position Marker (GPM) or 
“spot” just at the boundary of the maneuvering/non-maneuvering area.  A two minute delay was assumed 
between initiation of the ‘clock’ and when taxi along the route was to begin based on adherence to the 
taxi clearance.  The two minute delay was used as contingency to make sure the crews were ready to taxi 
(i.e., the route was understood, briefed, and all pre-taxi checklists completed). 
Intermediate waypoints were selected from existing GPMs along the straight segments of the taxi 
route.  Typically two were used.  The intermediate waypoints were not identified to the pilots.  The 
intermediate waypoints were primarily to improve the stability of the speed guidance in the surface STBO 
control law and also to try to create a more uniform speed trajectory profile along the entire route. 
The final RTA was also at a GPM but not at the runway hold point.  Previous testing [Foyle et al., 
2011] has suggested that using a holding position as the RTA location can be problematic: (a) it can 
adversely influence or present conflicts for the pilots between meeting RTAs and braking procedures and 
adversely affect passenger comfort; and, (b) an aircraft may not be able to meet an RTA because the 
holding spot may already be occupied.  For this test, the GPM at the RTA was not occupied by other 
traffic. 
The final STBO guidance law was a very simple algorithm.  More elaborate methods were tried in 
computing the speed commands and control laws and estimated times of arrival (ETAs), but in the end, 
the simple method was preferred for stability of guidance information, ease of implementation, and 
reductions in pilot workload - all without an observable loss in meeting RTA performance. 
Ownship position was used for comparison against the stored planned data to find the planned 
trajectory information.  From this, the ETA to the intermediate and final waypoint was calculated as: 
 
ETA = (RTAplanned – Timeplanned) + ElapsedTime; 
 
where ElapsedTime was the time (sec) from the start of the run; Timeplanned was the planned elapsed 
time to this point along the trajectory (sec); and, RTAplanned was the planned RTA to either the final or 
intermediate waypoint, whichever was relevant. 
STBO speed guidance – the “advised speed” – was computed using a feedback control law: 
 
Vadvised = (Kv_i*dTime_i + Kv_final*dTime_final + Vplanned) 
 
where Vadvised was the advised speed displayed to the pilot.  This speed was simply the planned speed 
at the current ownship position (Vplanned) with adjustment to that speed based upon the difference between 
the RTA and the ETA (i.e., RTA-ETA) at the intermediate (dTime_i) and final (dTime_final) waypoints.  
The gains, Kv_final and Kv_i , were equal to 0.25 fps/sec.  The value for the gains was developed in 
simulation using SMEs.  The advised speed was limited to maximum and minimum values: 30 kts and 10 
kts, respectively, on straight segments and 10 kts and 4 kts in turns and was displayed to the flight crew in 
2 knot increments. 
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The principal advantages to this method were that it relied significantly on the planned speed; yet it 
also reflected current ETA considerations at both the intermediate and final RTA points; it was quite 
stable since alternative methods using distance remaining can have stability and singularity concerns; and 
finally, it informed the pilot rather than guided the pilot.  The gains based on the arrival time difference 
(i.e., RTA-ETA) effectively doubled in the last segment since, as noted in the equation above, the last ith 
segment (dTimei) was identical to and used the final arrival time difference (dTimefinal). Flight crews could 
easily modulate taxi speed to meet their RTAs and this control law did not require continual monitoring - 
this method provided subtle advisory information.   
The crew was instructed that the advised GS (displayed in green at top left of AMM) was to be used 
as a reference for reaching the RTA point (green diamond near end of route) at the RTA (displayed in 
green at bottom of AMM display) and it was not required that they track the advised GS precisely. 
Acceptable performance was met if the time-of-arrival at the RTA end point was within +/- 15 seconds of 
the RTA (based on previous research [Foyle et al., 2011].  The ETA and seconds early or late was 
displayed at the bottom of the AMM in white to give the flight crew additional information on how well 
they were progressing along the route.  If the crew were more than 15 seconds early or late, the words 
‘EARLY’ or ‘LATE’ would also be displayed at the bottom of the AMM. 
5.3.2 Part 2 Research Displays 
Symbology was added to the basic AMM format and to the HUD to enable the flight crew to 
efficiently and safely conduct STBO taxi operations.  Two AMM and two HUD display conditions were 
evaluated as described below. 
The Map C condition consisted of a basic AMM format and added the display of textual STBO 
guidance information (advised GS, RTA, ETA, and seconds early or late), selected traffic information 
(call sign, aircraft type, bearing, heading, range from ownship, ground speed, and cleared taxi route), and 
the ownship cleared taxi route as a magenta line (Figure 19).   
 
 
Figure 19.  Map C Display Condition. 
The crew had the capability to obtain selected traffic information (aircraft identification; bearing, 
heading, and range from ownship; ground speed; and cleared taxi route) by touching the traffic icon 
symbol on the AMM.  The selected traffic information was displayed in white in the upper right corner of 
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the AMM.  By reading the traffic’s cleared taxi route, the crew could figure out route conflicts with the 
ownship’s cleared taxi route.  For this study, the cleared taxi route was only available for traffic that could 
potentially conflict with ownship. 
The Map D condition was created by the addition of graphical ownship and traffic intent and 
graphical traffic route (tan) (Figure 20). 
Graphical intent information was displayed for both the ownship and selected traffic using solid and 
open circles.  The solid traffic intent symbol gave an indication of where the aircraft should be positioned 
in 30 seconds to achieve the RTA according to the planned trajectory.  The open trend symbol gave an 
indication of the position of the aircraft in 30 seconds based upon the current aircraft status (position and 
time).  When the trend symbol surrounded the intent symbol, as shown in the left AMM image in Figure 
20, the aircraft was precisely tracking the STBO clearance.  If the trend symbol was displayed behind the 
intent symbol, as shown in the right AMM image in Figure 20, the aircraft was behind schedule and may 
reach the RTA point late.  If the trend symbol was displayed ahead of the intent symbol, the aircraft was 
ahead of schedule and may reach the RTA point early. 
The graphical taxi routes and intent, and STBO status information provided the capability to view the 
route conflicts at-a-glance rather than having to interpret the textual clearance in the information area to 
determine whether there was a potential conflict.  By viewing the traffic’s intent and trend symbols, it was 
obvious when a collision was predicted; the ownship and traffic intent and trend symbols were overlaid. 
The HUD was used during a portion of the STBO taxi scenarios.  The standard HUD surface 
symbology was used with the addition of the advised GS (displayed above the GS) (see Figure 21).  This 
allowed the Captain to remain heads-up to view the STBO guidance.  When test conditions did not 
require use of the HUD, the HUD was stowed so it would not be an influence or obstruction. 
 
 
Figure 20.  Map D Display Condition. 
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Figure 21.  STBO Taxi Guidance Displayed on HUD. 
5.3.3 Part 2 Test Matrix 
A total of six trials (four nominal, two off-nominal) were conducted with each crew.  All trials were 
conducted in daytime 1,800 ft visibility.  Since STBO is an advanced operational concept, it was decided 
to follow ATSA-SURF and SURF-IA specifications regarding position accuracy; therefore, NACp8 
accuracy was not used.  Traffic was transmitting position accuracy ranges from NACp 9 to NACp 11; 
therefore, all the airport traffic was displayed on the AMM.  ATC clearances were provided verbally via 
the voice generation system and via data-link. The full test matrix is shown in Appendix D. 
Nominal trials evaluated the flight crew’s performance in following STBO taxi guidance using HUD 
and AMM symbology.  Two AMM conditions (Map C and Map D) were evaluated between subjects, 
using two HUD display conditions (HUD or no HUD) during departure taxi scenarios, for a total of four 
nominal trials (Appendix E).  These display conditions were chosen to evaluate textual traffic intent 
information and ownship STBO guidance (Map C) versus graphical traffic intent information and 
ownship and traffic STBO guidance (Map D) and the utility of providing STBO guidance head-up.  The 
STBO taxi scenarios began in the ramp; the crew was to follow the cleared taxi route and STBO guidance 
to the departure runway.  The trial terminated once the aircraft stopped at the runway hold line.  A 
detailed description of the STBO taxi procedure is given below. 
Off-nominal trials were conducted between subjects to evaluate collision avoidance capability during 
STBO.  The focus of the off-nominal scenarios was to determine the usefulness of traffic intent 
information for taxi collision avoidance and also the usefulness of CD&R for collision avoidance during 
STBO.  Each crew completed two off-nominal trials as Test Runs 3 and 6 of six trials.  The HUD was not 
utilized during the off-nominal trials.  A detailed description of the off-nominal scenarios is given below.  
Each crew evaluated these two scenarios using either the Map C or D condition with conflict traffic 
transmitting either NACp 9 or NACp 10 position accuracy; therefore, three data points were collected for 
each combination of conditions.  IAs were not issued for traffic transmitting NACp 9 position accuracy, 
but were issued for traffic transmitting NACp 10 position accuracy (as per DO-323) [RTCA, 2010b]. 
Advised 
Ground 
Speed 
Readout 
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5.3.4 Part 2 Conflict Scenarios 
Two taxi conflict scenarios were utilized.  Every effort was made to produce similar timings; 
however, a certain amount of variability was naturally introduced due to the maneuvering conducted by 
the pilot (e.g., taxi speed). 
5.3.4.1 Taxi Head-On Conflict Scenario 
This scenario tested a potential head-on collision if no action were taken because the aircraft were 
given conflicting STBO taxi clearances. 
An approach and departure flow was simulated.  Traffic were approaching Runway 18R (three 
aircraft) (Figure 22, orange route) and Runway 18C (four aircraft) (Figure 22, orange dashed route), 
spaced 5 nm apart and staggered between runways.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied to 
the terminal.  Departure traffic (three aircraft) using Runway 18L were routed via the magenta and blue 
colored routes shown in Figure 22. 
At the beginning of this scenario, the ownship was parked on the ramp near GPM 4W.  The flight 
crew was cleared to taxi to Runway 18L via Taxiways A2, A, Y, and D (Figure 22, magenta route).  As 
the ownship taxied on Taxiway A, an aircraft was taxiing toward the ownship on Taxiway A.  Provided 
the flight crews of both aircraft followed the STBO guidance, the aircraft would collide at the intersection 
of Taxiways A and Y. 
 
       Figure 22.  Part 2 Conflict Scenario, Taxi Head-On. 
5.3.4.2 Taxi Intersection Conflict Scenario 
In this scenario, both aircraft were given STBO taxi clearances that were conflict free, but the failure 
of the traffic aircraft to comply with its taxi clearance resulted in a taxiway intersection conflict. 
The same approach and departure flow implemented for the Taxi Head-On scenario was used. 
At the beginning of this scenario, the ownship was parked on the ramp near GPM 4W.  The flight 
crew was cleared to taxi to Runway 18L via Taxiways A2, A, B, S, and D (Figure 23, magenta route).  As 
the ownship taxied on Taxiway A, an aircraft was taxiing on Taxiway S from GPM 10, toward Taxiway 
A.  The aircraft was given clearance to taxi to the terminal via Taxiways S, A, and N (Figure 23, green 
route).  However, the flight crew blunders and continues straight on Taxiway S instead of turning onto 
Taxiway A.  The aircraft conflicts with ownship at the intersection of Taxiways S and B, provided the 
subject flight crew followed their STBO guidance correctly. 
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     Figure 23.  Part 2 Conflict Scenario, Taxi Intersection. 
5.3.5 Part 2 Procedure 
Prior to the testing phase, each test subject participated in a briefing and simulator training session.  
The training included specific items and procedures related to Part 2 testing, such as STBO taxi 
procedures, Map Conditions C or D depending on which map condition would be utilized by the crew, 
and CD&R capability during taxi operations. 
Before each trial, the flight crew was briefed on the run conditions, e.g., departure runway, HUD 
utilization, and ATC radio frequencies.  The case order list is shown in Appendix F. 
STBO taxi operations began in the ramp area with an expected taxi clearance received by the ownship 
via data-link.  An example data-link expected taxi clearance is as follows:  “EXPECT TAXI TO RWY 
36C FROM SPOT 30 VIA C, E, J, R WITH EXPECTED TAXI RELEASE TIME 12:32:00Z.  
MONITOR GROUND 121.9.”  The expected taxi clearance was displayed as a dotted magenta line on the 
AMM (Figure 24).  After acknowledging the expected taxi clearance by data-link, the flight crew taxied 
to the indicated GPM (also known as spot).  After reaching the GPM, the actual taxi clearance was 
received via voice and data-link instructions.  An example taxi clearance was:  “TAXI RWY 36C BY 
12:37:30Z VIA L-S-R.  CROSS RWY 36C.  TAXI RELEASE TIME 12:32:00Z.”  The taxi clearance 
was displayed as a solid magenta line on the AMM (Figure 25).  The crew was required to respond to the 
taxi clearance via voice and data-link.  Investigation of taxi route modifications was not conducted; 
therefore, the expected and actual taxi clearances were always the same.  The crew was to begin taxi as 
close as possible to the taxi release time and notify ATC they were commencing taxi.  Once taxi began, 
the flight crew was requested to follow the taxi clearance and STBO guidance provided on the AMM and 
HUD, if utilized.  The crews were instructed that acceptable performance was obtained if their RTA was 
met within +/- 15 seconds.  The trial terminated once the aircraft stopped at the runway hold line 
The test runs were documented via audio, video, and digital data recordings, and post-run and post-
test questionnaires (see Appendices G, I, and J). 
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Figure 24.  Expected Taxi Clearance Shown on PFD and AMM. 
 
 
Figure 25.  Taxi Clearance Shown on PFD and AMM. 
5.4 Test Metrics 
For runway conflicts, a near-collision was counted if the CG of the two aircraft were < 300 ft apart 
laterally and vertical separation was < 200 ft.  A collision was counted if the aircraft were < 150 ft apart 
laterally and vertical separation was < 100 ft (Figure 26).  The 150 ft collision separation corresponds to 
large aircraft with a wingspan and fuselage length of approximately 150 ft (which was used for this 
study).  The 150 ft value also corresponds to the width of the simulated runway.  Also, aircraft that are 
between the hold line and runway edge (150 ft distance for this study) are considered hazards and 
classified as near collisions. 
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For taxiway conflicts, a near-collision was counted if the aircraft CGs were < 185 ft apart laterally.  A 
collision was counted if the aircraft CGs were < 150 ft apart laterally. 
 
 
Figure 26.  Near Collision and Collision Definition for Runway Conflicts. 
6 Results 
A summary of quantitative and qualitative results is presented for the Part 1 and Part 2 testing phases.  
All data are referenced from the aircraft CG.  The data was analyzed using parametric and non-parametric 
statistics, as appropriate, using apriori level of significance of 0.05. 
6.1 Part 1 Testing Results 
6.1.1 Part 1 Off-Nominal Scenario Results 
As described in the Test Method section, the test objective for six of the crews was to evaluate the 
impact of displaying qualified versus unqualified traffic on the AMM during conflict situations.  These 
crews were given a taxi crossing and departure conflict scenario, using either Map A or B display 
condition (Table 3).  The conflict traffic was transmitting NACp 8 position accuracy for all of these trials; 
therefore, IAs were not issued.  When using Map A, the conflict traffic was not displayed on the AMM 
and could only be viewed OTW, if possible for the visibility conditions.  When using Map B, the conflict 
traffic was displayed on the AMM and could also be viewed OTW. 
When using the Map A condition, action was only taken to avoid the conflict traffic on one of six 
trials (17%) (Table 5).  The flight crew was not aware of the conflict traffic on five of these trials and 
continued the operations, resulting in four collisions and one near-collision.  On one trial, after seeing the 
traffic OTW on takeoff roll, a high speed rejected takeoff (131 kts) was conducted.  The aircraft stopped 
just before reaching the traffic, resulting in a near-collision. 
When using the Map B condition, action was taken on four of six trials (67%) (Table 5).  For the taxi 
crossing scenario, one crew crossed the runway, unaware of the conflict traffic, resulting in a collision.  
This crew viewed the AMM for traffic, zooming out to the largest map scale; however, the map was 
scanned just before the traffic came into view.  For the departure scenario, the crew that departed saw the 
traffic on the AMM but was not sure if the traffic was on the runway due to the traffic’s position accuracy 
(crew commented that the aircraft symbol was “dancing” on the AMM). 
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Table 5.  Part 1 Off-Nominal Scenario Results, Map Condition Focus. 
 Taxi Crossing Departure 
Map A, NACp 8 3crossed: 
2 collisions, 1 near-collision 
2 departures, 1 high speed reject: 
2 collisions, 1 near-collision 
Map B, NACp 8 1 crossed, 2 held short: 
1 collision 
1 departure, 2 held in position: 
1 collision 
 
For the other six crews, the objective of the off-nominal trials was to evaluate the impact of receiving 
IAs versus not receiving them for traffic displayed on the AMM during conflict situations.  These crews 
were given a taxi crossing and departure conflict scenario using the Map A display condition.  The 
conflict traffic was transmitting either NACp 9 (no IAs) or NACp 10 (IAs issued) position accuracy 
(Table 4) and, therefore, was always displayed on the AMM. 
When the conflict traffic was transmitting NACp 9 accuracy, no action was taken on three of six trials 
(50%) (Table 6).  Two of the taxi crossing trials resulted in collisions; the crews did not see the traffic on 
the AMM and crossed the runway.  Two of the departure trials also resulted in collisions.  During one of 
the departure trials, the crew did see the conflict traffic on the AMM but they were not sure if the traffic 
was on the runway due to the traffic’s position accuracy so they continued the departure.  During the 
other departure trial, the crew saw the traffic OTW and conducted a high speed rejected takeoff (132 kts), 
having to veer to the right of the conflict traffic, which resulted in a collision. 
When the conflict traffic was transmitting NACp 10 accuracy, action was taken to avoid the conflict 
on all six trials (Table 6).  For the three taxi crossing trials, action was based on receiving RSIs.  For the 
three departure trials, action was based on receiving a warning, receiving an RSI, and viewing the conflict 
traffic on the AMM. 
Table 6.  Part 1 Off-Nominal Scenario Results, NACp Focus. 
 Taxi Crossing Departure 
Map A, NACp 9 2 crossed, 1 held short: 
2 collisions 
1 departure, 2 reject: 
2 collisions 
Map A, NACp 10 3 held short 
 
1 held position, 2 rejected 
6.1.1.1 Taxi Crossing Off-Nominal Details 
The details of the taxi crossing off-nominal/conflict trials are presented in Table 7.  The data shows 
that, with all traffic displayed and with an increase in position accuracy, the number of collisions/near-
collisions were reduced.  All trials in which the conflict traffic was not displayed on the AMM (Map A 
condition with conflict traffic transmitting NACp 8 position accuracy) resulted in a collision or near-
collision (closest point of approach (CPA), mean (µ) = 129 ft, standard deviation (σ) = 123 ft).  
Collisions/near-collisions were reduced when all the traffic was displayed on the AMM and the flight 
crew viewed the conflict traffic on the AMM (Map B condition (CPA, µ = 331 ft, σ = 157 ft) and Map A 
condition with conflict traffic transmitting NACp 9 accuracy (CPA, µ = 209 ft, σ = 173 ft)).  When IAs 
were issued (conflict traffic transmitting NACp 10 accuracy), there were no collisions or near-collisions 
because the flight crew became aware of the conflict traffic through RSIs (CPA, µ = 390 ft, σ = 87 ft).  
For all trials that resulted in a near collision or collision, the flight crew was not aware of the conflict 
traffic. 
In Table 7, all distances are referenced to the CG (the CG of the ownship was 72.8 ft from the nose of 
the aircraft).  For all trials but one in which the aircraft held short of the hold line (HL), the nose was well 
behind the HL (40 to 98 ft).  In this one case, the nose did cross the HL (technically a runway incursion) 
but stopped 153 ft before reaching the runway edge. 
IAs were possible on the conflict traffic on three taxi crossing trials (transmitting NACp 10 accuracy) 
(Table 8).  A TI was generated on one trial, ~3.4 nm from the traffic, 213 ft prior to crossing the hold line.  
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An RSI was generated on all three trials, 10,341 ft mean distance from the traffic (σ = 7,373 ft), 206 ft 
mean distance (σ = 13.5 ft) prior to crossing the hold line.  The large standard deviation was caused by the 
wide variability in taxi operations.  One crew taxied slower than the planned 15 kts and reached the 
runway hold line when the traffic was only 2,586 ft from the ownship.  In contrast, another crew generally 
taxied faster than the planned 15 kts and reached the runway hold line before conditions were met for IAs 
(TI and RSI later issued). 
Table 7.  Part 1 Taxi Crossing Scenario Results. 
Map NACp Action Outcome CPA (feet) CG Dist to HL (feet) Traffic Awareness 
A 8 Crossed Runway Collision 21.3 N/A Not Aware 
A 8 Crossed Runway Near-
collision 
262.9 N/A Not Aware 
A 8 Crossed Runway Collision 104.1 N/A Not Aware 
B 8 Held Short Stopped 385.3 134.5 AMM 
B 8 Held Short Stopped 452.9 114.6 AMM 
B 8 Crossed Runway Collision 154.4 N/A Not Aware – early 
map check 
A 9 Held Short Stopped 400.1 156.4 AMM 
A 9 Crossed Runway Collision 161.9 N/A Not Aware 
A 9 Crossed Runway Collision 63.9 N/A Not Aware 
A 10 Crossed HL Stopped 299.1 19.0 RSI 
A 10 Held Short Stopped 398.2 113.6 RSI 
A 10 Held Short Stopped 471.4 171.1 RSI 
 
Table 8.  Part 1 Taxi Crossing Scenario Conflict Traffic IA Results. 
Crew IA Distance from Traffic (feet) Distance over HL (feet) GS (kts) 
12 TI 20,704.8 -212.6 6.3 
4 RSI 2,585.9 -213.0 15.6 
8 RSI 11,177.9 -214.0 6.9 
12 RSI 17,259.6 -186.2 0 
 
IAs were also generated for other traffic during the off-nominal trials.  TIs were generated on all 12 
taxi crossing trials for an aircraft that was landing behind the conflict traffic as ownship was crossing the 
runway (distance from traffic, µ = 35,222 ft, σ = 74 ft).  One crew received an RSI on this same aircraft 
(distance from traffic, 17,147 ft).  Three crews also received IAs on an aircraft parked at a gate in the 
ramp area (one caution, 49 ft from traffic; two warnings, µ = 265 ft, σ = 1.7 ft from traffic).  Even though 
the static traffic was transmitting NACp 10 position accuracy, for these trials, there was a larger error on 
the position data, placing the aircraft closer to the path of the ownship.  Since aircraft can be closer 
together in the congested ramp area, perhaps IAs should be inhibited in the ramp area to minimize 
nuisance alerting caused by position data inaccuracies. 
6.1.1.2 Departure Off-Nominal Details 
The details of the departure conflict trials are presented in Table 9.  As with the taxi crossing trials, 
the number of collisions/near-collisions were reduced when all traffic were displayed and position 
accuracy was increased.  All trials in which the conflict traffic was not displayed on the AMM (Map A 
condition with conflict traffic transmitting NACp 8 position accuracy) resulted in a collision or near-
collision (CPA µ = 135 ft, σ = 84 ft); two crews were not aware of the conflict traffic and one crew saw 
the traffic OTW and rejected the takeoff but came close enough to ownship for a near collision to be 
counted.  Collisions/near-collisions were reduced when all the traffic was displayed on the AMM and the 
flight crew was able to view the conflict traffic on the AMM (Map B condition (CPA µ = 2,781 ft, σ = 
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2,345.) and Map A condition with conflict traffic transmitting NACp 9 accuracy (CPA µ = 975 ft, σ = 
1,431 ft)).  However, when IAs were issued (traffic transmitting NACp 10 accuracy), there were no 
collisions or near-collisions (CPA µ = 3,006 ft, σ = 1,465 ft).  For these three trials, two crews became 
aware of the conflict traffic through IAs; however, one crew became aware by viewing the traffic on the 
AMM.  The CPA distance varied greatly depending on the action of the pilot.  Also, in all trials in which 
the aircraft took-off, the collision occurred just after liftoff when the aircraft was 40 ft or less above 
ground level (AGL). 
Based on these departure test trials, the pilots rejected the takeoff sooner when traffic awareness 
occurred based on either viewing the conflict traffic on the AMM or when IAs were issued.  By the time 
the conflict traffic could be viewed OTW, it was too late to conduct a successful high speed rejected 
takeoff (RTO) resulting in a collision and near-collision. 
IAs were possible on the conflict traffic on three departure trials (transmitting NACp 10) (Table 10).  
An RSI was generated on one trial prior to receiving a warning alert, 4,269 ft from the traffic, when 
traveling 21 kts.  A warning alert was generated on two trials, 3,898 ft mean distance from the traffic (σ = 
298 ft), when traveling 51 kts mean (σ = 15 kts).  After initiating an RTO/stop, an RSI was generated on 
all three departure trials (distance from traffic, µ = 3,338 ft, σ = 1,043 ft; GS, µ = 25 kts, σ = 16 kts). 
 
Table 9.  Part 1 Departure Scenario Results. 
Map NACp Action Outcome CPA (feet) RTO GS 
(kts) 
AGL at collision 
(feet) 
Traffic Awareness 
A 8 Took-off Collision 44.0 N/A 2.7 Not Aware 
A 8 TO roll RTO – Near-
collision 
209.9 131 N/A OTW 
A 8 Took-off Collision 151.3 N/A 11.3 Not Aware 
B 8 Held 
Position 
Stopped 4,054.4 N/A N/A AMM 
B 8 Held 
Position 
Stopped 4,214.1 N/A N/A AMM 
B 8 Took-off Collision 74.6 N/A 39.6 Map but unsure due 
to reduced accuracy  
A 9 Start TO RTO 2,626.5 35 N/A AMM 
A 9 TO roll RTO-Collision 169.4 132 0 OTW 
A 9 Took-off Collision 128.3 N/A 34.7 Map but unsure due 
to reduced accuracy  
A 10 Initial roll Stopped 4,240.8 N/A N/A AMM 
A 10 Start TO RTO-Stopped 1,386.8 93 N//A Warning 
A 10 Start TO RTO-Stopped 3,390.9 47 NA RSI, but got Warning 
 
Table 10.  Part 1 Departure Scenario Conflict Traffic IA Results. 
Crew IA Distance from Traffic (feet) Ground Speed (kts) 
10 RSI 4,268.7 21.0 
6 Warning 3,687.8 62.2 
10 Warning 4,109.1 40.6 
6 RSI 2,218.5 30.5 
10 RSI 3,514.5 37.0 
2 RSI 4,281.9 7.3 
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6.1.2 Part 1 Qualitative Results 
Post-run and post-test questionnaires were administered.  The questionnaires were constructed and 
briefed to all pilot participants that the questionnaire properties were interval in nature, thereby allowing 
parametric statistics to be performed.  Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) and subsequent 
omnibus Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) were conducted on the applicable questionnaire responses.  
Only statistically significant results are presented at the p < 0.05 level. 
6.1.2.1 Part 1 Run Questionnaire Results 
At the end of each test trial, the evaluation pilots completed a post run questionnaire (Appendix G, 
Table G.1), a Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) [Taylor, 1990] questionnaire (Appendix G, 
Table G.3) to evaluate situation awareness, and a Task Load Index (TLX) workload [Hart and Staveland, 
1988] questionnaire (Appendix G, Table G.4) to rate workload.  The individual post run questionnaire 
items were grouped according to pre-test subject matter expert reviews and on exploratory factor analysis 
that resulted in several constructs that have similar underlying meaning.  The individual questions and the 
grouped questionnaire constructs were analyzed.  The MANOVA revealed significant main effects for 
Map and NACp condition that were further analyzed using ANOVAs. 
6.1.2.1.1 Post Run Questionnaire 
The post run questions were rated on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
 
Question A.  I was aware of ownship position. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 
2.707, p = 0.102 (Appendix H, Table H.1) for Question A responses.  Pilots reported a slightly higher 
mean rating for the Map A condition (showed only qualified traffic) (µ = 6.8, σ = 0.5) than the Map B 
condition (showed all traffic) (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.7) (Appendix H, Table H.2) for providing ownship position 
awareness; however, ownship position information was presented in the same manner for both Map 
conditions.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27.  Question A Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials (N = 96). 
Question A responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and a marginally 
insignificant main effect was found, F(1, 22) = 3.667, p = 0.069 (Appendix H, Table H.3).  The flight 
crews reported a slightly higher mean rating for the Map A condition (µ = 7.0, σ = 0.0) than for the Map 
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B condition (µ = 6.8, σ = 0.5) (Appendix H, Table H.4).  The number of responses for each rating value is 
presented in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28.  Question A Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with NACp 8 Conflicting 
Traffic (N = 12). 
For the off-nominal trials, Question A responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, 
and 10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 3.882, p = 0.031 (Appendix H, Table H.5).  
The NACp 8 condition (µ = 7.0, σ = 0.0) was rated higher than the NACp 9 condition (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.9) 
but not higher than the NACp 10 condition (µ = 6.7, σ = 0.5) (Appendix H, Table H.6); the NACp 9 
condition was not significantly different from the NACp 10 condition.  The number of responses for each 
rating value is presented in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29.  Question A Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 8, 9, and 10 
Conflicting Traffic (N = 12). 
It should be noted that for all conditions analyzed (Map A and B, NACp 8, 9, and 10), the same 
ownship position information (ownship chevron displayed on airport map layout) was available.  The 
difference in these conditions was the display of qualified (Map A and B) vs unqualified (Map B only) 
traffic and the display of conflict traffic on the AMM.  Traffic reporting NACp 8 accuracy were not 
displayed on the AMM; traffic reporting NACp 9 accuracy were displayed on the AMM but IAs were not 
issued; traffic reporting NACp 10 accuracy were displayed on the AMM and IAs were issued. 
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Question B.  I was aware of traffic and other vehicles during operations. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 
0.466, p = 0.496 (Appendix H, Table H.7) for Question B responses.  Pilots reported identical mean 
ratings for both the Map A condition (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.8) and the Map B condition (µ = 6.1, σ =1.0) 
(Appendix H, Table H.8) for providing traffic position awareness, even though all airport traffic was not 
displayed on the AMM when using the Map A condition.  The number of responses for each rating value 
is presented in Figure 30. 
Question B responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and a significant 
main effect was found, F(1, 22) = 7.954, p = 0.010 (Appendix H, Table H.9).  The pilots reported the Map 
A condition (µ = 3.0, σ = 2.1) as significantly lower than the Map B condition (µ = 5.4, σ = 2.1) 
(Appendix H, Table H.10).  This was most likely due to the fact that the conflict traffic was not always 
displayed on the AMM when using the Map A condition.  The number of responses for each rating value 
is presented in Figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Question B Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials (N = 96). 
 
 
Figure 31.  Question B Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with NACp 8 Conflicting 
Traffic (N = 12). 
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For the off-nominal trials, Question B responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, 
and 10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 10.271, p = 0.000 (Appendix H, Table H.11).  
The NACp 8 condition (µ = 3.0, σ = 2.1) was rated lower than the NACp 9 condition (µ = 4.4, σ = 1.7) 
and the NACp 10 condition (µ = 6.1, σ = 1.1) (Appendix H, Table H.12); the NACp 9 condition was rated 
lower than the NACp 10 condition.  When the conflict traffic was transmitting NACp 8 position accuracy, 
the traffic was not displayed on the AMM.  The conflict traffic was displayed on the AMM when it was 
transmitting NACp 9 accuracy; however, IAs were not issued.  When transmitting NACp 10 accuracy, the 
conflict traffic was displayed on the AMM and IAs were issued, providing the most information about the 
traffic.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32.  Question B Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 8, 9, and 10 
Conflicting Traffic (N = 12). 
 
Question C.  The display concepts were effective for management of mental workload. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 
0.338, p = 0.562 (Appendix H, Table H.13) for Question C responses.  Flight crews reported similar mean 
ratings for the Map A condition (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.8) and for the Map B condition (µ = 6.0, σ =1.1) 
(Appendix H, Table H.14) for managing mental workload.  The number of responses for each rating value 
is presented in Figure 33. 
Question C responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and no statistically 
significant effects were found, F(1, 22) = 1.665, p = 0.210 (Appendix H, Table H.15).  The pilots reported 
a slightly lower mean rating for the Map A condition (µ = 5.2, σ = 1.8) than for the Map B condition (µ = 
5.9, σ = 1.0) (Appendix H, Table H.16).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in 
Figure 34. 
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Figure 33.  Question C Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials (N = 96). 
 
 
Figure 34.  Question C Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with NACp 8 Conflicting 
Traffic (N = 12). 
Question C responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, and 10) for the off-
nominal trials and no statistically significant effects were found, F(2, 33) = 1.179, p = 0.320 (Appendix H, 
Table H.17).  The mean ratings for each NACp condition were as follows:  NACp 8 condition (µ = 5.2, σ 
= 1.8), NACp 9 condition (µ = 5.0, σ = 1.4) and NACp 10 condition (µ = 5.8, σ = 0.9) (Appendix H, 
Table H.18).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35.  Question C Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 8, 9, and 10 
Conflicting Traffic (N = 12). 
 
Question D.  The display concepts contributed to communication effectiveness (ATC and flight 
crew). 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 
0.001, p = 0.981 (Appendix H, Table H.19) for Question D responses.  Flight crews reported similar mean 
ratings for the Map A condition (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.7) and for the Map B condition (µ = 6.0, σ =1.1) 
(Appendix H, Table H.20) for communication effectiveness.  The number of responses for each rating 
value is presented in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36.  Question D Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials (N = 96). 
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Question D responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and no statistically 
significant effects were found, F(1, 22) = 1.774, p = 0.196 (Appendix H, Table H.21).  The pilots reported 
a slightly lower mean rating for the Map A condition (µ = 5.2, σ = 1.8) than for the Map B condition (µ = 
6.0, σ = 1.3) (Appendix H, Table H.22).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in 
Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 37.  Question D Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with NACp 8 Conflicting 
Traffic (N = 12). 
Question D responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, and 10) for the off-
nominal trials and no statistically significant effects were found, F(2, 33) = 2.049, p = 0.145 (Appendix H, 
Table H.23).  The mean ratings for each NACp condition were as follows:  NACp 8 condition (µ = 5.2, σ 
= 1.8), NACp 9 condition (µ = 5.1, σ = 1.4) and NACp 10 condition (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.7) (Appendix H, 
Table H.24).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 38.  Question D Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 8, 9, and 10 
Conflicting Traffic (N = 12). 
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Question E.  The display promoted effective crew resource management, coordination, and cohesion. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 
2.843, p = 0.093 (Appendix H, Table H.25) for Question E responses.  Flight crews reported a slightly 
higher mean rating for the Map A condition (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.8) than for the Map B condition (µ = 5.9, σ 
=1.1) (Appendix H, Table H.26) for effective crew resource management, coordination, and cohesion.  
The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 39. 
 
 
Figure 39.  Question E Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials (N = 96). 
Question E responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and no significantly 
different effects were found, F(1, 22) = 1.276, p = 0.271 (Appendix H, Table H.27).  The pilots reported a 
lower mean rating for the Map A condition (µ = 4.8, σ = 2.1) than for the Map B condition (µ = 5.7, σ = 
1.8) (Appendix H, Table H.28).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40.  Question E Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with NACp 8 Conflicting 
Traffic (N = 12). 
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For the off-nominal trials, Question E responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, 
and 10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 3.878, p = 0.031 (Appendix H, Table H.29).  
The NACp 8 condition (µ = 4.8, σ = 2.1) was not significantly different from the NACp 9 condition (µ = 
5.1, σ = 1.7); the NACp 8 and NACp 9 conditions were rated lower than the NACp 10 condition (µ = 6.5, 
σ = 0.7) (Appendix H, Table H.30).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 
41. 
 
Figure 41.  Question E Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 8, 9, and 10 
Conflicting Traffic (N = 12). 
Question F.  The display concepts contributed to perceived safety during operation. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 
0.268, p = 0.605 (Appendix H, Table H.31) for Question F responses.  Flight crews reported similar mean 
ratings for the Map A condition (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.8) and for the Map B condition (µ = 6.0, σ =1.0) 
(Appendix H, Table H.32) for contributing to perceived safety.  The number of responses for each rating 
value is presented in Figure 42. 
 
 
Figure 42.  Question F Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials (N = 96). 
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Question F responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and no statistically 
significant effects were found, F(1, 22) = 2.179, p = 0.154 (Appendix H, Table H.33).  The pilots reported 
a lower mean rating for the Map A condition (µ = 3.9, σ = 2.5) than for the Map B condition (µ = 5.3, σ = 
2.2) (Appendix H, Table H.34).  However, due to the large variance in ratings, the statistical analysis 
failed to find a significant effect.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 
43. 
 
Figure 43.  Question F Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with NACp 8 Conflicting 
Traffic (N = 12). 
For the off-nominal trials, Question F responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, 
and 10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 8.023, p = 0.001 (Appendix H, Table H.35).  
The NACp 8 condition (µ = 3.9, σ = 2.5) was rated lower than the NACp 9 condition (µ = 5.1, σ = 1.6) 
and NACp 10 condition (µ = 6.8, σ = 0.5) (Appendix H, Table H.36); the NACp 9 condition was rated 
lower than the NACp 10 condition.  The number of responses for each rating value are presented in 
Figure 44. 
 
Figure 44.  Question F Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 8, 9, and 10 
Conflicting Traffic (N = 12). 
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Question G.  The display concepts were effective for detection of potential surface conflicts. 
 
Question G was only administered during the off-nominal test trials since these were the scenarios in 
which surface conflicts occurred.  Question G responses were analyzed by Map condition and statistically 
significant effects were found, F(1, 22) = 53.790, p = 0.0001 (Appendix H, Table H.37).  The pilots rated 
the Map B condition (µ = 5.3, σ = 1.9) as significantly better for detection of potential surface conflicts 
than the Map A condition (µ = 1.3, σ = 0.5) (Appendix H, Table H.38).  This was due to the fact that all 
airport traffic was displayed on the AMM for the Map B condition but only qualified traffic (NACp 9 and 
higher) was displayed on the AMM for the Map A condition.  As a result, the possibility exists that the 
flight crew may not be aware of potential traffic when using the Map A condition (showing only qualified 
traffic), particularly if visibility is low and traffic cannot be visually acquired OTW.  The number of 
responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 45. 
For the off-nominal trials, Question G responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, 
and 10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 50.229, p = 0.000 (Appendix H, Table H.39).  
The NACp 8 condition (µ = 1.3, σ = 0.5) was rated lower than the NACp 9 condition (µ = 3.9, σ = 2.2) 
and NACp 10 condition (µ = 6.7, σ = 0.5) (Appendix H, Table H.40); the NACp 9 condition was rated 
lower than the NACp 10 condition.  When the conflict traffic was transmitting NACp 8 position accuracy, 
the traffic was not displayed on the AMM.  The conflict traffic was displayed on the AMM when it was 
transmitting NACp 9 accuracy; however, IAs were not issued.  When transmitting NACp 10 accuracy, the 
conflict traffic was displayed on the AMM and IAs were issued, providing the most information related to 
potential surface conflicts.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 46. 
 
 
Figure 45.  Question G Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with NACp 8 
Conflicting Traffic (N = 12). 
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Figure 46.  Question G Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 8, 9, and 10 
Conflicting Traffic (N = 12). 
6.1.2.1.2 Questionnaire Constructs 
The individual post run questionnaire items were grouped into several constructs that have similar 
underlying meaning:  Task Management (questions A – C), Communicative Efficacy (questions D – E), 
and Hazard Awareness (questions F – G). 
 
Task Management 
 
Flight crew responses to run questions A, B, and C were combined to form the Task Management 
construct: 
Question A:  I was aware of ownship position. 
Question B:  I was aware of traffic and other vehicles during operations. 
Question C:  The display concepts were effective for management of mental workload. 
For the nominal trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 0.042, p 
= 0.837 (Appendix H, Table H.41) for the Task Management construct responses.  Similar mean ratings 
were reported for the Map A condition (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.8) and for the Map B condition (µ = 6.2, σ = 1.0) 
(Appendix H, Table H.42).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 47. 
Task Management construct responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and 
a significant main effect was found, F(1, 22) = 4.481, p = 0.046 (Appendix H, Table H.43).  The Map B 
condition was rated significantly higher (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.4) than the Map A condition (µ = 5.1, σ = 2.3) 
(Appendix H, Table H.44).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 48. 
For the off-nominal trials, the Task Management construct responses were also analyzed by NACp 
condition (NACp 8, 9, and 10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 4.228, p = 0.023 
(Appendix H, Table H.45).  The NACp 8 condition (µ = 5.1, σ = 2.3) was not significantly different from 
the NACp 9 condition (µ = 5.3, σ = 1.6); the NACp 8 and NACp 9 conditions were both rated lower than 
NACp 10 condition (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.9) (Appendix H, Table H.46).  The number of responses for each 
rating value is presented in Figure 49. 
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Figure 47.  Task Management Construct Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials (Map A, N = 288; Map B, 
N = 282). 
 
 
Figure 48. Task Management Construct Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal trials – Map A and B with 
NACp 8 Conflicting Traffic (N = 36). 
 
 
Figure 49.  Task Management Construct Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 
8, 9, and 10 Conflicting Traffic (N = 36). 
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Communicative Efficacy 
 
Flight crew responses to run questions D and E were combined to form the Communicative Efficacy 
construct: 
Question D.  The display concepts contributed to communication effectiveness (ATC and flight 
crew). 
Question E.  The display promoted effective crew resource management, coordination, and cohesion. 
For the nominal trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 0.777, p 
= 0.379 (Appendix H, Table H.47) for the Communicative Efficacy construct responses.  Similar mean 
ratings were reported for the Map A condition (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.7) and for the Map B condition (µ = 6.0, σ 
=1.1) (Appendix H, Table H.48).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 
50. 
Communicative Efficacy construct responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal 
trials and no significant main effects were found, F(1, 22) = 1.620, p = 0.216 (Appendix H, Table H.49).  
The pilots reported the following average mean ratings:  Map A condition (µ = 5.0, σ = 1.9), Map B 
condition (µ = 5.8, σ = 1.6) (Appendix H, Table H.50).  The number of responses for each rating value is 
presented in Figure 51. 
For the off-nominal trials, the Communicative Efficacy construct responses were also analyzed by 
NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, and 10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 3.304, p = 0.049 
(Appendix H, Table H.51).  The NACp 8 condition (µ = 5.0, σ = 1.9) was not significantly different from 
the NACp 9 condition (µ = 5.1, σ = 1.5); the NACp 8 and NACp 9 conditions were both rated lower than 
NACp 10 condition (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.7) (Appendix H, Table H.52).  The number of responses for each 
rating value is presented in Figure 52. 
 
 
Figure 50.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials (Map A, N = 192; 
Map B, N = 188). 
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Figure 51. Communicative Efficacy Construct Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B 
with NACp 8 Conflicting Traffic (N = 24). 
 
 
Figure 52.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with 
NACp 8, 9, and 10 Conflicting Traffic (N = 24). 
 
Hazard Awareness 
 
Flight crew responses to run questions F and G were combined to form the Hazard Awareness 
construct: 
Question F.  The display concepts contributed to perceived safety during operation. 
Question G.  The display concepts were effective for detection of potential surface conflicts. 
The Hazard Awareness construct was only analyzed for the off-nominal (surface conflict) trials.  A 
significant effect was found for Map condition, F(1, 22) = 15.106, p = 0.001 (Appendix H, Table H.53).  
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Pilots reported that the Map B condition (µ = 5.3, σ = 2.0) was significantly better for detection of 
hazards (e.g. aircraft, vehicles) than the Map A condition (µ = 2.6, σ = 2.2) (Appendix H, Table H.54).  
The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 53. 
The Hazard Awareness construct responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, and 
10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 33.649, p = 0.000 (Appendix H, Table H.55).  The 
NACp 8 condition (µ = 2.6, σ = 2.2) was rated lower than the NACp 9 (µ = 4.5, σ = 2.0) and NACp 10 
conditions (µ = 6.7, σ = 0.5) (Appendix H, Table H.56); the NACp 9 condition was rated lower than the 
NACp 10 condition.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 54. 
 
 
Figure 53.  Hazard Awareness Construct Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with 
NACp 8 Conflicting Traffic (N = 24). 
 
 
Figure 54.  Hazard Awareness Construct Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 
8, 9, and 10 Conflicting Traffic (N = 24). 
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6.1.2.1.3 SART (Situational Awareness) 
The 3-dimensional SART scale was used: demand on attentional resources, supply of attentional 
resources, and understanding [Taylor, 1990] (Appendix G, Table G.3).  The three scores are used to 
calculate a total situation awareness score using the equation: situational awareness = understanding – 
(demand – supply).  The resulting situational awareness score can range in value from -5 to 13. 
For the nominal test trials, there was a marginally insignificant effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) = 
3.198, p = 0.075 (Appendix H, Table H.57) for the SART responses.  Pilots rated the Map B condition (µ 
= 7.2, σ =2.2) higher than the Map A condition (µ = 6.6, σ = 2.3) (Appendix H, Table H.58).  The number 
of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 55. 
SART responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and no significant main 
effects were found, F(1, 22) = 0.051, p = 0.823 (Appendix H, Table H.59).  The pilots reported similar 
mean ratings for the Map A condition (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.8) and the Map B condition (µ = 6.2, σ = 1.9) 
(Appendix H, Table H.60).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 56. 
For the off-nominal trials, the SART responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, 
and 10) and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 33) = 7.508, p = 0.002 (Appendix H, Table H.61).  
The NACp 8 condition (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.8) was rated lower than the NACp 9 (µ = 7.7, σ = 1.9) and NACp 
10 conditions (µ = 9.6, σ = 2.9) (Appendix H, Table H.62); the NACp 9 condition was not significantly 
different from the NACp 10 condition.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in 
Figure 57. 
 
Figure 55.  SART Situational Awareness Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
 
 
Figure 56. SART Situational Awareness Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with 
NACp 8 Conflicting Traffic. 
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Figure 57.  SART Situational Awareness Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 
8, 9, and 10 Conflicting Traffic. 
6.1.2.1.4 TLX (Workload) 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 188) 
= 1.085, p = 0.299 (Appendix H, Table H.63) for the TLX responses.  The mean ratings for the Map B 
condition (µ = 33.1, σ = 14.3) were slightly lower than for the Map A condition (µ = 35.5, σ = 15.8) 
(Appendix H, Table H.64); however, for both map conditions, the perceived overall mental workload was 
low to moderate.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 58. 
 
 
Figure 58.  TLX Workload Data for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
TLX responses were analyzed by Map condition for the off-nominal trials and no significant main 
effects were found, F(1, 22) = 0.524, p = 0.477 (Appendix H, Table H.65).  The pilots gave moderate 
workload ratings for both the Map A (µ = 26.3, σ = 11.4) and Map B (µ = 30.0, σ = 13.4) conditions 
(Appendix H, Table H.66).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 59. 
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Figure 59. TLX Workload Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A and B with NACp 8 
Conflicting Traffic. 
For the off-nominal trials, the TLX responses were also analyzed by NACp condition (NACp 8, 9, 
and 10) and no statistically significant effects were found, F(2, 33) = 0.430, p = 0.654 (Appendix H, 
Table H.67).  Low to moderate workload ratings were given for all NACp conditions:  NACp 8 (µ = 26.3, 
σ = 11.4), NACp 9 (µ = 31.0, σ = 14.6), and NACp 10 (µ = 28.5, σ = 11.1) (Appendix H, Table H.68).  
The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 60. 
 
 
Figure 60.  TLX Workload Data for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials – Map A with NACp 8, 9, and 10 
Conflicting Traffic. 
6.1.2.2 Part 1 Final Questionnaire Results 
At the conclusion of the testing, the evaluation pilots completed a final questionnaire.  All questions 
along with the pilots’ responses can be found in Appendix J.  Most of the questions were rated on a scale 
of 1 (“strongly disagree”, “low”, “not useful”) to 7 (“strongly agree”, “high”, “very useful”). 
6.1.2.2.1 Traffic Awareness and Symbology 
Pilots indicated a higher level of traffic awareness when all traffic was displayed on the AMM (µ = 
6.6, σ = 0.6) than when only qualified traffic (NACp 9 and higher) was displayed (µ = 4.9, σ = 1.6) 
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(Appendix J, Figure J.4, Table J.2).  Furthermore, the pilots indicated the presentation of only qualified 
traffic on the AMM was a greater safety issue (µ = 6.3, σ = 1.1) than displaying all traffic (µ = 2.3, σ = 
1.7) (Figure J.5, Table J.3).  They also felt the display of only qualified traffic on the AMM will increase 
the potential for accidents (µ = 5.5, σ = 1.4) than the display of all traffic (µ = 2.0, σ = 1.6) (Figure J.6, 
Table J.4).  All these results were statistically significant.  When asked if all traffic should be displayed 
on the AMM or only the traffic that meets NACp 9 and higher position accuracy levels, 23 of 24 pilots 
(95.8%) responded that all traffic should be displayed (confidence level of µ = 6.4, σ = 0.6, where 7 = 
100% confidence).  These results are consistent with the quantitative performance that shows fewer 
accidents and incidents with all traffic being displayed. 
The pilots were asked if the NACp surveillance accuracy should be shown on the AMM.  The pilot 
ratings indicated a slight preference for using different symbology for qualified and unqualified traffic (µ 
= 5.4, σ = 2.0) instead of using the same symbology (µ = 4.5, σ = 1.7) to avoid potentially misleading 
information (Figure J.8) (no statistical significance, Table J.5).  They felt there should be a distinction 
(difference) between the symbology representing qualified traffic and unqualified traffic (NACp 8 or less) 
(µ = 5.6, σ = 1.7) (Figure J.9).  Of 21 pilot ratings, 12 pilots (57%) would prefer a different symbol such 
as a rounded chevron, 5 pilots (24%) would prefer an accuracy range ring around the chevron symbol, 
and 4 pilots (19%) would prefer some other type of symbol, such as a segmented/dashed chevron, hollow 
symbol, different color symbol, or touching symbol to see accuracy of signal.  Some pilots commented 
that the traffic chevron symbol was too large when the map was scaled down (2 of 24 pilots, 8.3%) and 
touch/pinch/pan capability is desirable (4 of 24 pilots, 16.7%). 
For this study, the AMM was located on the EFB outboard of the PFD.  The pilots moderately agreed 
that this was an optimal location for viewing the AMM (µ = 5.3, σ = 1.4) (Figure J.7).  Several pilots (9 of 
24 pilots, 37.5%) commented that the AMM should be located on a forward display, preferably the ND, 
or in a central location for viewing by both pilots.  Also, there were too many menu levels (2 of 24 pilots, 
8.3%) and perhaps a hard button to go directly to the AMM would be useful. 
6.1.2.2.2 CD&R Symbology 
The pilots rated the CD&R symbology as effective in providing information on the conflict traffic (µ 
= 6.4, σ = 1.0) (Appendix J, Figure J.34) and providing a clear indication of the relative location of the 
conflict traffic (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.7) (Figure J.35).  Both indications and alerts were helpful in determining 
critical runway safety information (indications: µ = 6.3, σ = 1.2 (Figure J.36), alerts: µ = 6.5, σ = 0.6 
(Figure J.39), provided additional information over AMM traffic (indications: µ = 6.2, σ = 0.9 (Figure 
J.37), alerts: µ = 6.4, σ = 0.7 (Figure J.40)), and helped in determining the location and movement of 
traffic that was relevant to the safety of their own aircraft (indications: µ = 6.3, σ = 0.8 (Figure J.38), 
alerts: µ = 6.4, σ = 0.7 (Figure J.41)). 
The pilots felt there should be a distinction (difference) between the symbology representing traffic 
qualified for the CD&R indication and alerting function (traffic transmitting NACp 10 or 11) versus 
traffic not qualified for that function (traffic transmitting NACp 9 or less) (µ = 5.3, σ = 1.7) (Figure J.10).  
Of 21 pilot ratings, 11 pilots (52%) would prefer a different symbol, 6 pilots (29%) would prefer an 
accuracy range ring around the chevron symbol, and 4 pilots (19%) would prefer some other type of 
symbol, such as a different color symbol, hollow symbol, or touching symbol to see accuracy of signal. 
When an indication or alert occurred and the potential conflict traffic was not shown on the AMM at 
the current map scale, an off-scale traffic symbol was displayed at the edge of the AMM in the direction 
of the traffic (see Figure 14).  The pilots felt the off-scale symbology was moderately effective in 
providing information on the conflict traffic (µ = 5.1, σ = 1.6) (Figure J.43) and in providing a clear 
indication of the relative location of the conflict traffic (µ = 5.5, σ = 1.4) (Figure J.44).  Of 24 pilot 
ratings, 15 pilots (62.5%) felt that the AMM should auto-zoom to a scale that shows the conflict traffic 
symbol, 6 pilots (25%) felt the AMM should not auto zoom, and 3 pilots (12.5%) did not know if the 
AMM should auto-zoom.  These ratings were given without the pilots viewing the auto-zoom feature in 
practice. 
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6.1.2.2.3 General 
The pilots rated their level of perceived safety higher having the CD&R system onboard their aircraft 
during similar operations (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.6) than without having the system onboard (µ = 4.8, σ = 0.9) 
(Figure J.1) (statistically significant, Table J.1).  With a rating of 7 being completely safe, the pilots rated 
the level of safety felt during runway conflict incidents (µ = 5.7, σ = 1.0) (Figure J.2) and during taxi 
conflict incidents (µ = 5.9, σ = 0.8) (Figure J.3) as moderately high.  The pilots were asked to provide 
suggestions for improvements that would increase the safety of the system.  Some of the prevalent 
comments were: more experience with the system (4 of 24 pilots, 16.7%); detailed training, including 
appropriate map scale per operation (3 of 24 pilots, 12.5%); reduce head-down time (6 of 24 pilots, 25%); 
display all traffic on the AMM (23 of 24 pilots, 95.8%); display taxi clearance for all traffic, preferably 
graphically (3 of 24 pilots, 12.5%); provide IAs for all traffic (3 of 24 pilots, 12.5%); and directive 
alerting (2 of 24 pilots, 8.3%).  Also, the question of qualified vs. unqualified traffic and traffic position 
accuracy added to mental workload and uncertainty (4 of 24 pilots, 16.7%).  Some of the best features 
identified were the display of traffic on the AMM (6 of 24 pilots, 25%), graphical depiction of the taxi 
route (7 of 24 pilots, 29.2%), and IAs (5 of 24 pilots, 20.8%).  The general safety and system 
improvement responses are presented in Appendix J, questions 1 through 7. 
6.2 Part 2 Testing Results 
6.2.1 STBO Taxi Conformance Results 
Conformance in following STBO taxi guidance was evaluated by comparing actual performance 
against planned guidance at various locations along the cleared STBO taxi route.  The following locations 
were evaluated for conformance:  route start, straight segment mid-points, entering and exiting 90 degree 
turns, and route end.  These locations were chosen to ensure homogeneity across the scenarios for 
analysis purposes.  Examples of the taxi conformance segment locations are shown in Figure 61.  The 
independent variables for this analysis were Map condition (Map C (Figure 19) and Map D (Figure 20)) 
and the absence or presence of a HUD showing STBO guidance information (Figure 21).  The dependent 
measure was the conformance time in seconds which was displayed to the flight crew on the AMM as 
seconds early (+) or late (-).  Histograms are also included that present the conformance time grouped into 
5 second bins. 
 
 
Figure 61.  Example Taxi Conformance Segment Locations. 
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6.2.1.1 STBO Route Start Location 
The crew was instructed to begin taxi as close as possible to the taxi release time.  The “route start” 
conformance time measurement was taken when the aircraft CG crossed the hold line near the GPM. 
Data for all 72 STBO test trials but one (nominal and off-nominal) were analyzed for start location 
conformance.  Data for one crew was considered an outlier and omitted because the crew held for traffic 
in the ramp area before taxiing to the designated GPM, causing them to miss the release time.  In all other 
test runs, the crew taxied to the GPM prior to the release time and could begin the trial in a timely 
manner. 
After the taxi release time occurred, it took time for the engines to spool up and the aircraft to begin 
moving.  As a result, for all test trials, the conformance measurement at the start location was always 
negative (Figure 62), i.e. late in comparison to the planned STBO guidance.  The flight crews were within 
+/- 15 seconds of the planned STBO guidance on 54.9% (39 of 71) of the trials.  The 95th percentile data 
was between 7.8 and 20 seconds late.  No significant effects for STBO route start times were found for 
Map condition, F(1, 67) = 0.038, p = 0.847; HUD, F(1, 67) = 0.992, p = 0.323; or Map by HUD 
interaction, F(1, 67) = 0.730, p = 0.396.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 11. 
Many pilots made comments regarding starting out with a late conformance time.  As a result, some 
pilots started advancing the throttles slightly before the release time to begin engine spool up earlier on 
later trials.  Future STBO designs need to incorporate more latency in crew and aircraft spool-up at the 
start of the STBO route. 
 
 
Figure 62.  STBO Route Start Location Conformance. 
 
Table 11.  STBO Route Start Location Conformance (seconds). 
Display HUD µ σ N 
C No -13.5 3.6 24 
 Yes -15.4 3.7 12 
 Total -14.1 3.7 36 
D No -14.6 4.3 23 
 Yes -14.7 3.9 12 
 Total -14.6 4.1 35 
C + D No -14.0 3.9 47 
 Yes -15.0 3.8 24 
 Total -14.4 3.9 71 
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6.2.1.2 STBO Straight Segment Mid-Point Locations 
For this measurement, the conformance time was taken at the mid-point of a straight taxi segment.  
Some cleared STBO taxi routes only had one straight segment while others had multiple straight 
segments.  Data for all STBO test trials (nominal and off-nominal) were analyzed for the straight segment 
mid-point location (a total of 108 data points). 
In general, the flight crews were able to conform well to the STBO guidance during the straight taxi 
segments (Figure 63).  The crews were able to maintain +/- 10 seconds of the guidance at the straight 
segment mid-point location 86.1% (93 of 108) of the time and +/- 15 seconds for 92.6% (100 of 108) of 
the time. 
A marginally insignificant effect was found for Map condition, F(1,104) = 3.046, p = 0.084.  A 
significant main effect was found for HUD condition, F(1, 104) = 3.970, p = 0.049.  The Map by HUD 
interaction was not statistically significant, F(1,104) = 1.074, p = 0.302.  Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 12.  Pilots had significantly better STBO guidance conformance, on the straight route 
segments, using a HUD (µ = 1.1 sec, σ = 11.3 sec) than without using a HUD (µ = -2.6 sec, σ = 7.9 sec).  
The time delta from 0 seconds (perfect conformance) between these HUD conditions equates to 1.5 
seconds (|2.6| - |1.1|).  This equates to approximately 37 feet of travel at 15 kts, which is approximately 
25% of the length of a Boeing 757-200 and signifies that the use of a HUD affected STBO conformance. 
Although marginally statistically insignificant, pilots using the Map C condition had an average 
conformance of -2.7 seconds (σ = 7.0 sec) compared to using the Map D condition, which resulted in an 
average conformance of -0.1 seconds (σ = 11.0 sec).  The time delta between these Map conditions 
equates to 2.6 seconds or approximately 66 feet of travel at 15 kts, which is approximately 43% of the 
length of a Boeing 757-200, signifying that Map type affected STBO conformance. 
In the straight-segments, crews were able to adjust their speed to meet their RTA.  When viewed as 
conformance along the route, the data shows relatively good performance (92.6% compliance) but with 
some very significant tails in the data (i.e., one ~50 seconds early and several ~30 seconds late).  Along 
route conformance was suboptimal in these cases since the crews were only asked to meet the end-of-
route RTA performance.  Intermediate/ waypoint RTAs were not explicitly displayed to the crews.  How 
the crews performed without these data were analyzed to assess this effect. 
 
 
Figure 63.  STBO Straight Segment Location Conformance. 
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Table 12.  STBO Straight Segment Location Conformance (seconds). 
Display HUD Mean SD N 
C No -3.3 7.2 36 
 Yes -1.5 6.8 18 
 Total -2.7 7.0 54 
D No -1.9 8.7 36 
 Yes 3.7 14.2 18 
 Total -0.1 11.0 54 
C+D No -2.6 7.9 72 
 Yes 1.1 11.3 36 
 Total -1.4 9.3 108 
6.2.1.3 STBO 90 Degree Turn Locations 
To analyze STBO performance during 90 degree turns, conformance time was taken 20 seconds prior 
to the center of the turn and 20 seconds after the center of the turn based on the planned route guidance.  
Some cleared STBO taxi routes only had one 90 degree turn while others had multiple 90 degree turns.  
Data for only nominal STBO test trials were analyzed because the off-nominal scenarios did not contain 
any 90 degree turns. 
Of the 96 data points available, only 90 were included in the analysis.  On three trials using the Map 
D condition, a wrong turn was made and data was not available.  After discussing the error with the 
crews, it was determined that the Captains mistakenly thought that their aircraft was at the location of the 
trend symbol (Figure 20) instead of the white chevron and, as a result, turned early onto another taxiway.  
For three other trials, one turn produced outliers.  The ownship was taxiing on Taxiway C for a turn onto 
Taxiway A.  Another aircraft was taxiing along Taxiway A.  On these three occasions, the subject crew’s 
STBO conformance was late approaching the turn and the crew did not think the turn could be made onto 
Taxiway A in advance of the other aircraft; therefore, they held for the other traffic and thus, were very 
late entering the turn.  Since performance was significantly different than on the other trials, these data 
were omitted as outliers. 
There was a wide variability for conformance at the entry and exit location of the 90 degree turns 
(Figures 64 and 65 respectively).  The STBO guidance was reduced to 4 kts during 88.9% (80 of 90) of 
the 90 degree turns, 6 kts during 8.9% (8 of 90) of turns, 8 kts on one turn, and 10 kts on one turn.  Four 
knots is apparently slower than turns are usually taken because, in general, the actual speed during the 
turns (center of turn) was higher (µ = 9.5 kts, σ = 2.7 kts) and, as a result, conformance time at the entry 
location was later (µ = 0.9 sec, σ = 13.9 sec (see Table 13)) than conformance time at the exit location (µ 
= 9.5 sec, σ = 13.6 sec (see Table 14)).  The entry location was reached early 51.1% (46 of 90) of the 
time, while the exit location was reached early 77.8% (70 of 90) of the time.  From observation (data not 
collected) it was noticed that as some of the pilots realized that the planned speed was very slow in the 
turns, they began going into them late so the turn could be taken faster.  Many pilots commented that the 
STBO speed guidance in the turns was too slow and, for a transport category aircraft, should be 8 to 10 
kts. 
When entering a 90 degree turn, the flight crews maintained +/- 15 seconds of the planned STBO 
guidance on 78.9% (71 of 90) of the turns.  No statistically significant effects were found for Map 
condition, F(1, 86) = 1.907, p = 0.171; HUD, F(1, 68) = 0.097 p = 0.757; or Map by HUD interaction, 
F(1, 68) = 1.547, p = 0.217.  The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 13. 
When exiting a 90 degree turn, the flight crews maintained +/- 15 seconds of the planned STBO 
guidance on 73.3% (66 of 90) of the turns.  No statistically significant effects were found for Map 
condition, F(1, 92) = 3.148, p = 0.080; HUD, F(1, 68) = 0.162, p = 0.689; or Map by HUD interaction, 
F(1, 68) = 0.745, p = 0.391.  There was a marginally insignificant finding (p = 0.081) for Map condition 
for the exit locations, however.  The descriptive statistics (Table 14) suggest that STBO conformance was 
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better when using Map C than Map D, although the pilots preferred using the graphical intent information 
shown on Map D. 
 
 
Figure 64.  STBO Enter 90 Degree Turn Location Conformance. 
 
 
Figure 65.  STBO Exit 90 Degree Turn Location Conformance. 
 
Table 13.  STBO Enter 90 Degree Turn Location Conformance (seconds). 
Display HUD Mean SD N 
C No 0.2 11.1 23 
 Yes -2.5 10.8 23 
 Total -1.1 10.9 46 
D No 0.6 16.3 21 
 Yes 5.2 16.4 23 
 Total 3.0 16.3 44 
C+D No 0.4 13.7 44 
 Yes 1.3 14.3 46 
 Total 0.9 13.9 90 
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Table 14.  STBO Exit 90 Degree Turn Location Conformance (seconds). 
Display HUD Mean SD N 
C No 7.6 8.1 23 
 Yes 6.3 8.7 23 
 Total 7.0 8.4 46 
D No 10.2 17.3 21 
 Yes 13.8 17.3 23 
 Total 12.1 17.2 44 
C+D No 8.9 13.2 44 
 Yes 10.1 14.1 46 
 Total 9.5 13.6 90 
6.2.1.4 STBO Route End Location 
The goal of providing STBO guidance was to enable flight crews to reach the end of the taxi route at 
the RTA.  This “RTA point” was shown on the AMM as a green diamond near the end of the cleared 
route (Figure 19).  The conformance time measurement was taken when the aircraft CG crossed the RTA 
point.  Data for only nominal STBO test trials were analyzed because the RTA point was never reached 
during the off-nominal trials. 
Of the 48 data points available, only 47 were included in the analysis.  On one trial, the crew slowed 
to conduct the before takeoff checklist just before crossing the RTA point, making the conformance time 
very late (-27 seconds).  Since performance was significantly different than on the other trials, this data 
was omitted as an outlier.  Consideration must be given to these types of actions in the development of 
procedures and training for STBO. 
STBO route end location data is presented in Figure 66.  On 97.9% (46 of 47) of the trials, the RTA 
point was crossed within +/- 10 seconds of the RTA, and within +/- 5 seconds of the RTA on 87.2% (41 
of 47) of trials.  The crews were instructed that acceptable performance was met if the RTA point was 
reached within +/- 15 seconds of the RTA; these data show excellent compliance to this goal. 
On the one trial in which the 15 second requirement was not met, the crew was focused on oncoming 
traffic near the taxi route and crossed the RTA point 20 seconds early. 
 
 
Figure 66.  STBO Route End Location Conformance. 
No statistically significant effects were found for Map condition, F(1, 43) = 1.117, p = 0.296; HUD, 
F(1, 43) = 3.002, p = 0.090; or Map by HUD interaction, F(1, 43) = 1.547, p = 0.220.  The statistical 
result for HUD use was marginally insignificant with an observed power of 0.395.  The descriptive 
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statistics (Table 15) suggest that using the HUD (µ = -0.0 sec, σ = 3.8 sec) helped the pilots meet the RTA 
more effectively than when not using the HUD (µ = 2.2 sec, σ = 4.8 sec).  The conformance difference 
between using a HUD and not using a HUD (2.2 seconds) results in approximately 55 feet of travel at 15 
kts.  Even though using Map D was slightly less effective (µ = 1.8 sec, σ = 5.7 sec) in meeting the RTA 
than using Map C (µ = 0.4 sec, σ = 2.8 sec) overall, an examination of Figure 67 suggests that using Map 
D combined with a HUD is as equally effective (µ = -0.1 sec, σ = 4.7 sec) as using Map C combined with 
a HUD (µ = 0.1 sec, σ = 3.0 sec). 
The STBO data shows that intermediate performance could vary significantly but the crews met their 
instructed goal – the end route RTA. If compliance along the route is necessary, intermediate 
RTAs/waypoints will be required. The data also shows that STBO guidance development is not and may 
never be a trivial task. An STBO RTA significantly impacts air carrier SOPs and crew procedures (e.g., 
influencing when checklists can be started and completed), taxi speeds (including how this may vary by 
aircraft type and aircraft loading) and how they vary with traffic, taxi route (e.g., turns, hot spots) and 
prevailing visibility, and passenger comfort (e.g., how quickly to turn, accelerate, and decelerate). 
 
Table 15.  STBO Route End Location Conformance (Seconds). 
Display HUD Mean SD N 
C No 0.7 2.8 12 
 Yes 0.1 3.0 12 
 Total 0.4 2.8 24 
D No 3.6 6.1 12 
 Yes -0.1 4.7 11 
 Total 1.8 5.7 23 
C+D No 2.2 4.8 24 
 Yes -0.0 3.8 23 
 Total 1.1 4.5 47 
 
 
Figure 67.  HUD by Map Condition Non-Significant Interaction. 
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6.2.2 Part 2 Off-Nominal Scenario Results 
As described in the Test Method section, the off-nominal trials were conducted between subjects to 
evaluate collision avoidance capability during STBO.  The focus of the off-nominal scenarios was to 
determine the usefulness of traffic intent information for taxi collision avoidance and to determine the 
usefulness of CD&R for collision avoidance during STBO.  Each crew evaluated the off-nominal 
scenarios using either the Map C or D condition with conflict traffic transmitting either NACp 9 or NACp 
10 position accuracy; therefore, three data points were collected for each combination of conditions.  
Intent information was displayed graphically on Map D but only textually on Map C.  IAs were not issued 
for traffic transmitting NACp 9 position accuracy, but were issued for traffic transmitting NACp 10 
position accuracy.  Since all traffic on the airport was transmitting position accuracy of NACp 9 and 
higher, all traffic was displayed on the AMM. 
6.2.2.1 Taxi Head-On Conflict Scenario Results 
The taxi head-on scenario was given as Trial 3 of six trials for each crew.  This scenario simulated 
faulty STBO guidance where conflicting traffic would meet the ownship head-on at an intersection, if the 
ownship followed the STBO guidance. 
For all of the taxi head-on trials, the ownship either slowed down or stopped for traffic to turn ahead 
of them at the intersection, averting a collision or conflict (Table 16).  The flight crew was aware of the 
conflict traffic on each trial by either viewing the traffic intent information or seeing the traffic OTW.  It 
was relatively easy to visually acquire the traffic OTW since the visibility was 1,800 ft. 
Table 16.  Part 2 Off-Nominal Taxi Head-on Scenario Results. 
Map NACp Action Outcome CPA (feet) Viewed Intent 
C 9 Stopped  202.1 Yes 
C 9 Slowed  274.0 Yes 
C 9 Stopped  275.8 Yes 
C 10 Slowed  317.4 Yes 
C 10 Slowed Near-collision 213.4 Yes 
C 10 Slowed Near-collision 186.6 Yes 
D 9 Slowed  384.5 Yes 
D 9 Stopped  268.8 Yes 
D 9 Stopped  213.2 Yes 
D 10 Slowed Near-collision 222.2 Yes 
D 10 Stopped  333.6 Yes 
D 10 Stopped  319.3 Yes 
 
Alerts were possible on the conflict traffic on six taxi head-on trials (i.e., NACp 10) (Table 17).  Nine 
caution alerts were generated over all six trials prior to reaching the conflict intersection, at an average 
distance of 577 ft from the traffic (σ = 300 ft).  The caution alert was generated earlier when the ownship 
was traveling faster.  Multiple caution alerts were issued for two crews; i.e., alert toggling.  No provisions 
were made to reduce the occurrence of alert toggling which occurs when multiple instances of indications 
or alerts are generated as a result of position accuracy or aircraft maneuvering.  Alert toggling can be a 
distraction to the flight crew and could cause mistrust in the technology.  A warning alert was also 
generated on all three trials, 268 ft mean distance from the traffic (σ = 15 ft). 
Three trials where traffic was transmitting NACp 10 accuracy (i.e., with alerts generated) resulted in 
near-collisions per our criteria.  The near-collision calculation was made by determining whether the 
aircraft CGs were separated by less than 185 ft laterally; which is different than the CPA calculation 
(slant range).  Two of the near-collisions occurred at the conflict intersection because the pilot slowed 
instead of stopping and eventually met the near-collision criteria.  The third near-collision occurred when 
taxiing behind the conflict traffic after turning at the conflict intersection.  The subject crew had gotten 
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behind in following the STBO guidance because of waiting for the conflict traffic to turn ahead, and was 
trying to reacquire the STBO planned timing but, because they were judging separation distance visually, 
met the near-collision criteria. 
After turning at the subject intersection, alerts were generated while following the taxiing conflict 
traffic (Table 17).  As in the near-collision trial above, the pilots were trying to reacquire their STBO 
conformance and taxied close enough to the traffic to generate alerts.  Four caution alerts were generated 
for three trials, at an average distance of 280 ft from the traffic (σ = 83 ft).  One warning alert was 
generated on one trial 222 ft from the traffic. 
Alerts were not generated for any other traffic during these off-nominal trials. 
Table 17.  Part 2 Taxi Head-on Scenario Conflict Traffic IA Results. 
Map Crew IA Distance from Traffic 
(feet) 
Location GS 
C 1 Caution 551.3 Approaching intersection 8.2 
C 5 Caution 309.6 Approaching intersection 5.3 
C 9 Caution 862.2 Approaching intersection 15.2 
C 9 Caution 308.1 Approaching intersection 1.2 
D 2 Caution 466.2 Approaching intersection 7.9 
D 2 Caution 406.1 Approaching intersection 6.0 
D 2 Caution 281.4 Approaching intersection 7.8 
D 6 Caution 1,011.4 Approaching intersection 16.0 
D 10 Caution 995.7 Approaching intersection 17.1 
C 5 Warning 270.1 At intersection 6.4 
C 9 Warning 282.1 Approaching intersection 6.2 
D 2 Warning 251.5 Approaching intersection 8.2 
C 5 Caution 277.5 Following traffic 14.5 
C 5 Caution 216.4 Following traffic 7.1 
C 9 Caution 229.2 Following traffic 14.6 
D 10 Caution 398.8 Following traffic 21.0 
C 9 Warning 222.5 Following traffic 14.4 
6.2.2.2 Taxi Intersection Conflict Scenario Results 
The taxi intersection scenario was given as Trial 6 of six trials for each crew.  This scenario simulated 
a blunder, with the conflicting traffic missing its planned turn and instead, incurring from the right of the 
ownship, if the subject crew followed the STBO guidance. 
One or both pilots were aware of the conflict traffic on each trial by either viewing the traffic symbol 
or traffic intent on the AMM or viewing OTW.  For 10 of the taxi intersection trials, the ownship either 
slowed down or stopped for the taxiing traffic prior to the intersection (Table 18).  On two trials, the 
pilots were early in following their STBO planned guidance (by 8 and 10 seconds) at the intersection, 
they were aware of the conflict traffic and they knew the aircraft missed its turn.  The crews decided to 
speed up and turn in front of the traffic.  The automated conflict traffic taxiing from behind overran the 
ownship while the crew was trying to follow their STBO guidance, causing the two collisions.  Alerts 
were not generated for the conflict traffic on these two trials because the traffic was transmitting NACp 9 
accuracy.  Perhaps the crew was more willing to proceed ahead of the traffic when not provided with 
alerts. 
Four trials resulted in near-collisions.  Three of the near-collisions occurred at the conflict 
intersection.  The fourth near-collision occurred when taxiing behind the conflict traffic after turning at 
the conflict intersection.  The ownship taxied very close to the traffic near the end of the route, trying to 
cross the RTA point.  Only one near-collision occurred on the trials in which alerts were generated. 
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Table 18.  Part 2 Off-Nominal Taxi Intersection Scenario Results. 
Map NACp Action Outcome CPA (feet) Viewed Intent 
C 9 Stopped  303.9 Yes 
C 9 Slowed Near-collision 214.6 Yes, late 
C 9 Stopped Near-collision 251.7 Yes 
C 10 Stopped  262.9 Yes 
C 10 Stopped Near-collision 170.4 No, stopped based on 
caution 
C 10 Stopped  220.5 Yes, stopped based on 
caution 
D 9 Turned in front Collision 36.2 Yes 
D 9 Turned in front Collision 42.2 Yes 
D 9 Stopped Near-collision 179.7 Yes, early 
D 10 Stopped  303.0 Yes 
D 10 Stopped  268.9 Yes 
D 10 Stopped  235.4 Yes, early 
 
Alerts were possible on six taxi intersection trials (NACp 10) (Table 19).  A caution alert was 
generated for each of the six trials prior to reaching the conflict intersection, at an average distance of 460 
ft from the traffic (σ = 32 ft).  A warning alert was also generated on four of the trials, 265 ft mean 
distance from the traffic (σ = 7 ft). 
After turning at the subject intersection, alerts were generated while following the conflict traffic 
(Table 19).  The pilots were trying to reacquire their STBO conformance and taxied close enough to the 
traffic to generate alerts.  Three caution alerts were generated for two trials, at an average distance of 410 
ft from the traffic (σ = 123 ft).  Multiple alerts were issued for one crew.  One warning alert was 
generated on one trial 290 ft from the traffic. 
Alerts were not generated for any other traffic during these off-nominal trials. 
Table 19.  Part 2 Taxi Intersection Scenario Conflict Traffic IA Results. 
Map Crew IA Distance from Traffic 
(feet) 
Location GS 
C 3 Caution 444.6 Approaching intersection 12.4 
C 7 Caution 441.3 Approaching intersection 11.4 
C 11 Caution 449.6 Approaching intersection 10.5 
D 4 Caution 433.8 Approaching intersection 9.5 
D 8 Caution 518.3 Approaching intersection 13.0 
D 12 Caution 474.9 Approaching intersection 10.6 
C 3 Warning 266.5 Slowed at intersection 1.9 
C 7 Warning 258.5 Stopped at intersection 0.0 
C 11 Warning 260.3 Stopped at intersection 0.0 
D 8 Warning 273.2 Slowed at intersection 2.2 
C 7 Caution 511.4 Following Traffic 19.8 
D 12 Caution 445.4 Following Traffic 23.5 
D 12 Caution 273.3 Following Traffic 10.4 
D 12 Warning 290.4 Following Traffic 12.1 
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6.2.3 Part 2 Qualitative Results 
Post-run and post-test questionnaires were administered.  Most of the questions were rated on a scale 
of 1 (“strongly disagree”, “low”, “not useful”) to 7 (“strongly agree”, “high”, “very useful”).  An 
ANOVA was conducted on the questionnaire responses.  Statistically significant results are presented at 
the p < 0.05 level. 
6.2.3.1 Part 2 Run Questionnaire Results 
At the end of each test trial, the evaluation pilots completed a post run questionnaire (Appendix G, 
Table G.2), a SART questionnaire (Appendix G, Table G.3) to evaluate situation awareness, and a TLX 
questionnaire (Appendix G, Table G.4) to rate workload.  The individual post run questionnaire items 
were grouped according to pre-test subject matter expert reviews and on exploratory factor analysis that 
resulted in several constructs that have similar underlying meaning.  The individual questions and the 
grouped questionnaire constructs were analyzed.  For the nominal test trials, the questionnaire ratings 
were analyzed by Map condition, HUD condition, and Map by HUD interaction.  For the off-nominal test 
trials, the ratings were analyzed by Map condition, NACp condition, and Map by NACp interaction.  The 
HUD was not utilized during the off-nominal trials; therefore, analysis was not conducted for the HUD 
condition. 
6.2.3.1.1 Post Run Questionnaire 
For analysis of run questions A through I for the off-nominal trials, MANOVA statistics revealed a 
statistically significant effect for Map condition only, F(9, 36) = 4.974, p = 0.000.  The NACp condition, 
F(9,36) = 1.356, p = 0.244, and Map by NACp interaction, F(9,36) = 0.687, p = 0.716, were not 
significantly different; therefore, only the Map condition was analyzed for the ANOVA (results shown 
below by question). 
 
Question A.  I was aware of ownship position. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
2.265, p = 0.136), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 1.531, p = 0.219), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
0.252, p = 0.617) (Appendix I, Table I.1) for Question A responses.  Pilots reported similar mean ratings 
for both the Map C (µ = 6.9, σ = 0.3) and Map D (µ = 6.6, σ = 0.9) conditions and the HUD (µ = 6.8, σ = 
0.5) and no HUD (µ = 6.8, σ = 0.8) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.2) for providing ownship position 
awareness.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 68. 
 
 
Figure 68.  Question A Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
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For the off-nominal trials, there was not a significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 0.246, p = 
0.622 (Appendix I, Table I.3).  The flight crews reported similar mean ratings for both the Map C (µ = 
6.9, σ = 0.3) and Map D (µ = 6.6, σ = 0.7) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.4) for providing ownship 
position awareness.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 69. 
 
 
Figure 69.  Question A Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
 
Question B.  The display concepts were effective for maintaining my situation awareness of ownship. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
0.006, p = 0.938), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 0.082, p = 0.775), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
2.215, p = 0.140) (Appendix I, Table I.5) for Question B responses.  Pilots reported similar mean ratings 
for both the Map C (µ = 6.6, σ = 0.5) and Map D (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.7) conditions and for the HUD (µ = 6.5, 
σ = 0.6) and no HUD (µ = 6.6, σ = 0.6) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.6) regarding effectiveness for 
maintaining situation awareness of ownship.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented 
in Figure 70. 
 
Figure 70.  Question B Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
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For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 
0.899, p = 0.342 (Appendix I, Table I.7).  The pilots rated the Map D condition (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.7) 
significantly higher than the Map C condition (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.6) (Appendix I, Table I.8) regarding 
effectiveness for maintaining situation awareness of ownship.  The number of responses for each rating 
value is presented in Figure 71. 
 
 
Figure 71.  Question B Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
 
Question C.  I was aware of traffic and other vehicles during operations. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
2.362, p = 0.128), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 1.464, p = 0.229), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
3.004, p = 0.086) (Appendix I, Table I.9) for Question C responses.  Pilots reported similar mean ratings 
for both the Map C (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.6) and Map D (µ = 6.4, σ = 0.6) conditions and for the HUD (µ = 6.4, 
σ = 0.6) and no HUD (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.6) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.10) for traffic awareness.  The 
number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 72. 
For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 
1.25, p = 0.272 (Appendix I, Table I.11).  The pilots rated the Map D condition (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.9) 
significantly higher than the Map C condition (µ = 6.1, σ = 1.1) (Appendix I, Table I.12) for traffic 
awareness.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 73. 
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Figure 72.  Question C Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
 
 
Figure 73.  Question C Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
 
Question D.  The display concepts provided effective awareness of traffic intent information. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
0.419, p = 0.519), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 0.346, p = 0.558), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
2.910, p = 0.091) (Appendix I, Table I.13) for Question D responses.  Pilots reported similar mean ratings 
for both the Map C (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.8) and Map D (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.6) conditions and for the HUD (µ = 6.1, 
σ = 0.8) and no HUD (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.7) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.14) for awareness of traffic intent 
information.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 74. 
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Figure 74.  Question D Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 
1.824, p = 0.183 (Appendix I, Table I.15).  The flight crews reported similar mean ratings for both the 
Map C (µ = 5.8, σ = 1.2) and Map D (µ = 5.5, σ = 1.3) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.16) for awareness 
of traffic intent information.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 75. 
 
 
Figure 75.  Question D Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
 
Question E.  The display concepts were effective for required time-of-arrival taxi conformance. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
1.680, p = 0.198), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 0.014, p = 0.906), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
2.721, p = 0.102) (Appendix I, Table I.17) for Question E responses.  Pilots reported the same mean 
ratings for both the Map C (µ = 6.4, σ = 0.7) and Map D (µ = 6.4, σ = 0.7) conditions and for the HUD (µ 
= 6.4, σ = 0.7) and no HUD (µ = 6.4, σ = 0.7) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.18) for required time-of-
arrival conformance.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 76. 
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Figure 76.  Question E Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 
2.793, p = 0.101 (Appendix I, Table I.19).  The flight crews reported similar mean ratings for both the 
Map C (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.7) and Map D (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.6) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.20) for required 
time-of-arrival conformance.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 77. 
 
 
Figure 77.  Question E Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
 
Question F.  The display location of STBO taxi guidance information was effective for situation 
awareness. 
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0.801, p = 0.373) (Appendix I, Table I.21) for Question F responses.  Pilots reported similar mean ratings 
for both the Map C (µ = 6.4, σ = 0.5) and Map D (µ = 6.1, σ = 1.0) conditions and for the HUD (µ = 6.3, 
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σ = 0.7) and no HUD (µ = 6.2, σ = 1.0) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.22) for effectiveness of display 
location of STBO taxi guidance information for situation awareness.  The number of responses for each 
rating value is presented in Figure 78. 
 
 
Figure 78.  Question F Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 
2.507, p = 0.120 (Appendix I, Table I.23).  The flight crews reported similar mean ratings for both the 
Map C (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.7) and Map D (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.6) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.24) for 
effectiveness of display location of STBO taxi guidance information for situation awareness.  The number 
of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 79. 
 
 
Figure 79.  Question F Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
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Question G.  The display location of STBO taxi guidance information was effective for mental 
workload. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
1.365, p = 0.246), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 0.705, p = 0.403), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
2.942, p = 0.090) (Appendix I, Table I.25) for Question G responses.  Pilots reported similar mean ratings 
for both the Map C (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.6) and Map D (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.0) conditions and for the HUD (µ = 6.1, 
σ = 0.7) and no HUD (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.9) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.26) for effectiveness of display 
location of STBO taxi guidance information for mental workload.  The number of responses for each 
rating value is presented in Figure 80. 
 
 
Figure 80.  Question G Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 
0.951, p = 0.329 (Appendix I, Table I.27).  The pilots rated the Map D condition (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.6) 
significantly higher than the Map C condition (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.8) (Appendix I, Table I.28) for effectiveness 
of display location of STBO taxi guidance information for mental workload.  The number of responses 
for each rating value is presented in Figure 81. 
 
Question H.  The display concepts contributed to perceived safety during operation. 
 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
0.232, p = 0.631), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 2.452, p = 0.121), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
0.015, p = 0.904) (Appendix I, Table I.29) for Question H responses.  Pilots reported similar mean ratings 
for both the Map C (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.6) and Map D (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.9) conditions and for the HUD (µ = 6.4, 
σ = 0.6) and no HUD (µ = 6.4, σ = 0.9) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.30) for display concepts 
contributing to perceived safety.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 82. 
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Figure 81.  Question G Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
 
 
Figure 82.  Question H Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
 
For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 
1.465, p = 0.229 (Appendix I, Table I.31).  The pilots rated the Map D condition (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.6) 
significantly higher than the Map C condition (µ = 6.2, σ = 1.0) (Appendix I, Table I.32) for display 
concepts contributing to perceived safety.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in 
Figure 83. 
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Figure 83.  Question H Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
 
Question I.  The display concepts were effective for detection of potential surface conflicts during 
STBO taxi. 
 
Question I was only administered during the off-nominal (surface conflict) test trials.  There was not a 
statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 46) = 1.310, p = 0.258 (Appendix I, Table I.33).  
The pilots reported a slightly higher mean rating for the Map D condition (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.0) than the Map 
C condition (µ = 5.7, σ = 1.7) (Appendix I, Table I.34) for detection of potential surface conflicts during 
STBO taxi.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 84. 
 
 
Figure 84.  Question I Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 12). 
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6.2.3.1.2 Questionnaire Constructs 
 
Task Management 
 
Flight crew responses to run questions A, B, and C were combined to form the Task Management 
construct.  For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) 
= 2.728, p = 0.102), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 0.303, p = 0.583), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
0.109, p = 0.742) (Appendix I, Table I.35) for Task Management construct responses.  Pilots reported 
similar mean ratings for both the Map C (µ = 6.6, σ = 0.5) and Map D (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.7) conditions and 
for the HUD (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.6) and no HUD (µ = 6.6, σ = 0.7) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.36).  The 
number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 85. 
 
 
Figure 85.  Task Management Construct Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 72). 
For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 44) = 
0.165, p = 0.689 ), NACp condition, F(1, 44) = 0.179, p = 0.675, or Map by NACp interaction, F(1, 44) = 
0.145, p = 0.712 (Appendix I, Table I.37).  Pilots reported similar mean ratings for both the Map C (µ = 
6.5, σ = 0.8) and Map D (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.8) conditions and the NACp 9 (µ = 6.4, σ = 0.9) and NACp 10 (µ 
= 6.5, σ = 0.7) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.38).  The number of responses for each rating value is 
presented in Figure 86. 
 
Communicative Efficacy 
 
Flight crew responses to run questions D, E, F, and G were combined to form the Communicative 
Efficacy construct.  For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition 
(F(1, 92) = 2.505, p = 0.117), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 2.005, p = 0.160), or Map by HUD interaction 
(F(1, 92) = 1.173, p = 0.282) (Appendix I, Table I.39) for Communicative Efficacy construct responses.  
Pilots reported similar mean ratings for both the Map C (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.7) and Map D (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.9) 
conditions and for the HUD (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.7) and no HUD (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.8) conditions (Appendix I, 
Table I.40).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 87. 
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Figure 86.  Task Management Construct Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 36). 
 
 
Figure 87.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials (N = 96). 
 
For the off-nominal trials, there was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 44) = 
0.542, p = 0.468), NACp condition (F(1, 44) = 2.764, p = 0.104), or Map by NACp interaction (F(1, 44) = 
0.289, p = 0.589) (Appendix I, Table I.41).  Pilots reported similar mean ratings for both the Map C (µ = 
6.1, σ = 0.9) and Map D (µ = 6.1, σ = 0.9) conditions and for the NACp 9 (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.0) and NACp 10 
(µ = 6.2, σ = 0.7) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.42).  The number of responses for each rating value is 
presented in Figure 88. 
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Figure 88.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 48). 
 
Hazard Awareness 
 
Flight crew responses to run questions H and I were combined to form the Hazard Awareness 
construct.   The Hazard Awareness construct was only analyzed for the off-nominal (surface conflict) test 
trials.  There was not a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 44) = 0.392, p = 0.524), 
NACp condition (F(1, 44) = 2.681, p = 0.109), or Map by NACp interaction (F(1, 44) = 0.156, p = 0.687) 
(Appendix I, Table I.43).  Pilots reported similar mean ratings for both the Map C (µ = 5.9, σ = 1.4) and 
Map D (µ = 6.2, σ = 0.9) conditions and for the NACp 9 (µ = 5.8, σ = 1.2) and NACp 10 (µ = 6.3, σ = 
1.0) conditions (Appendix I, Table I.44).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in 
Figure 89. 
 
 
Figure 89.  Hazard Awareness Construct Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials (N = 24). 
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6.2.3.1.3 SART (Situational Awareness) 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect found for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
1.371, p = 0.245), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 0.024, p = 0.876), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
1.030, p = 0.313) (Appendix I, Table I.45) for SART responses.  The mean ratings for the Map and HUD 
conditions are as follows:  Map C (µ = 7.3, σ = 3.0), Map D (µ = 6.7, σ = 2.2), HUD (µ = 6.9, σ = 2.7), no 
HUD (µ = 7.0, σ = 2.5) (Appendix I, Table I.46).  The number of responses for each rating value is 
presented in Figure 90. 
 
 
Figure 90.  SART Situational Awareness Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
For the off-nominal trials, there was a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 44) = 
7.432, p = 0.009) and a marginally significant effect for NACp condition (F(1, 44) = 3.997, p = 0.52).  
The Map by NACp interaction was not significant (F(1, 44) = 0.033, p = 0.857) (Appendix I, Table I.47).  
Pilots reported that the Map D condition (µ = 7.8, σ = 1.3) was significantly higher for situation 
awareness than the Map C condition (µ = 6.5, σ = 1.8) (Appendix I, Table I.48).  Pilots also tended to 
report the NACp 9 condition (µ = 7.7, σ = 1.5) higher for SART ratings compared to the NACp 10 
condition (µ = 6.8, σ = 1.8).  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 91. 
6.2.3.1.4 TLX (Workload) 
For the nominal test trials, there was not a significant main effect for Map condition (F(1, 92) = 
1.571, p = 0.213), HUD condition (F(1, 92) = 1.674, p = 0.199), or Map by HUD interaction (F(1, 92) = 
0.301, p = 0.585) (Appendix I, Table I.49) for TLX responses.  The mean ratings for the Map conditions 
(Map C (µ = 27.9, σ = 12.6), Map D (µ = 31.1, σ = 12.5) and HUD conditions (HUD (µ = 31.2, σ = 13.7), 
no HUD (µ = 27.9, σ = 11.3)) (Appendix I, Table I.50)) indicate the perceived overall mental workload 
was low to moderate.  The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 92. 
For the off-nominal trials, there was a statistically significant effect for Map condition, F(1, 44) = 
8.305, p = 0.006) and for the Map by NACp interaction (F(1, 44) = 4.478, p = 0.040) but not for the 
NACp condition (F(1, 44) = 2.647, p = 0.111) (Appendix I, Table I.51).  Pilots tended to rate the Map D 
condition (µ = 48.0, σ = 11.9) as higher in mental workload than the Map C condition (µ = 38.6, σ = 11.9) 
(Appendix I, Table I.52); however, these TLX ratings are not practically significant as they both reflect a 
moderate level of mental workload.  The more interesting finding is the Map by NACp interaction (Figure 
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93) which demonstrates that pilots significantly increased their mental workload ratings when using the 
Map D and NACp 9 condition, which was significantly different from all other Map by NACp conditions.  
The number of responses for each rating value is presented in Figure 94. 
 
 
Figure 91.  SART Situational Awareness Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
 
 
Figure 92.  TLX Workload Data for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
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Figure 93.  TLX Workload Map by NACp Interaction. 
 
 
Figure 94.  TLX Workload Data for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
6.2.3.2 Part 2 Final Questionnaire Results 
At the conclusion of the testing, the evaluation pilots completed a final questionnaire.  All questions 
along with the pilots’ responses can be found in Appendix J. 
6.2.3.2.1 STBO 
The pilots were neutral in rating STBO for increasing workload compared to current surface 
operations (µ = 4.2, σ = 1.9) (Figure J.11); however, they did feel that STBO would increase their general 
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situation awareness (µ = 6.2, σ = 1.2) (Figure J.12).  They moderately agreed that STBO will increase 
efficiency (µ = 5.0, σ = 1.6) (Figure J.13) and safety (µ = 5.1, σ = 2.0) (Figure J.14) for ground movement 
of aircraft.  Pilots generally commented that STBO negatively impacts workload and reduces the ability to 
watch for other traffic.  Additional comments were that STBO can be distracting; takes one pilot out of 
the loop; realistic taxi speed and parameters should be utilized as aircraft performance differs, large 
aircraft must consistently manage their energy and momentum; and STBO works in a “sterile” 
environment; however, taxi operations differ among fleets and airports.  Concerns were expressed 
regarding how the STBO system will account for routing modifications, STBO guidance non-compliance, 
and taxi errors.  One pilot felt that STBO merely moves the queue from the runway to the very congested 
ramp area. 
6.2.3.2.2 STBO Symbology 
Pilot ratings indicated that STBO would cause a moderate increase in head-down time compared to 
current-day operations (µ = 4.8, σ = 2.0) (Figure J.15).  Pilots commented that STBO caused more heads-
down time than normal.  The pilots felt that STBO information should be located on the AMM on the ND 
display (18 pilots), HUD (15 pilots), and an AMM located on the EFB (14 pilots); however, they did not 
feel STBO information should be location on the PFD (3 pilots) (pilots were requested to select all that 
were required) (Figure J.16). 
The Captains agreed that the advised ground speed information on the HUD was useful in helping 
meet the RTA (µ = 5.8, σ = 1.8) (Figure J.18); however, they also felt that the advised ground speed 
alone, without any other STBO guidance information, was not optimal (µ = 3.6, σ = 2.0) (Figure J.19).  
Many pilots recommended also displaying the RTA time deviation (seconds early/late) on the HUD.  
Other recommendations were adding a steering arrow below the aircraft symbol, vertical scale bar 
showing advised GS as a mark along the scale, or a bar that expands above/below wing symbol for 
early/late status.  They did slightly agree that STBO taxi operations could be performed adequately 
without displaying STBO guidance information on the HUD (µ = 4.8, σ = 2.0) (Figure J.21).  Pilot 
comments on HUD use during STBO ranged from integrating as much as possible with the HUD to not 
believing the HUD is useful in taxi operations.  One pilot recommended integration into wearable glasses 
for ground operations. 
Pilots who used Map Condition C (see Appendix J, Question 31) indicated that it was easy to tell if 
they were going to reach the guidance end point on time, ahead of time, or behind schedule (µ = 6.4, σ = 
0.9) (Figure J.23).  To improve this rating, pilots suggested using the words ‘early’/’late’ instead of +/-,  
blink the guidance end point symbol (green diamond) if off of STBO guidance, or include a verbal 
prompt if more than 15 seconds from STBO guidance.  The pilots were asked to rate the usefulness of the 
STBO symbology elements for helping to meet the RTA.  All symbology elements were rated as being 
useful:  STBO time status (seconds early/late) (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.8), advised ground speed (µ = 6.3, σ = 0.9), 
guidance end point (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.6), and selected traffic information (µ = 5.5, σ = 1.6) (Figure J.24, 
Table J.6).  They felt the selected traffic information (textual information) was somewhat useful in 
determining the intent of the aircraft (µ = 5.4, σ = 1.5) (Figure J.25).  Comments regarding Map 
Condition C included; selected traffic information was too cluttered; turn speeds were too slow (should 
not be below 8 kts); and would like to be provided graphical display of traffic’s cleared route, traffic’s 
projected location, and right-of-way information. 
Pilots that used Map Condition D (see Appendix J, Question 35) also indicated that it was easy to tell 
if they were going to reach the guidance end point on time, ahead of time, or behind schedule (µ = 6.0, σ 
= 1.1) (Figure J.28).  To improve this rating, pilots suggested flashing the GS readout if excess GS is 
maintained for a certain period of time, add bar above/below wing symbol to indicate advised GS, and 
provide right-of-way information.  The pilots were asked to rate the usefulness of the STBO symbology 
elements for helping to meet the RTA.  The overall ratings were as follows:  traffic intent information 
(graphical) (µ = 6.5, σ = 0.7), advised ground speed (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.0), graphical STBO guidance (µ = 5.8, 
σ = 1.5), selected traffic information (µ = 5.3, σ = 1.6), guidance end point (µ = 5.3, σ = 1.5), and STBO 
  
78 
time status (seconds early/late) (µ = 5.3, σ = 1.6) (Figure J.29, Table J.7).  For the Map D condition, the 
symbology elements usefulness was rated differently between Captains and First Officers (Table 20), 
particularly for the selected traffic information.  The Captain had to focus more attention out the window 
and was not able to read this head-down textual information as readily as the First Officer.  The pilots 
were neutral regarding the usefulness of the selected (textual) traffic information (µ = 4.4, σ = 2.0) 
(Figure J.30); however, they felt that the graphical traffic intent information (traffic taxi route and 
guidance circles) was useful for determining the intent of aircraft (µ = 6.0, σ = 1.2) (Figure J.31), thus 
implying a preference for graphical information.  It was observed during the testing that the graphical 
intent information was easier to use than the textual intent information.  However, the graphical 
symbology was also confusing to some as evidence by two crews misinterpreting the symbology.  
Comments regarding Map Condition D included, increase turn speeds to 9 or 10 kts, use a status bar 
instead of the white open circle to show trend information, show taxi route for any traffic selected, and 
preferred graphical traffic route depiction. 
Table 20.  Usefulness of Map D STBO Symbology Elements per Pilot Position. 
Captain First Officer 
Traffic Intent Information,           µ = 6.33, σ = 0.82 Traffic Intent Information,           µ = 6.67, σ = 0.52 
Advised Ground Speed,               µ = 5.83, σ = 1.33  Selected Traffic Information,       µ = 6.33, σ = 0.82 
Guidance End Point,                    µ = 5.83, σ = 1.47 Advised Ground Speed,               µ = 6.17, σ = 0.75  
Graphical STBO Guidance,         µ = 5.67, σ = 1.97 Graphical STBO Guidance,         µ = 6.00, σ = 0.89 
STBO Time Status,                      µ = 4.50, σ = 1.64 STBO Time Status,                      µ = 6.00, σ = 1.26 
Selected Traffic Information,       µ = 4.33, σ = 1.51 Guidance End Point,                    µ = 4.60, σ = 1.34 
6.2.3.2.3 CD&R Symbology and STBO 
The pilots agreed that the CD&R system was effectively integrated with the STBO display concepts 
(µ = 5.8, σ = 1.0) (Figure J.45) and that CD&R was effective during STBO (µ = 5.5, σ = 1.1) (Figure 
J.46).  The pilots slightly agreed that the traffic intent information was useful in identifying traffic conflict 
situations when using either map condition (Map C, µ = 5.3, σ = 1.8 (Figure J.26); Map D, µ = 5.7, σ = 
1.9 (Figure J.32)).  Pilots commented that IA should be added to the HUD. 
7 Conclusions 
A piloted simulation study was conducted to evaluate the ability to conduct safe and efficient airport 
surface operations while utilizing an AMM displaying traffic of various position accuracies, as well as the 
effect of traffic position accuracy on airport CD&R capability.  Also, the ability to safely conduct STBO 
was evaluated by assessing the impact of providing traffic intent information, CD&R system capability, 
and the display of STBO guidance to the flight crew on both a head-down display and HUD. 
AMM, Traffic Position Accuracy, and CD&R Capability - Collisions and near collisions occurred 
more frequently when conflict traffic could only be viewed OTW, were reduced when conflict traffic 
could be view on an AMM, and were eliminated when CD&R capability was provided.  A collision or 
near-collision occurred on each trial in which the conflict traffic was not displayed on the AMM 
(transmitting NACp 8 accuracy).  The number of collisions and near-collisions were reduced when all 
traffic was displayed on the AMM, including traffic transmitting NACp 8 accuracy; however, collisions 
still occurred when the conflict traffic was not viewed on the AMM or the position accuracy was reduced, 
making the pilots unsure of the aircraft’s true location.  There were no collisions when IAs were 
generated on the conflict traffic (transmitting NACp ≥ 10 accuracy), notifying the flight crew of the 
potential conflict situation.  These outcomes are supported by the qualitative results. 
The test subjects thought that all the traffic should be displayed on the AMM, regardless of the 
position accuracy level, to provide a higher level of traffic awareness, increased safety, and to reduce the 
potential for accidents, but perhaps a distinction should be made in the symbology representing traffic 
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transmitting a higher accuracy versus traffic transmitting a lower accuracy (NACp 8).  There are some 
concerns with displaying traffic transmitting less accurate NACp 8 position accuracy, however.  Due to 
the level of position uncertainty, pilots were sometimes unsure if the traffic was actually on the runway 
and continued the operation, resulting in collision.  Further testing is required to determine the full effect 
of displaying less accurate data on an AMM for runway safety. 
The CD&R system was very effective in preventing collisions; no collisions occurred when IAs were 
generated for conflicting traffic.  With the current design, however, nuisance alerts were issued on traffic 
in the ramp area due to position accuracy, even at the NACp 10 level, suggesting CD&R alerting only be 
provided in the movement area due to the close proximity of aircraft in the ramp area.  IA toggling also 
occurred.  IA toggling happens when multiple instances of indications or alerts are generated as a result of 
position accuracy or aircraft maneuvering.  Alert toggling can be a distraction to the flight crew and could 
cause mistrust in the technology. 
Surface Trajectory-Based Operations - STBO was a new concept for the test subjects.  On 98 percent 
of the trials, the flight crews met their RTA at the end of the taxi route within +/- 10 seconds, well within 
the acceptable performance bounds of +/- 15 seconds of RTA.  They also had very good STBO 
conformance during straight taxi segments, on 93% of the trials the crews were within +/- 15 seconds of 
the planned guidance.  However, some of the design aspects of STBO (slow start-up at the release time, 
slow speeds in turns) were quickly identified by the crews and some of the pilots started advancing the 
throttles slightly before the taxi release time and ‘gaming’ the turns (i.e., going into them late so the turn 
could be taken faster).  Conformance, therefore, varied widely at these locations.  
If compliance along the route is necessary, explicit intermediate RTAs/waypoints will be needed.  
Effective STBO will also need to account for SOPs, crew procedures, aircraft type and aircraft loadings, 
traffic, taxi route, prevailing visibility, and passenger comfort. 
The display of traffic intent information was found to be helpful, particularly to the first officer.  
Graphical presentation of intent was preferred over textual presentation; however, the method of 
presentation must be optimized in either case.  The current graphical implementation was the cause of 
three wrong turns because the pilot mistakenly thought that their aircraft was at the location of the intent 
symbology. 
The CD&R system was minimally effective during STBO because the traffic was visible out-the-
window (1,800 ft visibility).  The flight crews were always aware of the traffic prior to any alerts being 
generated.  Interestingly, two collisions occurred because the flight crews were early in reaching the 
intersection and turned in front of traffic; subsequently, the automated traffic taxied into the ownship as 
the crew was following their STBO guidance.  Alerts were not generated on these aircraft, so perhaps the 
crew was more willing to proceed ahead of the traffic.  In some instances, alerts were issued when the 
ownship was following the traffic after turning at the intersection.  
Overall, the test subjects were neutral regarding the ability of STBO to increase efficiency but 
indicated STBO would increase situation awareness and safety.  The pilots expressed concern for 
increased workload, the ability to watch for other traffic, and increased head-down time.  Although not 
evaluated, pilots expressed concerns regarding how an STBO system will account for modifications to 
routing, STBO guidance non-compliance, and taxi errors.  
Summary – A CD&R system can potentially eliminate runway collisions, while display of airport 
traffic on an AMM will help prevent collisions over the ability to only view traffic OTW.  Although pilots 
prefer display of all traffic on an AMM for increased traffic awareness, further research is necessary to 
determine the effect on runway safety of displaying traffic that is transmitting less accurate data.  A 
CD&R system can be very effective in preventing runway collisions; however, may not be as effective in 
the ramp area due to the close proximity of traffic. 
The STBO concept tested showed potential for enabling the flight crew to safely conduct STBO 
operations.  Additional research is needed to determine the most effective information and display method 
for STBO pilot conformance and the effectiveness of CD&R during STBO operations. 
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Appendix A:  Part 1 Test Matrix 
 
Crew  n (n = 1 to 12) 
 
Scenario  A1      (101) = Nominal – 36C approach, land, taxi to ramp 
  A2      (102) = Nominal – 18C approach, land, taxi to ramp 
  D1      (103) = Nominal – taxi from ramp and depart 36C 
  D2      (104) = Nominal – taxi from ramp and depart 18C 
  ONA   (105) = 36C Taxi conflict approach 
  OND   (106) = 36C Departure/taxi conflict 
  TA      (901) = Training – 36L approach, land, taxi to ramp 
  TD      (902) = Training – taxi from ramp and depart 18R 
  TONA (903) = Training – 36L arrival/taxi conflict 
 
Map Concept A = ownship, no route, qualified traffic 
  B = ownship, no route, unqualified & qualified traffic 
 
HUD  No = HUD not used 
 
Conflict Traffic 8 = unqualified traffic 
NACp  9 = qualified for SURF application 
  10 = qualified for SURF and SURF IA applications 
  N/A = Not applicable 
 
Visibility (Vis) 1 = 1800 ft RVR, day 
  2 = 3nm, day 
 
CD&R Indications and alerts on traffic with NACp 10 or 11 only 
 
Wind:     0 = no winds 
  1 = 10 kts at 020, for use with 36 runways 
  2 = 15 kts at 150, for use with 18 runways 
 
 
Definitions: 
SURF qualified traffic = NACp 9+ accuracy 
SURF IA qualified traffic = NACP 10+ accuracy 
Unqualified traffic = NACp 8 
 
Note: 
Part 1 – traffic mix of NACp 8+ 
 
3 training scenarios before Part 1 - TA, TD, and TONA 
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Part 1 Test Matrix 
 
Case No. Crew Scenario Map 
Concept 
HUD Conflict Traffic 
NACp 
Vis Wind 
1 All A1 A No N/A 1 1 
2 All A2 A No N/A 1 2 
3 All D1 A No N/A 1 0 
4 All D2 A No N/A 1 0 
5 All A1 B No N/A 1 1 
6 All A2 B No N/A 1 2 
7 All D1 B No N/A 1 0 
8 All D2 B No N/A 1 0 
9 1, 5, 9 ONA A No 8 1 0 
10 3, 7, 11 ONA B No 8 1 0 
11 3, 7, 11 OND A No 8 1 0 
12 1, 5, 9 OND B No 8 1 0 
13 2, 6, 10 ONA A No 9 1 0 
14 4, 8, 12 ONA A No 10 1 0 
15 4, 8, 12 OND A No 9 1 0 
16 2, 6, 10 OND A No 10 1 0 
Training Scenarios 
Case No. Crew Scenario Map 
Concept 
HUD Conflict Traffic 
NACp 
Vis Wind 
41 All TA A No N/A 2 1 
42 All TD B No N/A 2 0 
43 All TONA A No 10 2 1 
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Appendix B:  Part 1 Nominal Scenarios 
Two approach and two departure nominal scenarios were used for Part 1 testing.  All nominal 
scenarios were designed to be conflict free, provided the crew followed the ATC instructions and 
executed them in a timely manner. 
Part 1 Nominal Scenario – Approach Runway 36C 
An approach and departure flow was implemented as follows.  Traffic were approaching Runway 
36C (Figure B.1, magenta route) and Runway 36L (Figure B.1, orange route), spaced 5 nm apart and 
staggered between runways.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied to the terminal via the 
routes shown in Figure B.1.  There was a departure flow to Runway 36R via the blue colored route shown 
in Figure B.1.  The traffic held at Runway 36C until after an aircraft landed, then crossed to Runway 36R 
for departure approximately every 3 minutes.  One aircraft would cross Runway 36C after every other 
arrival, for a rate of 1 departure for every 2 arrivals.  Other static traffic was placed in strategic locations 
to add interest to the scenario. 
At the beginning of this scenario, the ownship was approximately 5 nm from the runway threshold on 
approach to Runway 36C.  The flight crew was cleared to land, exit the runway at Taxiway C5, and taxi 
to the terminal via Taxiways C5, K, and J (Figure B.1, magenta route). 
Part 1 Nominal Scenario – Approach Runway 18C 
An approach and departure flow was implemented as follows.  Traffic were approaching Runway 
18R (Figure B.2, orange route) and Runway 18C (Figure B.1, magenta route), spaced 5 nm apart and 
staggered between runways.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied to the terminal via the 
routes shown in Figure B.2.  There was a departure flow to Runway 18L via the blue colored route shown 
in Figure B.2.  The traffic would depart approximately every 3 minutes, for a rate 1 departure for every 2 
arrivals.  Other static traffic was placed in strategic locations to add interest to the scenario. 
At the beginning of this scenario, ownship was approximately 5 nm from the runway threshold on 
approach to Runway 18C.  The flight crew was cleared to land, exit the runway at Taxiway C2, and taxi 
to the terminal via Taxiways C2, P, and P1 (Figure B.2, magenta route). 
Part 1 Nominal Scenario – Departure Runway 36C 
An approach and departure flow was implemented as follows.  Traffic were approaching Runway 
36R (Figure B.3, blue route) and Runway 36L (Figure B.3, orange route), spaced 5 nm apart and 
staggered between runways.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied to the terminal via the 
routes shown in Figure B.3.  There was a departure flow to Runway 36C via the magenta colored route 
shown in Figure B.3.  The traffic would depart approximately every 3 minutes, for a rate 1 departure for 
every 2 arrivals.  Other static traffic was placed in strategic locations to add interest to the scenario. 
At the beginning of this scenario, the ownship was on the ramp near Taxiway J.  The flight crew was 
cleared to taxi to Runway 36C via Taxiways J and R for departure (Figure B.3, magenta route). 
Part 1 Nominal Scenario – Departure Runway 18C 
An approach and departure flow was implemented as follows.  Traffic were approaching Runway 
18R (Figure B.4, orange route) and Runway 18L (Figure B.4, blue route), spaced 5 nm apart and 
staggered between runways.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied to the terminal via the 
routes shown in Figure B.4.  There was a departure flow to Runway 18C via the magenta colored route 
shown in Figure B.4.  The traffic would depart approximately every 3 minutes, for a rate 1 departure for 
every 2 arrivals.  Other static traffic was placed in strategic locations to add interest to the scenario. 
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At the beginning of this scenario, the ownship was on the ramp near Taxiway J.  The flight crew was 
cleared to taxi to Runway 18C via Taxiways J, K, C and C8 for departure (Figure B.4, magenta route). 
 
 
Figure B.1.  36C Approach Scenario.           Figure B.2.  18C Approach Scenario. 
 
 
Figure B.3.  36C Departure Scenario.           Figure B.4.  18C Departure Scenario. 
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Appendix C:  Part 1 Case Lists 
The experimental case order for each crew for Part 1 testing is listed in Tables C.1 and C.2.  Refer to 
Appendix A for a detailed description of each case. 
 
Table C.1.  Part 1 Case Order for Crews 1 through 6. 
 
 Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Crew 4 Crew 5 Crew 6 
Run 1 5 7 8 6 6 8 
Run 2 2 5 1 7 2 5 
Run 3 1 6 4 8 3 7 
Run 4 4 8 3 5 1 6 
Run 5 3 3 2 4 4 3 
Run 6 9 13 11 14 9 16 
Run 7 7 2 5 3 8 4 
Run 8 8 4 6 2 7 1 
Run 9 6 1 7 1 5 2 
Run 10 12 16 10 15 12 13 
 
 
Table C.2.  Part 1 Case List for Crews 7 through 12. 
 
 Crew 7 Crew 8 Crew 9 Crew 10 Crew 11 Crew 12 
Run 1 3 5 1 6 2 8 
Run 2 6 6 7 5 8 7 
Run 3 7 8 5 7 5 6 
Run 4 8 7 6 8 6 5 
Run 5 5 3 8 1 7 2 
Run 6 10 15 12 13 10 14 
Run 7 4 2 2 3 3 1 
Run 8 2 1 3 2 1 4 
Run 9 9 4 4 4 4 3 
Run 10 11 14 9 16 11 15 
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Appendix D:  Part 2 Test Matrix 
 
Crew  n (n = 1 to 12) 
 
Scenario  4D1a  (201) = 4D taxi from ramp to departure runway 
  4D1b  (202) = 4D taxi from ramp to departure runway 
  4D2a  (203) = 4D taxi from ramp to departure runway 
  4D2b  (204) = 4D taxi from ramp to departure runway 
  ONT   (205) = Taxi conflict 
  ONT2 (206) = Taxi conflict 
  T4D    (904) = Training – 4D taxi from ramp to departure runway 
  TONT (905) = Training – taxi conflict on SURF IA qualified traffic 
 
Map Concept C = ownship, route, traffic, ownship 4D text 
  D = Map C + ownship & traffic graphical 4D 
 
HUD  No = HUD not used 
  Yes = 4D text + standard symbology 
 
Conflict Traffic 9 = qualified for SURF application 
NACp  10 = qualified for SURF and SURF IA applications 
  N/A = Not applicable 
 
Visibility (Vis) 1 = 1800 ft RVR, day 
  2 = 3nm, day 
 
CD&R Indications and alerts on traffic with NACp 10 or 11 only 
 
Wind:    0 = no winds 
 
 
Definitions: 
SURF qualified traffic = NACp 9+ accuracy 
SURF IA qualified traffic = NACP 10+ accuracy 
Unqualified traffic = NACp 8 
 
Note: 
Part 2 – traffic mix of NACp 9+ 
 
3 training scenarios before Part 2 - T4D with Map C, T4D with Map D, and TONT 
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Part 2 Test Matrix 
 
Run 
No. 
Crew Scenario Map 
Concept 
HUD Conflict Traffic 
NACp 
Vis Wind 
17 1, 5, 9 4D1a C No N/A 1 0 
18 1, 5, 9 4D1b C Yes N/A 1 0 
19 1, 5, 9 4D2a C Yes N/A 1 0 
20 1, 5, 9 4D2b C No N/A 1 0 
21 1, 5, 9 ONT C No 9 1 0 
22 1, 5, 9 ONT2 C No 10 1 0 
23 3, 7, 11 4D1a C Yes N/A 1 0 
24 3, 7, 11 4D1b C No N/A 1 0 
25 3, 7, 11 4D2a C No N/A 1 0 
26 3, 7, 11 4D2b C Yes N/A 1 0 
27 3, 7, 11 ONT C No 10 1 0 
28 3, 7, 11 ONT2 C No 9 1 0 
29 2, 6, 10 4D1a D No N/A 1 0 
30 2, 6, 10 4D1b D Yes N/A 1 0 
31 2, 6, 10 4D2a D Yes N/A 1 0 
32 2, 6, 10 4D2b D No N/A 1 0 
33 2, 6, 10 ONT D No 9 1 0 
34 2, 6, 10 ONT2 D No 10 1 0 
35 4, 8, 12 4D1a D Yes N/A 1 0 
36 4, 8, 12 4D1b D No N/A 1 0 
37 4, 8, 12 4D2a D No N/A 1 0 
38 4, 8, 12 4D2b D Yes N/A 1 0 
39 4, 8, 12 ONT D No 10 1 0 
40 4, 8, 12 ONT2 D No 9 1 0 
Training Scenarios 
Run 
No. 
Crew Scenario Map 
Concept 
HUD Conflict Traffic 
NACp 
Vis Wind 
44 1, 5, 9, 3, 
7, 11 
T4D C Yes 10 2 0 
45 1, 5, 9, 3, 
7, 11 
T4D C No 10 2 0 
46 1, 5, 9, 3, 
7, 11 
TONT C No 10 2 0 
47 2, 6, 10 4, 
8, 12 
T4D D Yes 10 2 0 
48 2, 6, 10 4, 
8, 12 
T4D D No 10 2 0 
49 2, 6, 10 4, 
8, 12 
TONT D No 10 2 0 
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Appendix E:  Part 2 Nominal Scenarios 
Four STBO taxi nominal scenarios were used for Part 2 testing.  All nominal scenarios were designed 
to be conflict free, provided the crew followed the ATC instructions and STBO guidance.  A detailed 
description of the STBO taxi procedure is given in the Part 2 Procedure section above. 
Part 2 Nominal Scenarios – STBO Taxi Runway 36C 
Two STBO taxi scenarios were conducted to Runway 36C.  These two scenarios were the same 
except that ownship had a different starting location so the flight crews would not learn to anticipate the 
clearance.  This was done in order to have similar scenarios for analysis purposes 
An approach and departure flow was implemented as follows.  Traffic were approaching Runway 
36R (Figure E.1 and E.2, blue route) and Runway 36L (Figure E.1 and E.2, orange route), spaced 5 nm 
apart and staggered between runways.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied to the terminal 
via the routes shown in Figures E.1 and E.2.  There were two departure flows to Runway 36C via the 
green and magenta colored routes shown in Figures E.1 and E.2.  The traffic would depart approximately 
every 3 minutes, for a rate 1 departure for every 2 arrivals.  Other static traffic was placed in strategic 
locations to add interest to the scenario. 
At the beginning of these scenarios, the ownship was parked in the ramp facing Taxiway L and was 
then cleared to GPM 32.  For each scenario, the crew was given taxi clearance and STBO guidance to taxi 
to Runway 36C.  In one scenario, the taxi clearance was via Taxiways L, S, and R (Figure E.1, magenta 
route).  For the other scenario, the taxi clearance was via Taxiways J, P, S, and R (Figure E.2, magenta 
route). 
Part 2 Nominal Scenarios – STBO Taxi Runway 18R 
Two STBO taxi scenarios were conducted to Runway 18R.  Again, these two scenarios were the same 
except that the ownship had a different starting location. 
An approach and departure flow was implemented as follows.  Traffic was approaching Runway 18C 
(Figure E.3 and E.4, orange route), spaced 5 nm apart.  This traffic landed, exited the runway, and taxied 
to the terminal.  There were departure flows to Runway 18R via Taxiway A, N, and M9 and from the 
terminal ramp via Taxiway N and M9.  The traffic would depart approximately every 3 minutes, for a rate 
1 departure for every arrival.  Other static traffic was placed in strategic locations to add interest to the 
scenario. 
One aircraft taxied along Taxiway A, toward the Taxiway A/C intersection.  The aircraft turned south 
onto Taxiway C following the green route shown in Figures E.3 and E.4.  This aircraft appeared as if it 
could be a potential threat for the ownship; however, as long as the flight crew followed the STBO taxi 
guidance, the traffic aircraft would trail ownship, giving the subject crew plenty of time to turn in front of 
the aircraft. 
For one of the scenarios, the ownship started at the ramp near GPM 13 and was given clearance to 
Runway 18R via Taxiways C, A, N, and M9 (Figure E.3).  For the other scenario, the ownship began on 
the ramp near GPM 14 and was given clearance to Runway 18R via Taxiways V, C, A, N, and M9 
(Figure E.4). 
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    Figure E.1.  STBO 36C Taxi Scenario.                   Figure E.2.  STBO 36C Taxi Scenario. 
 
 
 
    Figure E.3.  STBO 18R Taxi Scenario.                    Figure E.4.  STBO 18R Taxi Scenario. 
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Appendix F:  Part 2 Case Lists 
The experimental case order for each crew for Part 2 testing is listed in Tables F.1 and F.2.  Refer to 
Appendix D for a detailed description of each case. 
 
Table F.1.  Part 2 Case List for Crews 1 through 6. 
 
 Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Crew 4 Crew 5 Crew 6 
Run 1 18 31 23 38 19 30 
Run 2 19 30 26 35 18 31 
Run 3 22 34 28 40 22 34 
Run 4 17 32 25 36 20 29 
Run 5 20 29 24 37 17 32 
Run 6 21 33 27 39 21 33 
 
 
Table F.2.  Part 2 Case List for Crews 7 through 12. 
 
 Crew 7 Crew 8 Crew 9 Crew 10 Crew 11 Crew 12 
Run 1 24 37 17 32 25 36 
Run 2 25 36 20 29 24 37 
Run 3 28 40 22 34 28 40 
Run 4 26 35 18 31 26 38 
Run 5 23 38 19 30 23 35 
Run 6 27 39 21 33 27 39 
 
  
95 
Appendix G:  Post Run Questionnaires 
At the end of each test trial, the evaluation pilots completed a post run questionnaire (Tables G.1 and 
G.2), a Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) questionnaire to evaluate situation awareness 
(Table G.3), and a Task Load Index (TLX) questionnaire to rate workload (Table G.4). 
 
Table G.1.  Part 1 Post Run Questionnaire. 
Post-Run Ratings 
Please rate agreement with 
statements based on display 
condition just evaluated 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree  
Slightly  
Agree 
Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
A. I was aware of ownship position.        
B. I was aware of traffic and other 
vehicles during operations. 
 
      
C. The display concepts were 
effective for management of mental 
workload. 
       
D. The display concepts contributed 
to communication effectiveness 
(ATC and Flight Crew). 
 
      
E. The display promoted effective 
crew resource management, 
coordination, and cohesion. 
       
F. The display concepts contributed 
to perceived safety during operation 
(if unsafe, please state to researcher 
and reason why). 
 
      
G. The display concepts were 
effective for detection of potential 
surface conflicts. 
.       
 
  
Task Management 
Communicative Efficacy 
Hazard Awareness 
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Table G.2.  Part 2 Post Run Questionnaire. 
Post-Run Ratings 
Please rate agreement with statements 
based on display condition just 
evaluated 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree  
Slightly  
Agree 
Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
A. I was aware of ownship position.        
B. The display concepts were 
effective for maintaining my situation 
awareness of ownship. 
 
 
     
C. I was aware of traffic and other 
vehicles during operations. 
       
D. The display concepts provided 
effective awareness of traffic intent 
information. 
       
E. The display concepts were 
effective for required time-of-arrival 
taxi conformance. 
 
 
     
F. The display location of STBO taxi 
guidance information was effective 
for situation awareness. 
       
G. The display location of STBO taxi 
guidance information was effective 
for mental workload. 
       
H. The display concepts contributed 
to perceived safety during operation 
(if unsafe, please state to researcher 
and reason why). 
 
 
     
I. The display concepts were effective 
for detection of potential surface 
conflicts during STBO taxi. 
       
 
  
Task Management 
Communicative Efficacy 
Hazard Awareness 
  
97 
Table G.3.  Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART). 
Situation Awareness Ratings Low....................................High 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SART #1  Demand on Attentional Resources 
How much demand was placed on attention due to complexity and 
variability of the task? 
       
SART #2  Supply of Attentional Resources 
How much spare attention and mental ability was available during 
the task? 
       
SART #3  Understanding 
What was the level of understanding of information and familiarity 
of the situation? 
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Table G.4.  Task Load Index (TLX). 
 
 
 
  
  
99 
Appendix H.  Part 1 Run Questionnaire Results 
 
Part 1 Post Run Questionnaire Results 
 
Question A.  I was aware of ownship position. 
 
Table H.1.  Question A ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.800 1 0.800 2.707 0.102 
Error 55.563 188 0.296   
Total 8693.000 190    
 
 
Table H.2.  Question A Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.8 0.5 96 
B 6.5 0.7 94 
Total 6.6 0.6 190 
 
 
Table H.3.  Question A ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.375 1 0.375 3.667 0.069 
Error 2.250 22 0.102   
Total 1137.000 24    
 
 
Table H.4.  Question A Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 7.0 0.0 12 
B 6.8 0.5 12 
Total 6.9 0.3 24 
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Table H.5.  Question A ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 2.667 2 1.333 3.882 0.031 
Error 11.333 33 0.343   
Total 1614.000 36    
 
Table H.6.  Question A Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 7.0 0.0 12 
9 6.3 0.9 12 
10 6.7 0.5 12 
Total 6.7 0.6 36 
 
 
Question B.  I was aware of traffic and other vehicles during operations. 
 
Table H.7.  Question B ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.590 1 0.590 0.466 0.496 
Error 238.063 188 1.266   
Total 7742.000 190    
 
Table H.8.  Question B Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.1 0.8 96 
B 6.1 1.0 94 
Total 6.1 0.9 190 
 
Table H.9.  Question B ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 35.042 1 35.042 7.954 0.010 
Error 96.917 22 4.405   
Total 557.000 24    
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Table H.10.  Question B Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 3.0 2.1 12 
B 5.4 2.1 12 
Total 4.2 2.4 24 
 
Table H.11.  Question B ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 57.167 2 28.583 10.271 0.000 
Error 91.833 33 2.783   
Total 878.000 36    
 
Table H.12.  Question B Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 3.0 2.1 12 
9 4.4 1.7 12 
10 6.1 1.1 12 
Total 4.5 2.1 36 
 
 
Question C.  The display concepts were effective for management of mental workload. 
 
Table H.13.  Question C ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.343 1 0.343 0.338 0.562 
Error 191.110 188 1.017   
Total 7298.000 190    
 
Table H.14.  Question C Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.1 0.8 96 
B 6.0 1.1 94 
Total 6.1 0.9 190 
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Table H.15.  Question C ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 3.375 1 3.375 1.665 0.210 
Error 44.583 22 2.027   
Total 785.000 24    
 
Table H.16.  Question C Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 5.2 1.8 12 
B 5.9 1.0 12 
Total 5.5 1.4 24 
 
Table H.17.  Question C ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 4.667 2 2.333 1.179 0.320 
Error 65.333 33 1.980   
Total 1094.000 36    
 
Table H.18.  Question C Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 5.2 1.8 12 
9 5.0 1.4 12 
10 5.8 0.9 12 
Total 5.3 1.4 36 
 
 
Question D.  The display concepts contributed to communication effectiveness (ATC and flight 
crew). 
 
Table H.19.  Question D ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.001 1 0.001 0.001 0.981 
Error 192.868 188 1.026   
Total 6973.000 190    
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Table H.20.  Question D Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.1 0.7 96 
B 6.0 1.1 94 
Total 6.1 0.9 190 
 
 
Table H.21.  Question D ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 4.167 1 4.167 1.774 0.196 
Error 51.667 22 2.348   
Total 804.000 24    
 
 
Table H.22.  Question D Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 5.2 1.8 12 
B 6.0 1.3 12 
Total 5.6 1.6 24 
 
 
Table H.23.  Question D ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 7.389 2 3.694 2.049 0.145 
Error 59.500 33 1.803   
Total 1134.000 36    
 
 
Table H.24.  Question D Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 5.2 1.8 12 
9 5.1 1.4 12 
10 6.1 0.7 12 
Total 5.4 1.4 36 
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Question E.  The display promoted effective crew resource management, coordination, and cohesion. 
 
Table H.25.  Question E ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 2.531 1 2.531 2.843 0.093 
Error 167.411 188 0.890   
Total 7387.000 190    
 
 
Table H.26.  Question E Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.2 0.8 96 
B 5.9 1.1 94 
Total 6.1 0.9 190 
 
 
Table H.27.  Question E ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 5.042 1 5.042 1.276 0.271 
Error 86.917 22 3.951   
Total 743.000 24    
 
 
Table H.28.  Question E Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 4.8 2.1 12 
B 5.7 1.8 12 
Total 5.2 2.0 24 
 
 
Table H.29.  Question E ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 20.722 2 10.361 3.878 0.031 
Error 88.167 33 2.672   
Total 1176.000 36    
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Table H.30.  Question E Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 4.8 2.1 12 
9 5.1 1.7 12 
10 6.5 0.7 12 
Total 5.4 1.8 36 
 
 
Question F.  The display concepts contributed to perceived safety during operation. 
 
Table H.31.  Question F ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.241 1 0.241 0.268 0.605 
Error 168.938 188 0.899   
Total 7448.000 190    
 
 
Table H.32.  Question F Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.2 0.8 96 
B 6.0 1.0 94 
Total 6.1 0.9 190 
 
 
Table H.33.  Question F ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 12.042 1 12.042 2.179 0.154 
Error 121.583 22 5.527   
Total 647.000 24    
 
 
Table H.34.  Question F Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition.. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 3.9 2.5 12 
B 5.3 2.2 12 
Total 4.6 2.4 24 
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Table H.35.  Question F ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 48.667 2 24.333 8.023 0.001 
Error 100.083 33 3.033   
Total 1141.000 36    
 
 
Table H.36.  Question F Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 3.9 2.5 12 
9 5.1 1.6 12 
10 6.8 0.5 12 
Total 5.3 2.1 36 
 
 
Question G.  The display concepts were effective for detection of potential surface conflicts. 
 
Table H.37.  Question G ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 100.042 1 100.042 53.790 0.000 
Error 40.917 22 1.860   
Total 401.000 24    
 
 
Table H.38.  Question G Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 1.3 0.5 12 
B 5.3 1.9 12 
Total 3.3 2.5 24 
 
 
Table H.39.  Question G ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 176.056 2 88.028 50.229 0.000 
Error 57.833 33 1.753   
Total 794.000 36    
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Table H.40.  Question G Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 1.3 0.5 12 
9 3.9 2.2 12 
10 6.7 0.5 12 
Total 3.9 2.6 36 
 
Part 1 Questionnaire Constructs Results 
 
Task Management 
 
Table H.41.  Task Management Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.023 1 0.023 0.042 0.837 
Error 103.661 188 0.551   
Total 7839.222 190    
 
Table H.42.  Task Management Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.3 0.8 288 
B 6.2 1.0 282 
Total 6.3 0.9 570 
 
Table H.43.  Task Management Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for 
Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 5.671 1 5.671 4.481 0.046 
Error 27.843 22 1.266   
Total 770.556 24    
 
Table H.44.  Task Management Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for 
Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 5.1 2.3 36 
B 6.0 1.4 36 
Total 5.5 1.9 72 
 
 
  
108 
Table H.45.  Task Management Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for 
NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 8.907 2 4.454 4.228 0.023 
Error 34.759 33 1.053   
Total 1132.667 36    
 
Table H.46.  Task Management Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for 
NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 5.1 2.3 36 
9 5.3 1.6 36 
10 6.2 0.9 36 
Total 5.5 1.7 108 
 
 
Communicative Efficacy 
 
Table H.47.  Communicative Efficacy Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.614 1 0.614 0.777 0.379 
Error 148.496 188 0.790   
Total 7146.000 190    
 
Table H.48.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.2 0.7 192 
B 6.0 1.1 188 
Total 6.1 0.9 380 
 
Table H.49.  Communicative Efficacy Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials 
for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 4.594 1 4.594 1.620 0.216 
Error 62.396 22 2.836   
Total 765.750 24    
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Table H.50.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal 
Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 5.0 1.9 24 
B 5.8 1.6 24 
Total 5.4 1.8 48 
 
Table H.51.  Communicative Efficacy Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials 
for NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 13.214 2 6.607 3.304 0.049 
Error 66.375 33 2.011   
Total 1146.500 36    
 
Table H.52.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal 
Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 5.0 1.9 24 
9 5.1 1.5 24 
10 6.3 0.7 24 
Total 5.4 1.6 72 
 
 
Hazard Awareness 
 
Table H.53.  Hazard Awareness Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for 
Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 45.375 1 45.375 15.106 0.001 
Error 66.083 22 3.004   
Total 487.500 24    
 
Table H.54.  Hazard Awareness Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for 
Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 2.6 2.2 24 
B 5.3 2.0 24 
Total 4.0 2.5 48 
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Table H.55.  Hazard Awareness Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for 
NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 102.264 2 51.132 33.649 0.000 
Error 50.146 33 1.520   
Total 913.250 36    
 
Table H.56.  Hazard Awareness Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for 
NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 2.6 2.2 24 
9 4.5 2.0 24 
10 6.7 0.5 24 
Total 4.6 2.4 72 
 
 
Part 1 SART Results 
 
Table H.57.  SART ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 16.942 1 16.942 3.198 0.075 
Error 996.052 188 5.298   
Total 9785.000 190    
 
Table H.58.  SART Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.6 2.3 120 
B 7.2 2.2 70 
Total 6.8 2.3 190 
 
Table H.59.  SART ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.167 1 0.167 0.051 0.823 
Error 71.667 22 3.258   
Total 960.000 24    
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Table H.60.  SART Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 6.0 1.8 12 
B 6.2 1.9 12 
Total 6.1 1.8 24 
 
Table H.61.  SART ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 77.167 2 38.583 7.508 0.002 
Error 169.583 33 5.139   
Total 2409.000 36    
 
Table H.62.  SART Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 6.0 1.8 12 
9 7.7 1.9 12 
10 9.6 2.9 12 
Total 7.8 2.7 36 
 
 
Part 1 TLX Results 
 
Table H.63.  TLX ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 253.139 1 253.139 1.085 0.299 
Error 43850.446 188 233.247   
Total 271806.250 190    
 
Table H.64.  TLX Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Nominal Trials. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 35.5 15.8 120 
B 33.1 14.3 70 
Total 34.6 15.3 190 
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Table H.65.  TLX ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 81.279 1 81.279 0.524 0.477 
Error 3410.359 22 155.016   
Total 22522.917 24    
 
Table H.66.  TLX Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
MAP Mean SD N 
A 26.3 11.4 12 
B 30.0 13.4 12 
Total 28.7 12.3 24 
 
Table H.67.  TLX ANOVA Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
NACp 134.144 2 67.072 0.430 0.654 
Error 5145.023 33 155.910   
Total 34748.611 36    
 
Table H.68.  TLX Descriptive Statistics for Part 1 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) 
Condition. 
NACp Mean SD N 
8 26.3 11.4 12 
9 31.0 14.6 12 
10 28.5 11.1 12 
Total 28.6 12.3 36 
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Appendix I:  Part 2 Run Questionnaire Results 
 
Part 2 Post Run Questionnaire Results 
 
Question A.  I was aware of ownship position. 
 
Table I.1.  Question A ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 1.406 1 1.406 2.265 0.136 
HUD 0.951 1 0.951 1.531 0.219 
MAPxHUD 0.156 1 0.156 0.252 0.617 
Error 57.122 92 0.621   
Total 4103.000 96    
 
 
Table I.2.  Question A Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.9 0.3 24 
C Y 6.9 0.3 24 
 Total 6.9 0.3 48 
D N 6.6 1.1 24 
D Y 6.6 0.7 24 
 Total 6.6 0.9 48 
C+D N 6.8 0.8 48 
C+D Y 6.8 0.5 48 
 Total 6.8 0.7 96 
 
 
Table I.3.  Question A ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.083 1 0.083 0.246 0.622 
Error 15.583 46 0.339   
Total 2096.000 48    
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Table I.4.  Question A Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 6.9 0.3 12 
C 10 6.8 0.4 12 
 Total 6.9 0.3 24 
D 9 6.6 0.8 12 
D 10 6.7 0.7 12 
 Total 6.6 0.7 24 
C+D 9 6.8 0.6 24 
C+D 10 6.8 0.5 24 
 Total 6.8 0.6 48 
 
 
Question B.  The display concepts were effective for maintaining my situation awareness of ownship. 
 
Table I.5.  Question B ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.006 1 0.006 0.006 0.938 
HUD 0.084 1 0.084 0.082 0.775 
MAPxHUD 2.256 1 2.256 2.215 0.140 
Error 93.722 92 1.019   
Total 3661.000 96    
 
Table I.6.  Question B Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.6 0.5 24 
C Y 6.6 0.5 24 
 Total 6.6 0.5 48 
D N 6.6 0.7 24 
D Y 6.5 0.7 24 
 Total 6.5 0.7 48 
C+D N 6.6 0.6 48 
C+D Y 6.5 0.6 48 
 Total 6.6 0.6 96 
 
Table I.7.  Question B ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 3.221 1 3.221 0.899 0.342 
Error 164.81 46 3.5882   
Total 1675.000 48    
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Table I.8.  Question B Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 6.4 0.7 12 
C 10 6.5 0.5 12 
 Total 6.5 0.6 24 
D 9 6.4 0.8 12 
D 10 6.7 0.7 12 
 Total 6.5 0.7 24 
C+D 9 6.4 0.7 24 
C+D 10 6.6 0.6 24 
 Total 6.5 0.7 48 
 
 
Question C.  I was aware of traffic and other vehicles during operations. 
 
Table I.9.  Question C ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 1.534 1 1.534 2.362 0.128 
HUD 0.951 1 0.951 1.464 0.229 
MAPxHUD 1.951 1 1.951 3.004 0.086 
Error 59.744 92 0.649   
Total 3801.000 96    
 
Table I.10.  Question C Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.5 0.6 24 
C Y 6.4 0.6 24 
 Total 6.5 0.6 48 
D N 6.5 0.5 24 
D Y 6.3 0.6 24 
 Total 6.4 0.6 48 
C+D N 6.5 0.6 48 
C+D Y 6.4 0.6 48 
 Total 6.4 0.6 96 
 
Table I.11.  Question C ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 4.433 1 4.433 1.250 0.272 
Error 163.502 46 3.554   
Total 1332.000 48    
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Table I.12.  Question C Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 5.8 1.3 12 
C 10 6.3 0.8 12 
 Total 6.1 1.1 24 
D 9 6.4 0.8 12 
D 10 6.2 0.9 12 
 Total 6.3 0.9 24 
C+D 9 6.1 1.1 24 
C+D 10 6.3 0.9 24 
 Total 6.2 1.0 48 
 
 
Question D.  The display concepts provided effective awareness of traffic intent information. 
 
Table I.13.  Question D ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.336 1 0.336 0.419 0.519 
HUD 0.278 1 0.278 0.346 0.558 
MAPxHUD 2.336 1 2.336 2.910 0.091 
Error 73.844 92 0.803   
Total 3678.000 96    
 
Table I.14.  Question D Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.3 0.8 24 
C Y 6.0 0.9 24 
 Total 6.1 0.8 48 
D N 6.4 0.7 24 
D Y 6.1 0.6 24 
 Total 6.3 0.6 48 
C+D N 6.3 0.7 48 
C+D Y 6.1 0.8 48 
 Total 6.2 0.74 96 
 
Table I.15.  Question D ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 3.521 1 3.521 1.824 0.183 
Error 88.792 46 1.930   
Total 1645.000 48    
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Table I.16.  Question D Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 5.3 1.5 12 
C 10 6.3 0.6 12 
 Total 5.8 1.2 24 
D 9 5.2 1.5 12 
D 10 5.9 0.9 12 
 Total 5.5 1.3 24 
C+D 9 5.3 1.5 24 
C+D 10 6.1 0.8 24 
 Total 5.7 1.2 48 
 
 
Question E.  The display concepts were effective for required time-of-arrival taxi conformance. 
 
Table I.17.  Question E ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 1.344 1 1.344 1.680 0.198 
HUD 0.011 1 0.011 0.014 0.906 
MAPxHUD 2.178 1 2.178 2.721 0.102 
Error 73.644 92 0.800   
Total 3678.000 96    
 
Table I.18.  Question E Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.4 0.8 24 
C Y 6.4 0.6 24 
 Total 6.4 0.7 48 
D N 6.4 0.7 24 
D Y 6.4 0.8 24 
 Total 6.4 0.7 48 
C+D N 6.4 0.7 48 
C+D Y 6.4 0.7 48 
 Total 6.4 0.7 96 
 
Table I.19.  Question E ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 6.750 1 6.750 2.793 0.101 
Error 111.167 46 2.417   
Total 1822.000 48    
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Table I.20.  Question E Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 6.1 0.9 12 
C 10 6.2 0.6 12 
 Total 6.1 0.7 24 
D 9 6.3 0.6 12 
D 10 6.4 0.7 12 
 Total 6.3 0.6 24 
C+D 9 6.2 0.8 24 
C+D 10 6.3 0.6 24 
 Total 6.2 0.7 48 
 
 
Question F.  The display location of STBO taxi guidance information was effective for situation 
awareness. 
Table I.21.  Question F ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.306 1 0.306 0.232 0.631 
HUD 0.584 1 0.584 0.443 0.507 
MAPxHUD 1.056 1 1.056 0.801 0.373 
Error 121.256 92 1.318   
Total 3567.000 96    
 
Table I.22.  Question F Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.3 0.6 12 
C Y 6.5 0.5 12 
 Total 6.4 0.5 24 
D N 6.0 1.3 12 
D Y 6.2 0.8 12 
 Total 6.1 1.0 24 
C+D N 6.2 1.0 48 
C+D Y 6.3 0.7 48 
 Total 6.3 0.8 96 
 
Table I.23.  Question F ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 6.021 1 6.021 2.507 0.120 
Error 110.458 46 2.401   
Total 1715.000 48    
 
  
119 
Table I.24.  Question F Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 6.2 0.6 12 
C 10 6.3 0.8 12 
 Total 6.2 0.7 24 
D 9 6.3 0.7 12 
D 10 6.3 0.5 12 
 Total 6.3 0.6 24 
C+D 9 6.3 0.6 24 
C+D 10 6.3 0.6 24 
 Total 6.3 0.6 48 
 
 
Question G.  The display location of STBO taxi guidance information was effective for mental 
workload. 
 
Table I.25.  Question G ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 1.176 1 1.176 1.365 0.246 
HUD 0.608 1 0.608 0.705 0.403 
MAPxHUD 2.535 1 2.535 2.942 0.090 
Error 79.276 92 0.862   
Total 3672.825 96    
 
Table I.26.  Question G Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.3 0.6 24 
C Y 6.3 0.6 24 
 Total 6.3 0.6 48 
D N 6.0 1.2 24 
D Y 6.0 0.8 24 
 Total 6.0 1.0 48 
C+D N 6.2 0.9 48 
C+D Y 6.1 0.7 48 
 Total 6.2 0.8 96 
 
Table I.27.  Question G ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 7.212 1 7.212 0.951 0.329 
Error 735.49 46 15.991   
Total 1032.415 48    
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Table I.28.  Question G Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 6.1 0.8 12 
C 10 6.1 0.8 12 
 Total 6.1 0.8 24 
D 9 6.2 0.7 12 
D 10 6.1 0.5 12 
 Total 6.1 0.6 24 
C+D 9 6.1 0.7 24 
C+D 10 6.1 0.7 24 
 Total 6.1 0.7 48 
 
 
Question H.  The display concepts contributed to perceived safety during operations. 
 
Table I.29.  Question H ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.178 1 0.178 0.232 0.631 
HUD 1.878 1 1.878 2.452 0.121 
MAPxHUD 0.011 1 0.011 0.015 0.904 
Error 70.444 92 0.766   
Total 3674.000 96    
 
Table I.30.  Question H Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.5 0.6 24 
C Y 6.4 0.6 24 
 Total 6.5 0.6 48 
D N 6.3 1.1 24 
D Y 6.3 0.7 24 
 Total 6.3 0.9 48 
C+D N 6.4 0.9 48 
C+D Y 6.4 0.6 48 
 Total 6.4 0.8 96 
 
Table I.31.  Question H ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for Map Condition. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 41.217 1 14.217 1.465 0.229 
Error 38.212 46 0.831   
Total 943.560 48    
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Table I.32.  Question H Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 6.0 1.2 12 
C 10 6.3 0.7 12 
 Total 6.2 1.0 24 
D 9 6.3 0.5 12 
D 10 6.3 0.8 12 
 Total 6.3 0.6 24 
C+D 9 6.2 0.9 24 
C+D 10 6.3 0.7 24 
 Total 6.3 0.8 48 
 
 
Question I.  The display concepts were effective for detection of potential surface conflicts during 
STBO taxi. 
 
Table I.33.  Question I ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 2.083 1 2.083 1.310 0.258 
Error 73.167 46 1.591   
Total 1594.000 48    
 
 
Table I.34.  Question I Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 5.2 1.6 12 
C 10 6.2 1.6 12 
 Total 5.7 1.7 24 
D 9 5.8 1.2 12 
D 10 6.2 0.8 12 
 Total 6.0 1.0 24 
C+D 9 5.5 1.4 24 
C+D 10 6.2 1.2 24 
 Total 5.8 1.4 48 
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Part 2 Questionnaire Constructs Results 
 
Task Management 
 
Table I.35.  Task Management Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 2.344 1 2.344 2.728 0.102 
HUD 0.260 1 0.260 0.303 0.583 
MAPxHUD 0.094 1 0.094 0.109 0.742 
Error 79.042 92 0.859   
Total 3671.000 96    
 
 
Table I.36.  Task Management Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.7 0.5 72 
C Y 6.6 0.5 72 
 Total 6.6 0.5 144 
D N 6.6 0.8 72 
D Y 6.5 0.7 72 
 Total 6.5 0.7 144 
C+D N 6.6 0.7 144 
C+D Y 6.5 0.6 144 
 Total 6.6 0.6 288 
 
 
Table I.37.  Task Management Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.642 1 0.642 0.165 0.689 
NACp 1.157 1 1.157 0.179 0.675 
MAPxNACp 0.554 1 0.554 0.145 0.712 
Error 351.532 44 3.821   
Total 1994.562 48    
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Table I.38.  Task Management Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for 
NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 6.4 1.0 36 
C 10 6.6 0.6 36 
 Total 6.5 0.8 72 
D 9 6.5 0.8 36 
D 10 6.5 0.8 36 
 Total 6.5 0.8 72 
C+D 9 6.4 0.9 72 
C+D 10 6.5 0.7 72 
 Total 6.5 0.8 144 
 
 
Communicative Efficacy 
 
Table I.39.  Communicative Efficacy Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 3.760 1 3.760 2.505 0.117 
HUD 3.010 1 3.010 2.005 0.160 
MAPxHUD 1.760 1 1.760 1.173 0.282 
Error 138.125 92 1.501   
Total 3425.000 96    
 
 
Table I.40.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 6.3 0.7 96 
C Y 6.3 0.7 96 
 Total 6.3 0.7 192 
D N 6.2 1.0 96 
D Y 6.2 0.8 96 
 Total 6.2 0.9 192 
C+D N 6.3 0.8 192 
C+D Y 6.2 0.7 192 
 Total 6.3 0.8 384 
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Table I.41.  Communicative Efficacy Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 1.089 1 1.089 0.542 0.468 
NACp 4.030 1 4.030 2.764 0.104 
MAPxNACp 0.580 1 0.580 0.289 0.589 
Error 184.920 44 2.010   
Total 2258.300 48    
 
 
Table I.42.  Communicative Efficacy Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials 
for NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 5.9 1.0 48 
C 10 6.2 0.7 48 
 Total 6.1 0.9 96 
D 9 6.0 1.0 48 
D 10 6.2 0.7 48 
 Total 6.1 0.9 96 
C+D 9 6.0 1.0 96 
C+D 10 6.2 0.7 96 
 Total 6.1 0.9 192 
 
 
Hazard Awareness 
 
Table I.43.  Hazard Awareness Construct ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 0.501 1 0.501 0.392 0.524 
NACp 3.001 1 3.001 2.681 0.109 
MAPxNACp 0.215 1 0.215 0.156 0.687 
Error 49.243 44 1.119   
Total 1793.500 48    
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Table I.44.  Hazard Awareness Construct Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for 
NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 5.6 1.5 24 
C 10 6.3 1.2 24 
 Total 5.9 1.4 48 
D 9 6.1 0.9 24 
D 10 6.3 0.8 24 
 Total 6.2 0.9 48 
C+D 9 5.8 1.2 48 
C+D 10 6.3 1.0 48 
 Total 6.0 1.1 96 
 
Part 2 SART Results 
 
Table I.45.  SART ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 9.375 1 9.375 1.371 0.245 
HUD 0.167 1 0.167 0.024 0.876 
MAPxHUD 7.042 1 7.042 1.030 0.313 
Error 629.250 92 6.840   
Total 5294.000 96    
 
 
Table I.46.  SART Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 7.6 2.8 24 
C Y 7.0 3.1 24 
 Total 7.3 3.0 48 
D N 6.4 2.2 24 
D Y 6.9 2.3 24 
 Total 6.7 2.2 48 
C+D N 7.0 2.5 48 
C+D Y 6.9 2.7 48 
 Total 7.0 2.6 96 
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Table I.47.  SART ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 18.750 1 18.750 7.432 0.009 
NACp 10.08 1 10.083 3.997 0.052 
MAPxNACp 0.083 1 0.083 0.033 0.857 
Error 111.000 44 2.523   
Total 2634.000 48    
 
 
Table I.48.  SART Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (9, 10) Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 7.1 1.7 12 
C 10 6.1 1.9 12 
 Total 6.5 1.8 24 
D 9 8.3 1.0 12 
D 10 7.4 1.5 12 
 Total 7.8 1.3 24 
C+D 9 7.7 1.5 24 
C+D 10 6.8 1.8 24 
 Total 7.2 1.7 48 
 
Part 2 TLX Results 
 
Table I.49.  TLX ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 247.577 1 247.577 1.571 0.213 
HUD 263.896 1 263.896 1.674 0.199 
MAPxHUD 47.461 1 47.461 0.301 0.585 
Error 14501.823 92 157.629   
Total 98732.639 96    
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Table I.50.  TLX Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Nominal Trials. 
MAP HUD Mean SD N 
C N 25.6 11.6 24 
C Y 30.3 13.4 24 
 Total 27.9 12.6 48 
D N 30.2 10.7 24 
D Y 32.1 14.2 24 
 Total 31.1 12.5 48 
C+D N 27.9 11.3 48 
C+D Y 31.2 13.7 48 
 Total 29.5 12.6 96 
 
 
Table I.51.  TLX ANOVA Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
MAP 1062.514 1 1062.514 8.305 0.006 
NACp 338.672 1 338.672 2.647 0.111 
MAPxNACp 572.931 1 572.931 4.478 0.040 
Error 5629.225 44 127.937   
Total 97520.139 48    
 
 
Table I.52.  TLX Descriptive Statistics for Part 2 Off-Nominal Trials for NACp (8, 9, 10) Condition. 
MAP NACp Mean SD N 
C 9 37.8 13.6 12 
C 10 39.4 10.6 12 
 Total 38.6 11.9 24 
D 9 54.1 7.3 12 
D 10 41.9 12.8 12 
 Total 48.0 11.9 24 
C+D 9 45.9 13.5 24 
C+D 10 40.6 11.5 24 
 Total 43.3 12.7 48 
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Appendix J:  Final Questionnaire Results 
A post-test questionnaire was administered to each of the 24 test subjects. 
 
General Safety 
 
1. Rate the level of perceived safety you believe you would experience if you did not have this system (i.e., 
what you have today) onboard your aircraft during similar operations.                                                            
1 = Not Safe;  7 = Completely Safe 
 
2. Rate the level of perceived safety you believe you would experience if you had this system (CD&R system) 
onboard your aircraft during similar operations.   1 = Not Safe;  7 = Completely Safe 
 
 
Figure J.1.  Level of Perceived Safety Responses. 
 
Table J.1.  ANOVA Statistics for Level Of Perceived Safety. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CDR Sphericity Assumed 25.521 1 25.521 65.371 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 25.521 1.000 25.521 65.371 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 25.521 1.000 25.521 65.371 .000 
Lower-bound 25.521 1.000 25.521 65.371 .000 
Error(CDR) Sphericity Assumed 8.979 23 .390   
Greenhouse-Geisser 8.979 23.000 .390   
Huynh-Feldt 8.979 23.000 .390   
Lower-bound 8.979 23.000 .390   
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3. Rate the level of safety you felt during runway conflict incidents.   1 = Not Safe;  7 = Completely Safe 
 
 
Figure J.2.  Level of Safety During Runway Conflict Incidents Responses. 
 
If not completely safe, please provide suggesions for improvements that may potentially increase perceived 
level of safety to “completely safe”. 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 Not enough experience with the system to suggest improvements to what you have designed. 
2 It was hard to understand.  The symbology – especially for “off-scale” aircraft conflicts. 
3 Perhaps a caution a little earlier when another aircraft approaches the runway, thereby, reminding 
the aircraft taking off to expand their scale and search for conflicts outside visual range. 
4 (no answer) 
5 Label possible conflicting aircraft with their NAC number to let pilots know if they will get auto-
warnings. 
6 Not necessaryily the system, but the operators (users) comfort level. 
7 Level 10 or better. 
8 Require all aircraft and operators to be equipped and trained at the highest level. 
9 (no answer) 
10 Ground speed/acceleration information of target aircraft. 
11 Need distance from conflicting airplane. 
12 (no answer) 
13 Make sure all movement at those conditions are a 10 or higher.  A FLIR backup would help. 
14 No suggestions – one can never eliminate risk, only identify potential areas for problems and 
employ risk management techniques.  Ex. SOP’s, policies, and procedures. 
15 Question of participating vs non-participating adds to mental workload and uncertainty. 
16 Maybe an idea of distance, i.e. 1.0 nm not a good idea to cross, 5.0 nm its ok to cross.  ATC 
cleared us to cross today at 0.9 nm, we questioned that. 
17 Safety is relative to the number of reporting aircraft.  100% reporting = 100% +/- safety. 
18 Show all traffic. 
19 Procedures to allow CA or taxi pilot to observe conflict without looking down to moving map.  At 
least one pilot should be outside at all times. 
20 (no answer) 
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21 1. While I do believe this adds an additional layer of safety to avoid conflicts, the words 
“completely safe” implies to me “perfection” which in my opinion may lead to slight dependency 
and/or complacency while using such systems.  The trust but verify the method could be slightly 
diminished thereby adding false security in operations.  2. No interaction by ATC or did other 
aircraft have similar equipment?  Don’t know. 
22 Detailed training on what scale to use during different types of operations.  Our crew missed a 
conflict that may have been avoided had we been on the proper screen scale. 
23 (no answer) 
24 Better resolution or more experience with current system.  I spent a lot of attention looking at 
aircraft in hold short situations wondering if there were an incursion or if it was display/resolution 
issue. 
 
4. Rate the level of safety you felt during taxi conflict incidents.   1 = Not Safe;  7 = Completely Safe 
 
 
Figure J.3.  Level of Safety During Taxi Conflict Incidents Responses. 
 
If not completely safe, please provide suggesions for improvements that may potentially increase perceived 
level of safety to “completely safe”. 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 Increase the distance between conflicting aircraft wherein a caution is annunciated – Increase 
would be minimal however many times I thought the impending conflict got too close before 
aural caution. 
2 On several of the other targets their taxi clearance information wasn’t available.  Even when it 
was displayed, we still didn’t know if the other aircraft would follow its guidance. 
3 Perhaps a system to send a “stop” signal to one of the aircraft in a conflict situation. 
4 More connectivity (either voice or data link) verifying critical clearance items, i.e. runway 
crossing or merging traffic. 
5 Same as #3 
6 (no answer) 
7 (no answer) 
8 Increase radius of warning. 
9 Not all obesrved potential conflicts were identified by the system.  No warning (or caution) was 
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displayed for some “close calls”.  Have different collision algorithms been tested? 
10 Prefer to set my own taxi speed with respect to other constraints on THS operations, i.e. final 
numbers, weather conditions. 
11 (no answer) 
12 (no answer) 
13 Somehow alert us if a traffic has the same clearance and is +/- 15 seconds of us.  A FLIR 
backup would help. 
14 Same as #3 
15 Same as #3 
16 (no answer) 
17 All aircraft reporting exact position in the best. 
18 Show all traffic. 
19 If 1800 RVR, emphasis should be visual confirmation of conflict. 
20 (no answer) 
21 Other airplance involved in conflict had no ATC questioning as did we, were not sure if aircraft 
was also conflict equipped.  The human factor was removed making myself unconfortable with 
the situation. 
22 Although it’s a great system, I would never totally trust a system into feeling “completely safe”.  
I believe that a certain element of risk will always remain despite our best efforts. 
23 (no answer) 
24 As with the runway, we don’t receive an advisory with every traffic occurrence and we didn’t 
get a path from every symbol I highlighted.  So…. I try to watch visually and clear verbally all 
traffic.  No system will make me feel completely safe. 
 
 
General Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
5. What do you consider the best feature of the displays/technology you evaluated today? 
Can the feature be improved?  If so, how? 
 
Subject Best Feature Improvement 
1 Real time imagery with ability to deter 
route of confict aircraft. 
Routing of conflict aircraft displayed instead of just 
having taxiways listed. 
2 
Visual of traffic and ability to ID them. 
Put moving map on ND display.  I have to go to a lot 
of other pages on the EFB, so I couldn’t be tracking 
traffic as easily. 
3 The projected taxi path was very helpful. Not sure. 
4 Traffic following beyond the visual range. (no answer) 
5 Shows taxi route graphically. No suggestions. 
6 The warning system of impending conflict 
was an excellent tool. (no answer) 
7 
Taxi route. 
Yes, my aircraft chevron symbol yellow and closer to 
the ring – it gets lost at bottom plus further to scan. 
8 Visual taxi path.  Possible early awareness 
of conflicts. (no answer) 
9 The ability to observe the aircraft position 
and direction of travel in real-time on the 
moving map display. Show the ground speed next to the aircraft symbol. 
10 When all aircraft have the NACp 11. When all aircraft have the NACp 11. 
11 Colored taxi route. (no answer) 
12 Display of unnoticed traffic. (no answer) 
13 IFR. Make all tolerences NACp 10 or better. 
14 CPDLC eliminates readback/hearback Too cumbersome to “Wilco” on this device. 
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errors. 
15 
Traffic location. 
Hollow widget for NACp 8 and below.  Solid for 
higher NACp. 
16 
Datalink taxi instructions and traffic 
awareness symbology. 
Maybe an auto-scale feature that when a traffic 
symbol is off scale, and it might conflict, it scales out 
so you can see it. 
17 SA in low visibility. Seems to be real close to perfect. 
18 Display.  Confidence that we can see all of 
the traffic. Show all traffic regardless of accuracy! 
19 Moving map with real-time position 
awareness. 
Using position awareness similar to ground roll 
guidance in HUD during takeoff roll. 
20 Being able to identify conflicting aircraft 
routes. No. 
21 
1. Adds a new dimension to situational 
awareness.  2. Ease of use. 
Definitely needs a touch screen availability while in 
the moving map mode to quickly gain overall SA at 
airport. 
22 
Audio call-outs of the conflicts. 
Yes, it should offer a more concise resolution.  Such 
as “STOP” or “GO AROUND”. 
23 One more level of higher safety – 
especially for operations during reduced 
visibility. 
Yes, have the cautions and warnings show on the 
primary flight display and HUD. 
24 
Like TCAS, the visual depictions and 
predictive advisories increase situational 
awareness, even if occasionally we get 
nuisance alerts. 
I don’t think we should worry about displaying too 
many aircraft even if their exact location isn’t perfect.  
Especially when in taxi operations.  Again, some of 
this is learning on operator part, what resolution we 
are seeing.  I.e., is that symbol with his nose touching 
the runway a threat?  Otherwise its distracting. 
 
6. What do you consider to be the worst feature of the displays/technology you evaluated today? 
Can the feature be improved?  If so, how? 
 
Subject Worst Feature Improvement 
1 (no answer) (no answer) 
2 Never heard an “aural” alert for runway conflicts.  
You had to be looking at moving map. 
For runway conflicts, provide aural alerts.  
Move the moving map display to the ND. 
3 
No deconfliction guidance. 
A simple “stop” command to at least one of 
the aircraft. 
4 (no answer) (no answer) 
5 
The arrival time prediction display (+/- ETAs). 
Switch the signs so that if you’re early, the 
display shows a minus value and vice-versa 
for late arrivals. 
6 NACp scale was a little confusing when an 8 or 9 
level aricraft caused a conflict.  Was not sure if it 
would be an issue or not. Not sure. 
7 Scale of map on approach. Yes, able to slew it with the smaller scales. 
8 Takes a lot of time of at least one pilot during busy 
period. Not sure. 
9 Movement information for targets (speed) was not 
displayed for ground targets next to their symbols. (no answer) 
10 
Seeing some targets not all. 
To have the confidence of TCAS… will take 
some time. 
11 Arrows for all aircraft need to be smaller and 
taxiways larger. Self explanatory. 
12 Some traffic not displayed. (no answer) 
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13 Not all traffic shown, thus you cannot trust it 
completely. 
Be able to see traffic say on a 7-8 mile final 
and be told what runway he is cleared for. 
14 Too much head-down and button pushing.  Plus, 
first officers have to input weight and balance data, 
make radio calls, run checklists, etc.  No time to 
look outside, expecially if a short taxi. 
Task loading can send a first officer from the 
green into the red quickly.  Must reduce 
tasks.  Fewer button pushes would help 
somewhat. 
15 Uncertainty of NACp 8-9 aircraft. See #5. 
16 
Ground RTAs. 
A update feature / function.  If you cannot 
make an RTA you let ATC know and revise. 
17 Unreported and uncertain aircraft. Yes, increased required position certainty. 
18 N/A N/A 
19 Symbology.  Could be confused easily.  Timed 
departure taxi.  Puts pressure on pilot to achieve a 
schedule during taxi.  Some pilots simply need 
more time during low vis taxi. (no answer) 
20 Learning curve is fast.  No bad feature. (no answer) 
21 1. There was a few times when I wanted to see and 
verify my magenta taxi route 100%, and due to 
aircraft position even on full zoom out could not 
see entire airport (the direction arrows seem to not 
work in this moving map display).  2. Removal of 
the human element as this took out knowing the 
intentions of conflicting traffic and situations that 
could lead to sooner resolutions. 
By adding a conventional touch/pinch feature 
to moving map or by activating the pan 
arrows to see around airport without changing 
the zoom or size of runway/taxiway. 
22 
Requires more heads down time. 
A more automated system that required less 
crew monitoring would help the crew. 
23 1. Causes pilots to be “heads down” during critical 
taxi operations.  2. Does not identify all conflicts 
(vehicles and some aircraft). 
1. Overlaying the “moving map” display onto 
the field diagram chart.  2. See question #5. 
24 Definitely the layering of the moving map, comm, 
checklists, charts.  I think this is a safety problem 
from the workload management perspective.  The 
system is good enough to give a false sense of 
safety “perception”. In reality if you add 2D (?) 
engine start, PA’s, new ATIS, T/O data, runway 
change to the problem of being off moving map 
page, you have a safety problem. 
Move comm panel CPDLC to a different 
screen like 777.  Get the checklist to a 
different screen like 777 and either use 
datalink comm which I prefer to voice but not 
both.  The duplication is distracting and you 
already have enough distraction in the 
system. 
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7. What other suggestions, comments, etc. can you provide that may potentially enhance the 
displays/technology you evaluated today? 
 
Subject Comments 
1 (no answer) 
2 (no answer) 
3 See above. 
4 (no answer) 
5 See comment on displaying NACp values. 
6 None 
7 1. Slew approach.  2. Yellow my aircraft pulsing.  3. Closer to ring – easy scan. 
8 (no answer) 
9 Version “A” allowed a false sense of security since not all traffic was able to be observed.  I think 
that only version B should be considered for implementation. 
10 Being able to “pinch” and/or slide screen view. 
11 I would recommend using TCAS symbology.  It’s simple, accurate, and understandable. 
12 Smaller aircraft symbols. 
13 If you have a HUD, couple it with a FLIR like system. 
14 Ground display improvement – when about to cross a runway or taxi onto a runway, nice to zoom 
out to see traffic landing in reduced visibility, including night.  The display should be able to have 
your position in the center of the screen, so you can see full-scale zoom out for the runway.  Can it 
incorporate ramp and taxiway closures/construction?  Linked to Jeppesen updates? 
15 (no answer) 
16 (no answer) 
17 (no answer) 
18 (no answer) 
19 (no answer) 
20 None 
21 I think in a real world environment that ATC/human elements might have resolved the conflicts 
“sooner than later” if they had been available; however, as a stand alone system it was a great 
backup to SA.  The above human factors should be factored in somwhow! 
22 Assign one pilot the task of focusing outside, and the other pilot the task of monitioring the 
dispalys inside. 
23 Voice guidance would be very helpful.  When I use my I-phone as a navigation system, the voice 
prompts are easy to understand – even with other background noise (radio/wife and/or daughter 
talking ).  Could work well. 
24 I think we need to increase the consistancy of alerts and warnings vs filter.  I felt like we spent a 
lot of time heads down looking at symbols on the moving map and wondering if they were going 
to become a factor.  The vast majority did not. 
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Traffic Awareness 
 
8. Rate your level of overall traffic awareness when ALL traffic was displayed on the airport moving map.            
1 = Low;  7 = High 
 
9. Rate your level of overall traffic awareness when only qualified traffic (NACp 9 and higher) was displayed 
on the airport moving map.   1 = Low;  7 = High 
 
 
Figure J.4.  Traffic Awareness Responses. 
 
Table J.2.  ANOVA Statistics for Traffic Responses. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Traffic Sphericity Assumed 36.750 1 36.750 21.535 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 36.750 1.000 36.750 21.535 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 36.750 1.000 36.750 21.535 .000 
Lower-bound 36.750 1.000 36.750 21.535 .000 
Error(Traffic) Sphericity Assumed 39.250 23 1.707   
Greenhouse-Geisser 39.250 23.000 1.707   
Huynh-Feldt 39.250 23.000 1.707   
Lower-bound 39.250 23.000 1.707   
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10. The presentation of ALL traffic on the airport moving map represents a safety issue (i.e., qualified and 
unqualified traffic).    1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
11. The presentation of only qualified traffic on the airport moving map represents a safety issue (i.e., aircraft 
reporting less accurate data not shown).    1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.5.  Traffic Presentation Represents Safety Issue Responses. 
 
Table J.3.  ANOVA Statistics for Traffic Presentation Represents Safety Issue. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Traffic Sphericity Assumed 196.021 1 196.021 68.854 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 196.021 1.000 196.021 68.854 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 196.021 1.000 196.021 68.854 .000 
Lower-bound 196.021 1.000 196.021 68.854 .000 
Error(Traffic) Sphericity Assumed 65.479 23 2.847   
Greenhouse-Geisser 65.479 23.000 2.847   
Huynh-Feldt 65.479 23.000 2.847   
Lower-bound 65.479 23.000 2.847   
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12. The presentation of ALL traffic on the airport moving map will increase the potential for accidents (i.e., 
qualified and unqualified traffic).    1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
13. The presentation of only qualified traffic on the airport moving map will increase the potential for accidents 
(i.e., aircraft reporting less accurate data not shown).    1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.6.  Traffic Presentation Increases Potential for Accidents Responses. 
 
Table J.4.  ANOVA Statistics for Traffic Presentation Increases Potential for Accidents. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Traffic Sphericity Assumed 126.750 1 126.750 33.800 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 126.750 1.000 126.750 33.800 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 126.750 1.000 126.750 33.800 .000 
Lower-bound 126.750 1.000 126.750 33.800 .000 
Error(Traffic) Sphericity Assumed 86.250 23 3.750   
Greenhouse-Geisser 86.250 23.000 3.750   
Huynh-Feldt 86.250 23.000 3.750   
Lower-bound 86.250 23.000 3.750   
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Displays 
 
14. The location of the EFB was optimal for viewing the airport moving map.                                                      
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.7.  EFB Location Optimal for Viewing AMM Responses. 
 
If you disagree, what location/display is preferable for locating the airport moving map. 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 (no answer) 
2 The location of the EFB was really good.  But there are multiple other pages that we need to 
look at on the EFB (charts, checklists, etc.). 
3 With my longer legs, the location was not optimal.  I frequently banged my knee on the EFB.  
The viewing angle was good, however. 
4 Add moving map to ND in certain range settings. 
5 (no answer) 
6 (no answer) 
7 ND page on ground. 
8 Not sure it was optimal – But sure it is better than by side window. 
9 (no answer) 
10 Center console/pedestal … where both pilots can point to display 
11 It should be on PFD for better scan. 
12 Put it in the NAV display. 
13 Possible HUD but it could get cluttered. 
14 On the ND.  Too many screens. 
15 (no answer) 
16 (no answer) 
17 AMM should be on forward display. 
18 (no answer) 
19 (no answer) 
20 (no answer) 
21 (no answer) 
22 Elevated to eye level would be ideal. 
23 Maybe on a movable “arm” to put a display more in center of pilots view.  Then the EFB can be 
“stowed” out of the center of view when not required. 
24 Physically I think its fine and I hate to keep looping on layering but how about a hard button to 
go straight to the moving map. 
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Displays - Traffic Symbology 
 
15. Should all traffic be displayed on the airport moving map or only the traffic that meets NACp 9 and higher 
position accuracy levels? 
 
23 for All traffic 
1 for NACp 9+ 
 
Rate the level of confidence in the answer provided above.  1 = None (0%),  7 = Completely (100%) 
Pilot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 6 5 6 7 7 6 6 7 6 7 6 6 
Pilot 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
 6 7 6 6  7 6 7 7 6 7 6 
Mean 6.35 
Std. Dev. 0.57 
 
 
16. Displaying all traffic using the same map symbol (even for traffic with less accurate position information 
(NACp 8 or less)) would not provide hazardously misleading information.                                                       
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
17. Displaying all traffic using different map symbols for unqualified (NACp 8 or less) and qualified (NACp 9 
or higher) traffic would not provide hazardously misleading information.                                                       
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.8.  Traffic Display is Not Hazardously Misleading Responses. 
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Table J.5.  ANOVA Statistics for Traffic Display is Not Hazardously Misleading. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Symbol Sphericity Assumed 10.083 1 10.083 3.096 .092 
Greenhouse-Geisser 10.083 1.000 10.083 3.096 .092 
Huynh-Feldt 10.083 1.000 10.083 3.096 .092 
Lower-bound 10.083 1.000 10.083 3.096 .092 
Error(symbol) Sphericity Assumed 74.917 23 3.257   
Greenhouse-Geisser 74.917 23.000 3.257   
Huynh-Feldt 74.917 23.000 3.257   
Lower-bound 74.917 23.000 3.257   
 
18. There should be a distinction (difference) between the symbology representing qualified traffic (traffic with 
NACp 9 or higher) and unqualified traffic (NACp 8 or less).                                                                             
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.9.  Distinction Between Qualified and Unqualified Traffic Responses. 
 
If you agree, which symbology do you feel would be most effective (choose one): 
 
Different symbol – such as rounded chevron – 12 votes 
Accuracy range ring around symbol – 5 votes 
Other – 4 votes, segmented/dashed chevron, hollow widget, by selecting by touch to see NACp of signal, 
different color 
* 4 pilots did not respond, 1 pilot made 2 selections 
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19. There should be a distinction (difference) between the symbology representing traffic qualified for the 
CD&R indication and alerting function (traffic with NACp 10 or 11) vs traffic not qualified for that 
function (NACp 9 or less).       1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.10.  Distinction Between Traffic Symbology for CD&R Function Responses. 
 
If you agree, which symbology do you feel would be most effective (choose one): 
 
Different symbol – 11 votes 
Accuracy range ring around symbol – 6 votes 
Other – 4 votes, symbol in different color, hollow widget, symbol strength measured by NACp by touch on 
screen 
* 4 pilots did not respond, 1 pilot made 2 selections 
 
 
Surface Trajectory-Based Operations (STBO) 
 
20. STBO will increase my workload compared to current surface operational procedures.                                 
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.11.  STBO Will Increase Workload Responses. 
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21. STBO will increase my situation awareness compared to current surface operational procedures.                 
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.12.  STBI Will Increase Situation Awareness Responses. 
Please comment on STBO and how it should be integrated into current procedures: 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 With increased SA, cockpit CRM and communication will become enhanced if crews commit 
to a dialogue that continually updates new situations and awareness. 
2 I don’t know the benefit.  It seems your are merely moving the queue from the end of the 
runway to the very congested ramp area. 
3 I found it quite helpful, especially the moving map display.  But, it does increase the 
workload/scan rate. 
4 It should be dynamic vice static.  If the RTA is paramount, it should rule.  If not, it should be 
updated as the situation evolves. 
5 STBO greatly reduces the chances of an error in route while taxiing.  The conflict features will 
be very useful during low vis applications.  I feel the aural caution and warning or at least a 
visual indication should be given for aircraft below NACp 9 when crossing runways and an 
aircraft collision hazard exists. 
6 Trying to incorporate it into the current SMGCS system would be a benefit.  It can be difficult 
to taxi with just a paper chart in low vis. 
7 Normal flows and checklist, training in class room, sim is vital not home computer self taught. 
8 Cumbersome – takes one pilot out of loop. 
9 The workload associated with maintaining appropriate RTA had a significant impact on my 
ability to watch for other traffic, even with the HUD in use.  I believe the system should use 
only a taxi start time derived from an approximate total taxi time based on an average speed. 
10 Any attempt to show ground traffic (of any kind/type) is fine by me. 
11 In low visibility situations, night and rain or snow. 
12 Put it on the NAV display and merge it with the TCAS. 
13 You do focus on it a lot which could lead to distraction, i.e. checklists, but I feel the benefits 
outweigh the negatives by a wide margin. 
14 Excellent tool.  Could seamlessly be incorporated into current procedures. 
15 Some crew training will be required to understand high and low NACp traffic.  Realistic taxi 
speed and parameters need to be loaded as aircraft performance differs if having to use 
excessive braking will increase wear and heating hazards on long taxi. 
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16 Only proximity traffic should be able to display.  When another traffic is selected, then 
previous traffic turns off trajectory and truns on new traffic selected. 
17 Works in a “sterile” environment.  Taxi speeds, and traffic sequencng differ among fleets and 
airports. 
18 Text is ideal.  Excellent. 
19 (no answer) 
20 (no answer) 
21 It definitely adds to SA increases, and it almost self integrates itself into your scan normally.  I 
think that part comes naturally, what took a little more time was defining what it would be like 
using only this system and no normal ATC communications.  So this would require some 
training on removal of human factors elements. 
22 It needs to account for poor surface conditions such as snow and ice. 
23 Great system to provide more SA to pilots – it can be distracting at times.  Should be utilized 
as a safety tool for special utilization for weather/traffic events.  Should not be used every 
day/every flight. 
24 Any info we get on what other aircraft are doing on the ground is most helpful, especially at 
busy airports or during international ops.  But as helpful as the speed and desequencing can be, 
we also saw potential problems when attention gets prioritized on speed and spacing and not 
on routing and safety, i.e. spacing.  Interesting to see warnings when we snugged up behind 
prededing aircraft which lots of captains like to do. 
 
22. STBO will increase efficiency for ground movement of aircraft.                                                                     
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.13.  STBO Will Increase Efficiency Responses. 
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23. STBO will increase safety for ground movement of aircraft.                                                                           
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.14.  STBO Will Increase Safety Responses. 
 
24. STBO did not increase my subjective estimate of head-down time compared to current-day operations.       
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.15.  STBO Did Not Increase Head-Down Time Responses. 
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Please comment on the reason for the rating above: 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 Yes – my head was down more; however, when it came back up I had a much clearer idea of 
what was happening around me – great trade off. 
2 It caused me to be far more heads-down than I normally would be. 
3 It was necessary to increase the head down time/EFB scan while taxiing. 
4 We currently do not compute estimate to an RTA on the ground.  We are more interested in 
time to takeoff and that is done outside not inside head down. 
5 A portion of my attention was needed to monitor speed and ETA estimates which would put 
more reliance on the FO to apprise me of other possible threats. 
6 I personally scanned inside/outside as a normal procedure (or at least tried to!). 
7 Watching time circles. 
8 Increased head-down time for both. 
9 Much higher taxi workload. 
10 Timing taxi is a bad idea.  Too many other tasks to set up for flight. 
11 A lot of “heads-down” is required.  Can it be trained to efficiency – yes. 
12 (no answer) 
13 You do look down more, but the payoff of no wrong taxi and seeing your taxi clearance in 
word and map = Fantastic! 
14 Too much button pushing – moving map, checklists, CPDLC, map zoom, etc. 
15 Much more heads down time even with HUD. 
16 I found, at times, to be heads down more than I would without this technology. 
17 Increases “head-down” time since most pilots would strive to be +/- 0.  Perfection takes extra 
attention. 
18 (no answer) 
19 Pilot needs to be head-up.  So symbols in HUD may be alternative to moving map. 
20 You are constantly checking your 10-9 page (airport).  You have your route.  Just need to 
follow it. 
21 The time I use head-down on airport diagram is/was about the same while incorporating my 
scan down into EFB. 
22 It became the focus of my attention, and could easily distract a crew from performing essential 
safety items and procedures. 
23 It definitely increased my “heads-down” time. 
24 We are pilots.  If you give us a target, we will try to hit it.  Our fear of failure is greater than 
our fear of death.  I watched my captain taxi over all creation and darn near ram 2 other planes 
trying to keep the “circle on the disk”.  Its going to be distracting and really only beneficial at 
airports with relatively long unrestricted runs, not like JFK. 
 
  
  
146 
25. To perform STBO adequately, information is required to be located on the following displays:             
(Check all that are required.) 
 
 
Figure J.16.  Best Location for STBO Information Responses. 
 
Head-Up Display (HUD) STBO Guidance 
 
If you used the HUD during STBO, answer questions in this section. 
 
 
Figure J.17.  HUD Displaying STBO Guidance. 
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26. Refer to the item labeled (A) on Figure J.17.  Please rate the usefulness of the advised ground speed 
displayed on the HUD in helping you to meet the RTA.  1 = Not Useful;  7 = Very Useful 
 
 
Figure J.18.  Advised Ground Speed Usefulness on HUD Responses. 
 
27. The display of advised ground speed on the HUD, without any other STBO guidance information, is 
suficient for helping me meet the RTA.    1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.19.  Advised Ground Speed on HUD Sufficient Responses. 
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If you disagree, which other symbology should be shown on the HUD. 
 
Subject Other Symbology Suggestions 
1 Plus/minus time to RTA would be nice. 
3 Perhaps a steering arrow could be incorporated. 
5 The ETA +/- display would be useful to avoid heads-down time to check progress on the EFB. 
7 (no answer) 
9 Time deviation in seconds. 
11 (no answer) 
13 You might as well put the clock showing how many seconds ahead/behind on HUD.  I kept 
looking down to reference that. 
15 (no answer) 
17 Need to look “heads-down” for actual GS decreases situation awareness. 
19 My experience is that the HUD is a distratction when taxiing during low vis ops.  So pilots are 
inclined to ignore. 
21 The early/late scale shown on bottom of EFB should be on HUD as well! 
23 Current GS.  Cautions/warnings. 
 
28. Please indicate on the figure below where you would locate the “advised ground speed” symbology.  Feel 
free to change the format of the symbology if necessary. 
 
29. Please indicate on the figure below any additional symbology you feel is required on the HUD for STBO. 
 
Images showing pilots marking on the figures are not included in this document. 
 
 
Figure J.20.  HUD Symbology. 
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Subject Symbology Location on Figure 
1 Plus/minus time to RTA in seconds near ADV GS. 
3 Steering arrow in center below aircraft symbol (flasher when approaching turn). Move ADV 
GS/GS to middle of HUD. 
5 ETA and +/- seconds beside ADV GS/GS. Under heading scale at top, Caution/Warning Traffic 
with left/right arrow below. 
7 Distance in feet to next turn. 
9 Add +/- time below ADV GS/GS.  Move that block of data above horizon line to left of heading 
scale. 
11 Move ADV GS/GS up to the left of the aircraft symbol. 
13 Add +/- time to right of ADV GS.  Show current taxiway and next turn on HUD, i.e., on “Alpha 
left turn Bravo”. 
15 Add +/- target time near ADV GS. 
17 Put ground speed in box to left, add vertical scale bar showing ADV GS as mark along scale. 
19 Move ADV GS/GS up to upper left of HUD.  Add taxi route to HUD.  Add bar above/below 
wing symbol for early/late. 
21 ADV GS location is good where it is.  Add +/- scale below GS. 
23 Move ADV GS/GS up to  left of heading.  Add words “Caution”, “Warning”. 
 
30. STBO taxi operations can be performed adequately without displaying STBO guidance information on the 
HUD.    1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.21.  HUD STBO Guidance Not Necessary Responses. 
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Map C Condition – STBO Guidance Textually Only 
 
If you used the Map C condition, answer questions in this section. 
 
 
Figure J.22.  Map C Condition. 
 
31. While taxiing during the STBO scenarios using Map Condition C, it was easy to tell if I was going to reach 
my guidance end point on time, ahead of time, or behind schedule.                                                                 
1 = Strongly Disagree,  7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.23.  STBO Taxi Performance with Map C Responses. 
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What, if anything, could be changed or modified to increase the rating? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
1 Replace +/- with E (early) or L (late) 
2 There is no more than a 7. 
5 See previous note on changing +/- symbology for showing ahead or behind ETA. 
6 It was a very good system.  Straight forward to read data. 
9 The information provided was excellent. 
10 N/A Captain used this…. I was traffic and radio man!! 
13 Maybe put the + or – beside the symbol of the airplane. 
14 Put a second display of time error, ex. (-0:07) under the GS in the upper left hand corner. 
17 Always display ‘EARLY’ or ‘LATE’.  Change the display “if greater than +/- 10” to a color 
change. 
18 Works great! 
21 If off of ETA the diamond should blink at you.  For HUD and graphics above:  Note: Also the 
max ADV GS of 30 kts would have to be modified so as to avoid violations of rules.  For 
example, the max GS of taxiing aircraft in China according to their ATC manuals is 22 kts! 
22 Include a verbal prompt if > 15 seconds of the required time. 
 
32. Refer to the items labeled (A), (B), (C), and (D) on the figures above.  Please rate the usefulness of each 
item in helping you to meet the RTA.    1 = Not Useful;  7 = Very Useful  
 
 
Figure J.24.  Map C Symbology Usefulness for Meeting RTA Responses. 
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Table J.6.  ANOVA Statistics for Map C Symbology Usefulness for Meeting RTA. 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
STBO_ELEMENTS Sphericity Assumed 
5.159 3 1.720 1.429 .254 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5.159 2.305 2.239 1.429 .261 
Huynh-Feldt 5.159 3.000 1.720 1.429 .254 
Lower-bound 5.159 1.000 5.159 1.429 .259 
Error(STBO_ELEMENTS) Sphericity Assumed 
36.091 30 1.203 
  
Greenhouse-Geisser 36.091 23.046 1.566   
Huynh-Feldt 36.091 30.000 1.203   
Lower-bound 36.091 10.000 3.609   
 
What, if anything, could be changed or modified to increase the rating? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
1 (no answer) 
2 Regarding Map C, putting other traffic’s RTA would help us know if we should try to go in 
front of or behind conflicting traffic that is going to our same runway (or similar route to ours). 
5 (no answer) 
6 Traffic information was good with a route, but also was sometimes more clutter on the screen. 
9 Too much time was alloted for the completion of turns.  Turn speeds should probably not be 
below 8 kts. 
10 N/A Captain used this…. I was traffic and radio man!! 
13 Airliners do not turn as slow as you have it calibrated. 
14 See #31.  Selected traffic information – too much information clutter. 
17 (no answer) 
18 (no answer) 
21 If conflict target shows holding for you or not in data block. 
22 Make the display slightly larger to make it more noticable. 
 
33. Refer to the item labeled (C) on Figure J.22.  Rate the usefulness of the selected traffic information in 
determining the intent of that aircraft.  1 = Not Useful;  7 = Very Useful 
 
 
Figure J.25.  Map C Selected Traffic Usefulness Responses. 
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What information could be added or deleted to enhance the quality and value of the selected traffic information 
(item C)? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
1 Graphic depiction of intended taxi route, not just taxi letter designators. 
2 See #32.  Add their RTA if going to the same or nearby (runway with simialr track).  Also, 
when traffic is selected, show their route on the moving map in a different color/width or some 
visual way to see where they are cleared. 
5 Delete the portions of the cleared route of the selected traffic which have already been 
completed. 
6 (no answer) 
9 Add ground speed next to aircraft symbol. 
10 I like it as is. 
13 Maybe a projected line of where he will be in the next 20 seconds? 
14 See #32.  Cluttered display.  Also, pilots frequently make taxi errors – what ATC cleared him to 
do isn’t always what they do do - unfamiliar airport, reduced visibility, hear back/read back 
errors, expected clearances. 
17 What the pilot was actually going to do – but you can never display that. 
18 Very helpful. 
21 Adding information in data block to target.  If both aircraft are to cross paths, I needed to know 
who has give-way instructions, couldn’t determine this easily. 
22 The system should make it clear who has the right of way, and who should yield. 
 
34. The traffic intent information was useful in identifying traffic conflict situations.                                           
1 = Not Useful;  7 = Very Useful  
 
 
Figure J.26.  Map C Traffic Intent Useful in Identifying Conflicts Responses. 
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How may the traffic intent information be improved to increase traffic conflict situation identification? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
1 Earlier warning – expand the caution/warning bubbles around conflict aircraft minimally. 
2 Same as above in #33. 
5 See previous note about showing NACp 8 traffic when in runway crossing situation. 
6 Could it be available for more than one potential traffic conflict? 
9 It’s a great system but the possibility that other aircraft will not make the required turns still 
exists. 
10 I like it as is. 
13 See above (#33). 
14 Look out the window.  Caution and warning messages excellent and well displayed (CD&R). 
17 (no answer) 
18 Enhance the color of crossing taxiways. 
21 See answer #33 above please. 
22 Aircraft with the right of way should flash and/or blink. 
 
 
Map D Condition – STBO Guidance Textually and Graphically 
 
If you used the Map D condition, answer questions in this section. 
 
 
Figure J.27.  Map D Condition. 
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35. While taxiing during the STBO scenarios using Map Condition D, it was easy to tell if I was going to reach 
my guidance end point on time, ahead of time, or behind schedule.                                                                 
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree  
 
 
Figure J.28.  STBO Taxi Performance with Map D Responses. 
 
What, if anything, could be changed or modified to increase the rating? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
3 I didn’t use the RTA/ETA figures at the bottom until close to the guidance end point and the 
graphical STBO guidance was parked there.  I must admit I did not notice (D) the selected 
traffic information. 
4 No 
7 Change color of my aircraft yellow – plus move close to time rings. 
8 (no answer) 
11 Nothing! 
12 (no answer) 
15 Too much heads down especially in busy airport scenario. 
16 I think maybe a flashing GS readout if excess GS is maintained for a certain period of time. 
19 How about using known symbols for speed and thrust vector.  Added bar above/below wing 
symbol.  I just don’t think pilot wants to use HUD during low vis taxi! 
20 (no answer) 
23 Give pilots capability to move EFB more to the center of view (attached to swingable arm). 
24 Yes easy to tell, no touch to manage.  I think you should eliminate the turn speed correction for 
one.  Its easy to catch up but hard to slow down.  I’m honestly not sure what we are trying to 
achieve here.  All it takes is one hold short of – for traffic entering/exiting ramp to really muck 
this up, and I don’t see any real deconfliction of traffic like the above left secenario which we 
need.  We still don’t know who is supposed to go first at intersection as both jets chase the puck 
with the circle. 
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36. Refer to the items labeled (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F) on the figures above.  Please rate the usefulness of 
each item in helping you to meet the RTA.    1 = Not Useful;  7 = Very Useful 
 
 
Figure J.29.  Map D Symbology Usefulness for Meeting RTA Responses. 
 
Table J.7.  ANOVA Statistics for Map D Symbology Usefulness for Meeting RTA. 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
STBO_ELEMENTS Sphericity Assumed 
67745.500 5 13549.100 .988 .434 
Greenhouse-Geisser 67745.500 1.000 67734.644 .988 .342 
Huynh-Feldt 67745.500 1.000 67731.388 .988 .342 
Lower-bound 67745.500 1.000 67745.500 .988 .342 
Error(STBO_ELEMENTS) Sphericity Assumed 
754393.833 55 13716.252 
  
Greenhouse-Geisser 754393.833 11.002 68570.268   
Huynh-Feldt 754393.833 11.002 68566.971   
Lower-bound 754393.833 11.000 68581.258   
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What, if anything, could be changed or modified to increase the rating? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
3 See #35. 
4 (no answer) 
7 Increase turn speed to 9 or 10 kts. 
8 (no answer) 
11 Taxi speed on turns is not realistic and needs to be changed. 
12 (no answer) 
15 (no answer) 
16 Nothing. 
19 Use status bar on magenta line to replace forecast position instead of white circle.  E.g., Push 
power and see progress color move to green ball. 
20 (no answer) 
23 None. 
24 I love the routing – for us and other traffic < max useful.  Several times I selected moving 
targets and got no path.  Not helpful. 
 
37. Refer to the item labeled (D) on the figure above.  Rate the usefulness of the selected traffic information in 
determining the intent of that aircraft.  1 = Not Useful;  7 = Very Useful  
 
 
Figure J.30.  Map D Selected Traffic Usefulness Responses. 
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What information could be added or deleted to enhance the quality and value of the selected traffic information 
(item D)? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
3 I preferred the graphical (E) traffic intent. 
4 (no answer) 
7 Time to cross my track. 
8 (no answer) 
11 (no answer) 
12 (no answer) 
15 We are not ATC and not our job to sort sequencing. 
16 Nothing. 
19 None. 
20 (no answer) 
23 The route depiction is much more useful. 
24 If you have data and he’s taxiing give us his path. 
 
38. Refer to the item labeled (E) on the figure above.  Rate the usefulness of the traffic graphical intent 
information (traffic taxi route and guidance circles) in determining the intent of that aircraft.                        
1 = Not Useful;  7 = Very Useful  
 
 
Figure J.31.  Map D Traffic Graphical Intent Usefulness Responses. 
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What information could be added or deleted to enhance the quality and value of the graphical intent information 
(item E)? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
3 N/A – Very useful for deconfliction. 
4 (no answer) 
7 Speed. 
8 Predicted path isn’t necessarily actual. 
11 Nothing! 
12 (no answer) 
15 Knowing potential conflict good.  Sequencing not useful. 
16 Maybe a CPA symbol (CPA = closest point of approach). 
19 None. 
20 (no answer) 
23 None. 
24 Route – very helpful.  Guidance circles – what is it telling me? 
 
39. The traffic intent information was useful in identifying traffic conflict situations.                                           
1 = Not Useful;  7 = Very Useful 
 
 
Figure J.32.  Map D Traffic Intent Usefulness in Identifying Conflicts Responses. 
 
How may the traffic intent information be improved to increase traffic conflict situation identification? 
 
Subject Suggested Changes 
3 N/A 
4 (no answer) 
7 Warning a little sooner. 
8 (no answer) 
11 (no answer) 
12 Make traffic behind you more prevolent. 
15 Same as #38. 
16 Change color if aircraft doesn’t follow it. 
19 N/A not sure. 
20 (no answer) 
23 Changes color when a “caution”.  Changes color when a “warning”. 
24 Maybe with more use we could learn to use it but today it ??enied ineffective. 
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CD&R Symbology 
 
 
 
          Traffic Indication            Runway Status Indication 
 
 
 
             Caution Alert     Warning Alert 
 
Figure J.33.  Indication and Alerting Symbology. 
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40. How effective was the CD&R symbology in providing information on the conflict traffic?.                                           
1 = Minimal;  7 = Substantially 
 
 
Figure J.34.  CD&R Symbology Effectiveness. 
 
 
41. The CD&R symbology provided a clear indication of the relative location of the conflict traffic.                                           
1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree  
 
 
Figure J.35.  CD&R Symbology Identified Conflict Traffic Location. 
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42. I received Indications during the experiment.    (Yes, No, Don’t Know) 
 
Yes No Don’t Know 
23 1 0 
 
If you did receive indications: 
 
A.  I found Indications helpful in determining critical runway safety information.                                               
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.36.  Indications Helpful in Determining Critical Runway Safety Information. 
 
B. Indications provided additional information over surface map traffic.                                                             
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.37.  Indications Provided Additional Information Over AMM Traffic. 
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C. Indications helped me in determining the location and movement of traffic that was relevant to the safety of 
my own aircraft.   1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree  
 
 
Figure J.38.  Indications Helped Determine Location and Movement of Traffic. 
Please provide any comments regarding Indications. 
Subject Suggestions 
1 Color change of symbology is essential. 
2 The one we got was off scale and hard to notice with other duties (confirming taxi route 
compliance, checklist performance (causing loss of moving map), and other ground taxi duties 
we didn’t perform in sim (calling F/AS, departure PA, etc.)  Have an aural alert for runway 
status indication. 
3 Very helpful. 
4 (no answer) 
5 (no answer) 
6 (no answer) 
7 Change color to yellow – pulse. 
8 (no answer) 
9 (no answer) 
10 (no answer) 
11 (no answer) 
12 Except overtaking from behind. 
13 (no answer) 
14 (no answer) 
15 (no answer) 
16 (no answer) 
17 (no answer) 
18 Solid circle is good, but maybe it could blink a few times! 
19 (no answer) 
20 (no answer) 
21 I really liked this info the most as it was visually easy to make conflict stand out!  As a pilot, I 
want all available information, but want it in a form I can decipher quickly.  I think it meets 
this requirement nicely! 
22 A lot more training and experience with the system would be required before I felt 
comfortable using it. 
23 Very clear – easy and quick to understand. 
24 (no answer) 
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43. I received Alerts during the experiment.    (Yes, No, Don’t Know) 
 
Yes No Don’t Know 
23 1 0 
 
If you did receive alerts: 
 
A.  I found Alerts helpful in determining critical runway safety information.                                                       
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.39.  Alerts Helpful in Determining Critical Runway Safety Information. 
 
B. Alerts provided additional information over surface map traffic.                                                                      
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
Figure J.40.  Alerts Provided Additional Information Over AMM Traffic. 
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C. Alerts helped me in determining the location and movement of traffic that was relevant to the safety of my 
own aircraft.   1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree  
 
 
Figure J.41.  Alerts Helped Determine Location and Movement of Traffic. 
 
Please provide any comments regarding Alerts. 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 All good. 
2 (no answer) 
3 Very helpful in making a go-around/land decision. 
4 (no answer) 
5 (no answer) 
6 They were much more graphic (i.e. caught my attention to possible conflicts). 
7 Warning at ¾ mile. 
8 (no answer) 
9 (no answer) 
10 (no answer) 
11 Change chevron of conflicting aircraft to red! 
12 (no answer) 
13 (no answer) 
14 (no answer) 
15 Aural alerts needs to be unique and unambiguous. 
16 (no answer) 
17 Alerts could be a distration if intentionally taxiing too close to another. 
18 Excellent. 
19 (no answer) 
20 (no answer) 
21 Same as comments on #42 above. 
22 Still has areas of ambiguity that needs to be resolved. 
23 Excellent! 
24 (no answer) 
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Figure J.42.  Off-Scale Traffic Symbology. 
 
When an indication or alert occurred and the potential conflict traffic was not shown on the surface map at the 
current map scale, an off-scale traffic symbol was displayed. 
 
44. I viewed off-scale indication or alert symbology during the experiment.    (Yes, No, Don’t Know) 
 
Yes No Don’t Know 
21 2 1 
 
If you did view off-scale symbology: 
 
A.  How effective was the off-scale symbology in providing information on the conflict traffic?                        
1 = Minimal; 7 = Substantially 
 
 
Figure J.43.  Off-Scale Symbology Effectiveness. 
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B. This implementation provided a clear indication of the relative location of the conflict traffic.                             
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree  
 
 
Figure J.44.  Off-Scale Symbology Clearly Identified Location of Conflict Traffic. 
 
Recommendations for changes or improvements to display of off-scale traffic on the surface map. 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 Not enough experience with symbology to quickly decipher what it is trying to tell me. 
2 If causes a conflict alert, caution or warning, have moving map scale change. 
3 Only saw it once, and didn’t really find it useful. 
4 (no answer) 
5 (no answer) 
6 None. 
7 Have language say “off-scale”. 
8 Works – not great – but…. 
9 (no answer) 
10 (no answer) 
11 (no answer) 
12 (no answer) 
13 Depending on workload it is difficult to focus head down to determine if a threat or not. 
14 See #7.  Your aircraft should be in center of screen. 
15 (no answer) 
16 None. 
17 Automatic AMM range change to include actual position of “off-scale traffic”. 
18 Works well. 
19 (no answer) 
20 (no answer) 
21 Same as #42 and #43 comments above. 
22 This feature is fine. 
23 The current display is sufficient. 
24 One situation with us cleared traffic cross runway with traffic on t/o roll.  I was immediately 
alerted with a/c vector and speed then got blue runway and even though didn’t have a/c 
symbol the info we got saved us! 
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45. When an indication or alert occurs and the potential conflict traffic is not shown on the map at the current 
map scale, would you prefer the map to auto-zoom to a scale that shows the traffic symbol.                     
(Yes, No, Don’t Know) 
 
Yes No Don’t Know 
15 6 3 
 
46. The CD&R system was effectively integrated with the STBO display concepts.                                               
(1 = Strongly Disagree;  7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
 
Figure J.45.  CD&R System Effectively Integrated with STBO Concept. 
 
47. If you received any CD&R during STBO, please answer the following: 
Rate your subjective estimate of the effectiveness of the CD&R during STBO.                                               
(1 = Minimal;  7 = Substantially)  
 
 
Figure J.46.  CD&R Effectiveness During STBO. 
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48. Please provide any comments that may help improve the quality of the CD&R, or the STBO, or better 
jointly implement both technologies. 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 As mentioned previously, bigger bubbles for cautions/alerts and graphic displays of their 
intended taxi routes. 
2 What we saw was not bad but at airports with tons of ground traffic, I can see the display getting 
very cluttered.  Somehow need to declutter.  Maybe declutter aircraft heading away from you. 
3 Did not see the integration of the two systems during our session. 
4 (no answer) 
5 See previous runway crossing situation comments 
6 The integration worked well.  My lack of experience (with the system) may have made it difficult 
to see how both work together. 
7 1) Approach – able to slew so you can see if a/c is conflicting.  2) Aircraft chevron symbol needs 
to change size as scale.  It is huge as you scale down.  3)Taxi a/c, yellow closer to time rings.  4) 
ADV speed on HUD in center R7 or left.  5) Need time to check airport charts before taxi even if 
you have taxi magenta laid out. 
8 (no answer) 
9 As mentioned earlier, I was not confident in the capability of the system to identify all potential 
taxi conflicts. 
10 Not enough warning time during taxi ops. 
11 Symbology arrows (chevrons) should be smaller and color coded for threat level, like TCAS.  
HUD didn’t do anything but add a distraction to taxiing. 
12 (no answer) 
13 Airliners do not turn that slow.  Put the + or – time on the HUD.  Show a trajectory of other 
aircraft that may conflict with you.  Something like speed trend vector. 
14 1) STBO and CD&R – As before, your aircraft should be in the center of the screen.  2) CD&R – 
Excellent tool.  Best part of test today.  Good display, good audio.  Keep it like TCAS, because 
we’re trained to that already.  Must be similar.  3) STBO – Nominally effective unless all aircraft 
and vehicles have capability to be displayed.  4) Keep task loading to a minimum!  Risk 
management! 
15 We saw it before the indication.  If the vis is so low as not to see it first, then too many aircraft 
were moving without ATC intervention. 
16 (no answer) 
17 (no answer) 
18 These systems greatly enhance our safety within the airport area.  Would like to see them on the 
line as soon as possible! 
19 (no answer) 
20 (no answer) 
21 Well, on the one hand, you have this ETA that we are tasked with making, then on the other you 
had a few conflicts.  This needs to be addressed, to ATC, would likely modify your time, since 
there will be many variables to the new equation, if both a/c stop for example, there has to be a 
way to resolve this quickly, otherwise, a snowball of enormous proportions will start to build, 
affecting more and more a/c at very busy times of day.  With what we were given, I didn't see 
resolutions to these potential problems. 
22 STBO needs to account for the a/c size and weight.  Large a/c such as the 747 must consistantly 
manage their energy and momentum.  Directing a 747 at gross weight to maintain a set speed in 
a turn may not be possible.  In addition, brake and tire overheating can result at gross weight if 
trying to maintain an STBO directed speed. 
23 Integrate with HUD as much as possible.  Integrate into wearable glasses to be used for ground 
operations.  Integrate cautions and warnings onto PFD. 
24 In one scenario we were pos and hold for a long time.  The off scale symbol for a/c behind us 
actually displayed on the screen to our left.  Which just happended to line the syumbol up with a 
parallel runway.  (Note: in reality the aircraft was actually going to the parallel runway)  We 
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were very nervous because we didn't know if we had an a/c about to land on us or if it was a 
nuisance warning from the parallel to our left.  When our runway turned blue, the excitement 
really escallated.  Too bad we stopped the run because I would love to know what to do when 
you think you are going to get hit but don't have t/o clearance. 
 
49. Please provide any additional comments that will help us in our evaluation and development of the 
concepts you saw today. 
 
Subject Suggestions 
1 (no answer) 
2 1- Sometimes we were cleared to taxi on a route that crosses a runway (off duty).  FARs changed 
a few years ago that require verbal clearance to cross a runway whether not in use or even 
closed.  Recommend incorporation of this into pre-recorded taxi clearances.  2- The aircraft that 
took off in front of us never received an audio clearance to take off.  This is a problem for 2 
reasons. A) You think you are on the wrong frequency and become distracted with checking the 
proper frequency.  B)  The verbal T/O clearance the aircraft in front of you receives is a "cue" 
for us to be ready to take the runway.  Recommend you incorporate this audio in your pre-
recorded audio messages. 
3 I do like the expanding scale idea, as well as more deconfliction info during the STBO guidance 
phase, up to and including "stop"guidance. 
4 (no answer) 
5 (no answer) 
6 Overall my perceptions of the technology presented was enhancing to the user by improving 
information given to avoid potential rwy/taxi conflicts.  As a first time user, it was not a difficult 
system to quickly understand for use.  The system would be very beneficial at major airports. 
7 1) HUD could provide guidance - like google maps in 300 ft 90 degree right turn with distance 
tracking down to turn.  2) Aural notice "100 ft turn right" or "half right"  or "45 degree right" for 
example with ability to turn arual off when you are 100%. 
8 This is certainly an improvement over our current environment. We have pilots that are 
predominantly extremely experienced. I would be interested to see inexperienced pilots 
performance 
9 You have developed a great system.  For it to be most effective: 1) all traffic needs to be 
displayed in some form,  2) STBO needs to become less labor intensive for the captain,  3) 
ground conflicts need to be displayed with higher reliability. 
10 I like the technology…  Only the time taxi is overly intrusive. 
11 I like this a lot and hope it gets implemented in the not too far future! 
12 I like the equipment but it adds to the workload.  I found myself inside the cockpit more than 
usual. 
13 (no answer) 
14 Too much orientation time for pilots who have never flown a B757/767 advanced 737 model.  I 
would recommend that be specified in the online application. 
15 1) Excellent tools and concepts.  Must consider ATC interactions with procedures.  These tools 
must be global applicability not just US centric.  2) The more uncertainty in targets in flight or 
ground, the increased work load for pilots.  3) Ground taxi performance and fidelity unrealistic.  
Light weight aircraft need less power/more braking to maintain speeds, heavier ones much more 
power.  End result - more fuel/wear tear, increased hazard to unreliability with traffic 
deconfliction and heads down time for ATC efficiency??? Not a good trade-off. 
16 Auto-zoom for off scale and maybe aural tones to get our attention of conflicts.  Great product so 
far. 
17 HUD information is a substantial increase in SA concerning STBO. 
18 System is excellent.  Training will be paramount.  Once up and running, safety will definitely be 
enhanced.  The text feature is needed now.  Anything we can do to cut down on radio calls is a 
plus.  Thank you for letting me praticipate in this study.  Good luck going forward and I look 
forward to using these wonderful tools on the line! 
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19 As PIC, I found taxi guidance to be a distraction and tempted me to follow the line instead of 
knowing my position on the field.  I worry about complacency and not seeing the threat directly 
out the window.  Procedures would require an aural annunciation when deviating from taxi 
instructions because of workload during normal taxi out.  My humble opinion. 
20 (no answer) 
21 Very good and usable system to enhance safety and SA!!  Watching throughout my career things 
like; flight data recorders, TCAS, CPDLC, GPWS, then EGPWS, Wx avoidance, surface radar, 
etc… etc… develop and then become a normal piece of everyday equipment, I think that the 
system presented here today adds an incredibly better dose of situational awareness to the flight 
deck.  As stated earlier, as an operating crew memeber, I want as much information as I can get 
to make for a SAFER OPERATION.  But it of course needs to come in a form thats easily usable 
to avoid info overload.  That said, the use of this system met these goals with some minor 
changes and would definitely enhance SA and avoid conflicts.  But I do use this as back-up to 
human interaction making final decisions.  The concept is great and puts another tool in my box! 
22 Airline operations departments should be involved in the testing.  Some airlines will likely 
oppose being assigned a set taxi time and speed.  Some carriers are known to taxi very fast, 
while others taxi much slower.  Having a fast moving Southwest jet taxi with STBO, while 
coordinating with a very slow moving foreign carrier - 747 at ORD would likely create problems 
with this system.  Also some airports like ANC have inclines on the taxiway which would make 
maintaining a set speed nearly impossible without creating a hazard from the jet blast behind the 
a/c. 
23 Less is better - the less distracting information flow to the pilots - the better.  Heads up during 
T/O, approach, and ground operations is critical.  Heads up display/goggles or voice information 
is excellent! 
24 Also we took off over an a/c with a midfield incursion.  I saw him hold short with approximately 
3-4 other a/c symbols all nosed on our runway.  Its unnerving and distracting to watch all these 
symbols wondering if they are going to poke their nose on.  As you watch engine performance 
and call V speeds I thought I saw him start to move on the screen but he was 3-4 K feet down the 
runway.  I'm wondering about range accuracy, resolution, his position accuracy and if he really is 
moving.  In the mean time, I get him out the window rolling on to our runway with no alert or 
warning and we early rotate the aircraft to try and clear him.  Not many war fuzzies there.  
Overall its a great idea.  Still lots of gotchas in a system that could easily lull an unsuspecting 
crew into thinking they were safe.  I noticed every time I went away from moving map, my SA 
on our position and that of traffic went to almost zero. 
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